Defense of the Revolution explained

Unit Name:	Defense of the Revolution
Dates:	1978–1980
Country:	Afghanistan
Branch:	People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA)
Type:	Paramilitary
Role:	Anti-tank warfare Counter-revolutionary Counterinsurgency Counterintelligence Covert operation Desert warfare Force protection HUMINT Internal security Raiding Reconnaissance Tracking
Size:	20,000 men (at height)
Garrison:	Kabul
Garrison Label:	Headquarters
Nickname:	DotR, CDR, NODR
Battles:	Soviet–Afghan War

Defense of the Revolution was a generic term employed to designate the irregular paramilitary or popular militia units created by the Communist government of Afghanistan following the 1978 Saur Revolution, with the intent of mobilizing the population against counter-revolutionary and other enemies of the new state. These units were officially volunteer, and based on the "Cuban model";^[1] they were armed by the government and employed to guard sensitive infrastructure and maintain public order.^[2] Some reports indicate volunteers received incentives such as coupons for government stores.^[3] Editorials in the Soviet journal Pravda praised these defensive formations as early as mid-1979.^[4]

Bruce Amstutz documents DotR units composed of teenage urban males, numbering 20,000 on paper by the mid-1980s, who received US$162 per month for supporting the security forces.^[5] Other academics have commented on the female members of DotR units.^[6]

Early organization

Hafizullah Amin, the General Secretary of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), had established in 1978 the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution – CDR, later reorganized into the National Organization for the Defense of the Revolution – NODR. Despite extensive coverage in Afghan media, all mention of the NODR disappeared following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979.

Amin was assassinated in the takeover, and the core staff who had developed the CDR and NODR were arrested and executed or simply disappeared. Anthony Arnold suggests that the Soviets considered a loosely accountable body of irregular armed groups to be undesirable during their occupation.^[7]

See also

• Sarandoy

Bibliography

• Antonio Giustozzi, War, Politics and Society in Afghanistan, 1978-1992, Georgetown University Press 2000., 0878407588
• Edgar O'Ballance, Afghan Wars, Battles in a hostile land - 1839 to the present, Brassey's, London 1993 (revised edition 2002).
• David Isby and Ron Volstad, Russia's War in Afghanistan, Men-at-arms series 178, Osprey Publishing Ltd, London 1986.
• Ken Guest, Afghanistan, in Flashpoint! At the Front Line of Today’s Wars, Arms and Armour Press, London 1994, pp. 9-37.
• Mark Urban, War in Afghanistan, Palgrave Macmillan, London 1988., 0333432649

Notes and References

1. Book: World Affairs Report. 1981. California Institute of International Studies.. 97.
2. Book: Julie Billaud. Kabul Carnival: Gender Politics in Postwar Afghanistan. 18 March 2015. University of Pennsylvania Press. 978-0-8122-4696-4. 219–.
3. Book: Myron Weiner. Ali Banuazizi. The Politics of Social Transformation in Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan. registration. 1994. Syracuse University Press. 978-0-8156-2609-1. 226–.
4. Book: William Ben Hunt. Getting to War: Predicting International Conflict with Mass Media Indicators. 31 December 1996. University of Michigan Press. 0-472-10751-8. 104–.
5. Book: J. Bruce Amstutz. Afghanistan: The First Five Years of Soviet Occupation. 1 July 1994. DIANE Publishing. 978-0-7881-1111-2. 189–.
6. Book: Mary Ann Tétreault. Women and Revolution in Africa, Asia, and the New World. 1994. Univ of South Carolina Press. 978-1-57003-016-1. 227–.
7. Book: Anthony Arnold. Afghanistan's Two-Party Communism: Parcham and Khalq. 1983 . Hoover Press. 978-0-8179-7793-1. 95–.