| Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan | |
| Author: | Michael T. Flynn Matthew Pottinger Paul D. Batchelor |
| Publisher: | Center for a New American Security |
| Pub Date: | January 2010 |
| Pages: | 26 |
Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan was a report published by the Washington D.C. based think tank Center for a New American Security that examined the role and relevance of the U.S. intelligence community in ongoing counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan and recommended a reform of intelligence-gathering and analytical efforts. The 26-page long report was authored by Lieutenant General Michael T. Flynn, at the time a senior intelligence officer in Afghanistan, Captain Matthew Pottinger, a Marine Corps officer and Flynn aide, and Defense Intelligence Agency adviser Paul D. Batchelor.
The report argues that the United States has placed the focus of much of its intelligence resources on militant groups in the region and too little on the country of Afghanistan as a whole and the people itself creating an environment in which the U.S. is unable to adequately conduct the war.[1]
Fixing Intel was written in 2009 and draws off the personal experiences of the authors as well as interviews with hundreds of people both within and outside of the intelligence community. The report is meant to address fundamental problems in how the United States pursues intelligence-gathering in the War in Afghanistan and offers a critique, as well as a litany of recommendations on how the intelligence community operates. Notably, it casts doubt on the effectiveness of American intelligence assets that place the brunt of their focus on studying and observing various insurgent groups while remaining unacquainted with local economics, powerbrokers, and the relationships between various villages and ethnic groups and the government. The report was aimed at informing U.S. military commanders and intelligence officials on the inability to "answer fundamental questions about the environment in which we operate and the people we are trying to protect and persuade."[2] [3]
The report labels U.S. intelligence efforts in Afghanistan as "token and ineffective." One of the major criticisms is the lack of sufficient and effective analysts as well as the absence of guidance from commanders to their intelligence subordinates. The absence of effectual reporting channels inhibits the ability of intelligence-gatherers to report their findings to the appropriate levels. In addition, the United States places an overemphasis on tracking and researching militants while disregarding "population-centric information" such as the productiveness of local contractors, or the state of a heavily trafficked roadways. General Stanley McChrystal stated, "Our senior leaders – the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, Congress, the President of the United States – are not getting the right information to make decisions with ... The media is driving the issues. We need to build a process from the sensor all the way to the political decision makers."[3]
Despite its rebuke of coalition efforts, the report was endorsed by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates who called it "brilliant" and "spot on," though he held reservations about the fact that it was published through a private think tank.[7]
James Philips, a senior fellow at The Heritage Foundation said, "I think it was a valid criticism and I think it's a long-overdue effort to reform intelligence gathering and set things right."[8]