Debate on the Chineseness of the Yuan and Qing dynasties explained

The debate on the "Chineseness" of the Yuan and Qing dynasties is concerned with whether the Mongol-led Yuan dynasty (1271–1368) and the Manchu-led Qing dynasty (1644–1912) can be considered "Chinese dynasties", and whether they were representative of "China" during their respective historical periods. The debate, although historiographical in nature, has political implications. Mainstream academia and successive governments of China, including the imperial governments of the Yuan and Qing dynasties, have maintained the view that they were "Chinese" and representative of "China".[1] [2] [3] The debate stemmed from differing opinions on whether regimes founded by ethnic minorities could be representative of "China", where the Han Chinese were and remain the main people.

Modern nationalism cannot be applied to the interpretation of pre-modern historical periods because "China" was not the concept of a nation state but more of a cultural identity with territorial and ruling class flexibility until the late 19th century. A pre-modern foreign state ruling over another territory and ethnicity was localized during its existence did not exist only in China, an example is the Normans conquering England of the Anglo-Saxons in 1066 with their dynasty becoming a legitimate English one and later the Norman settlers becoming assimilated by native people. There occurred ethnic discrimination against Han Chinese and preference for the ruling ethnicity in the two dynasties, especially in the Yuan dynasty; however both dynasties were multi-ethnic and multi-cultural empires, and both also had significant sinicization, heavily in the Qing dynasty. Their capitals were also located in China proper. Unlike the Yuan dynasty, the Qing dynasty referred consistently to all Qing subjects regardless of ethnicity as "Chinese",[4] and the Qing was widely recognized as "China" (or the Chinese Empire) by the international community with treaties and modern diplomacy during its period. In 1909, the Qing dynasty enacted the Chinese nationality law. The Mongols and Manchus have also been recognized by modern Chinese states since 1912.

Background

Origin and development

The debate emerged following the 1868 Meiji Restoration in Japan. In their attempt to rationalize the debate, some Japanese scholars deliberately conflated the concepts of "China" and "China proper", in the process diminishing the scope of the former. The position that the Yuan and Qing dynasties were "non-Chinese" was later adopted by some late-Qing anti-Manchu revolutionaries who had lived in Japan. Zhang Binglin, for instance, in a work titled On the Chinese Republic (Chinese: 中華民國解), proposed that a potential Chinese republican state to be founded in the event of a Qing collapse should only comprise regions influenced by Han culture, and that non-Han regions were outside of "China".[5]

Furthermore, to serve Japanese political agenda, some Japanese academics and politicians like Yano Jinichi and Ishiwara Kanji made a distinction between "China" and the "Qing dynasty"; and separated Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, and Outer Mongolia from the territorial scope of "China" in their rhetoric to justify the Continental Policy and the Japanese invasion of China.[6] [7] [8] [9]

Political significance

Whereas there were many regimes in Chinese history that were ruled by non-Han Chinese ethnicities, the Yuan and Qing dynasties were the only two that ultimately achieved the unification of China proper. The Qing dynasty, in particular, is noted for having laid the foundation for the modern-day territories and legal ethnic diversity of China, and it was also the first Chinese state to use the name "China" in international treaties (starting with the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk with Russia) and gradually transform China into a modern nation-state under the Westphalian sovereignty by the end of the 19th century. Both the People's Republic of China (Mainland China) and the Republic of China (Taiwan) base their constitutional territorial claims on those of the Qing dynasty, in accordance with the succession of states theory. Both polities have always officially denied that the Yuan and Qing dynasties were foreign dynasties; including the first (provisional) president of the Republic of China Sun Yat-sen, who changed his stance from Han chauvinism to Chinese nationalism with the Han people as the center by embracing a multi-ethnic China because he saw the great risk of establishing a Han Chinese nation-state. Denying the "Chineseness" of the Yuan and Qing dynasties threatens legal basis for the territorial integrity of contemporary China and solidarity between Chinese peoples (especially in Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Tibet, Manchuria, and Taiwan), and causes serious damage to the reputation of Chinese history by interpreting China as a "colony" rather than as a nation that assimilated its conquerors. To protect Chinese national and traditional historiographical interests, Chinese historians and governments have rejected the opinion that the Yuan and Qing dynasties were "non-Chinese".[1] [2] [3]

Opposing positions

Yuan and Qing as "non-Chinese" dynasties

Theory on the non-Chineseness of the Yuan and Qing dynasties
T:元清非中國論
S:元清非中国论
L:Theory on the non-Chineseness of the Yuan and Qing
P:Yuán Qīng fēi Zhōngguó lùn
T2:滿蒙非中國論
S2:满蒙非中国论
L2:Theory on the non-Chineseness of the Manchus and Mongols
P2:Mǎn Měng fēi Zhōngguó lùn

Proponents of the view that the Yuan and Qing dynasties were "non-Chinese" or "foreign" generally equate "Chinese people" with the Han ethnicity, and "China" with the Han-dominated region of China proper. Emphasis is often given to the fact that both regimes and those who founded them did not originate from the Central Plains, the cradle of Han civilization and the heartland of the Han people. Furthermore, the rulers were ethnically not Han Chinese. The dominant Han people traditionally considered non-Han peoples "barbarians", according to the HuaYi dichotomy. Thus, during these periods "China" should be perceived as a "colony" of the Mongols and Manchus respectively.[10] By extension, the lands controlled by the Yuan and Qing dynasties, particularly those inhabited by significant non-Han populations, should not be regarded as historical Chinese territories.[11] [12]

Currently, the position is supported by the Central Tibetan Administration, Uyghur separatists, Mongolian nationalists, the extreme part of Han Chinese nationalists, some Western scholars, most of the anti-Chinese movements, and far-right Japanese historians.[11] [12] [13] [14] [15]

Some scholars prefer to view the Yuan and Qing dynasties differently. While the Yuan dynasty was officially named "Great Yuan" (Chinese: 大元), in the Mongolian language, "", a borrowing from the Chinese name, was often used in conjunction with "" ("Great Mongol State"), which resulted in the form "Mongolian: Dai Ön Yeqe Mongɣul Ulus" (Chinese: 大元大蒙古國; "Great Yuan–Great Mongol State")[16] or Mongolian: Dai Ön qemeqü Yeqe Mongɣol Ulus ("Great Mongol State called Great Yuan").[17] Scholars arguing that the Yuan dynasty was "non-Chinese" point to the use of the term "Yeqe Mongɣul Ulus" as indicative of the "non-Chinese" self-conception of the Yuan rulers.[18] On the other hand, while the Qing dynasty was officially named "Great Qing" (Chinese: 大清), its rulers expanded the definition of Zhongguo (China) and used the term to refer to the entire empire.[19] Traditional Tibetan records also appeared to view the two dynasties differently. While Tibet had been controlled by both the Yuan and Qing dynasties, the Yuan rulers were seen as exclusively Mongol by some Tibetan subjects, but Tibetan subjects traditionally perceived the Qing monarchs as "Chinese" and referred to its rulers using the title "Emperor of China" or "Chinese Emperor" (rgya nag gong ma).[20] For example, in the Treaty of Thapathali of 1856 both Tibetans and Nepalese agreed to "regard the Chinese Emperor as heretofore with respect, in accordance with what has been written".[21]

Yuan and Qing as "Chinese" dynasties

Scholars who uphold the view that both dynasties were "Chinese" find fault with the opposing group's narrow conception of "China" and "Chinese" in cultural, ethnic, and political terms. These scholars posit that "China" and "Chinese" should be best understood as multicultural and multiethnic concepts that transcend the ideological boundaries of contemporary ethnic nationalism. Liang Qichao, for instance, argued that "macro-nationalism" (Chinese: 大民族主義) with its emphasis on a multicultural and multiethnic China could best explain the historical trajectories of China, as opposed to "micro-nationalism" (Chinese: 小民族主義) that foregrounded the Han people at the expense of ethnic minorities.[22] These scholars also criticize the opposing group for retroactively applying modern-day ideologies and constructs such as ethnic nationalism to historical peoples and regimes, resulting in distorted narratives.

The imperial governments of the Yuan and Qing dynasties maintained the view that their regimes were orthodox dynasties of China. The Chineseness of both dynasties was also recognized politically and culturally by Sinosphere countries such as Vietnam and Korea when the two countries were their vassals. The view that both dynasties were "non-Chinese" is rejected by mainstream academia, as well as the governments of the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China.[1] [2] [3] The Historical Atlas of China, one of the most authoritative works on Chinese historical geography, considered both dynasties to be "Chinese" alongside other polities ruled by non-Han ethnicities. As part of their efforts to maintain Chinese historiographical tradition and make known the official position regarding the nature of the Yuan and Qing dynasties, the Republic of China has published the New History of Yuan, the Draft History of Qing, and the History of Qing; whereas the People's Republic of China has also commissioned its version of the History of Qing.

Yuan dynasty as "Chinese" dynasty

Kublai (Emperor Shizu of Yuan) referred to the Mongol Empire using the term Zhongguo, such as in the Ultimatum from the Mongol State issued to the Emperor Kameyama of Japan in 1266.[23] In 1271, Kublai issued the Edict on the Proclamation of the Dynastic Name, which formally claimed succession from prior Chinese regimes, from the Three Sovereigns and Five Emperors to the Tang dynasty, for the entire Mongol-ruled realm and equated the Mongol Empire with the Yuan dynasty.[24] [25] [26] [27] The edict of enthronement of Temür (Emperor Chengzong of Yuan) proclaimed that Temüjin (Genghis Khan) received the Mandate of Heaven and went on to "establish China (Quxia)"—a traditional Chinese expression referring to the founding of a Chinese dynasty.[28] As evident from the Chinese seal bestowed by Temür to Öljaitü of the Ilkhanate, seen in a letter by Öljaitü to Philip IV of France dated 1305, the Yuan dynasty officially saw itself as possessing the Mandate of Heaven in the traditional Chinese style.[29] Released in 1307 by Khayishan (Emperor Wuzong of Yuan), the edict establishing the Zhida era began with a statement celebrating the Yuan dynasty's "unification of China (Huaxia)".[30] During the reign of Toghon Temür (Emperor Huizong of Yuan), he commissioned the History of Liao, the History of Song, and the History of Jin—a policy in line with Chinese historiographical tradition which reflected the Yuan dynasty's self-conception as a legitimate successor state to the earlier Liao, Song, and Jin dynasties.[31] The History of Jin, in particular, defined Genghis Khan as a Chinese monarch, in the same vein as Liu Bang (Emperor Gao of Han) and Li Shimin (Emperor Taizong of Tang).[32] The Southern Song dynasty, before its eventual conquest by the Yuan dynasty, regarded the Yuan dynasty as the "northern dynasty" of a divided China.[33] Zhu Yuanzhang (Hongwu Emperor), who led a peasant rebellion against and eventually overthrew the Yuan dynasty, accepted the Yuan dynasty as an orthodox Chinese dynasty and ordered the compilation of the History of Yuan to reflect this view. He considered his Ming dynasty to be the legitimate successor of the Yuan dynasty.

Qing dynasty as "Chinese" dynasty

Emperors of the Qing dynasty officially equated their empire with "China" and adopted "Dulimbai Gurun", Manchu for "Zhongguo", as a name for the state. The Qing dynasty was formally conceived as a multiethnic empire and its emperors openly rejected the idea that "Chinese" and "China" only referred to the Han people and the lands that they populated, respectively. In 1711, Xuanye (Kangxi Emperor) publicly proclaimed that the Manchu homeland of Manchuria was part of the "land of China (Zhongguo)".[34] The Records of Great Righteousness Resolving Confusion issued by Yinzhen (Yongzheng Emperor) ridiculed and objected to narratives that depicted the Qing dynasty as "non-Chinese" and "foreign".[35] In official Qing parlance, "Chinese languages" (Dulimbai gurun-i bithe) included Mandarin, Manchu, and Mongolian; while "Chinese people" referred to all subjects of the Qing dynasty, regardless of their ethnicity. When the Qing dynasty annexed Dzungaria in 1759, it was officially proclaimed that the region was "absorbed into China (Dulimbai Gurun)" in a Manchu-language memorial. In addition, terms such as "China", the "Chinese Empire", and the "Empire of China" were used as synonyms for the Qing dynasty in international treaties.[36] [37] [38] For example, the Manchu-language version of the Convention of Kyakhta signed in 1768 with the Russian Empire referred to subjects of the Qing dynasty as "people from the Central Kingdom (Dulimbai Gurun)". While the Qing dynasty gradually gave up Sinocentrism and the tributary system to follow modern Western diplomacy and the legalization of its existing borders under international law by the late 19th century, it signed a series of treaties with other countries which consistently referred to Qing rulers as the "Emperor of China" and his administration as the "Government of China".[39]

Likewise, the Manchu–Mongolian–Chinese Interlinear Trilingual Textbook published by the Qing imperial government also referred to the Qing dynasty as "China" (Zhongguo) and claimed the empire as part of the 5000-year-old Chinese civilization.[40] Like its Yuan predecessor, the Qing dynasty also composed the History of Ming to reflect its position as the orthodox successor to the Ming dynasty. A manifestation of the Qing dynasty's self-conception as a legitimate dynasty of China, Qing emperors periodically carried out imperial worships at the Temple of Monarchs of Successive Dynasties in Beijing, where the spiritual tablets of earlier Chinese rulers and officials of both Han and non-Han ethnic origins, including those of the Mongol Empire and Yuan dynasty, were situated. In deciding the list of worshipped individuals, Hongli (Qianlong Emperor) promoted the idea that the "succession of Chinese (Zhonghua) monarchs" should be understood as an "unbroken lineage reminiscent of a thread", regardless of the ethnicity of the rulers.[41] [42] During the Preparative Constitutionalism in the early 20th century, the Qing government recognized the existence of 5 main ethnicities in China at the time (Han Chinese, Manchus, Tibetans, Muslim, and Mongols),[43] [44] echoing a similar pronouncement of China's multiethnic character by the Qianlong Emperor in 1755.[45] In the 1911 Revolution between republicans and the Qing dynasty, the court accepted defeat and the Empress Dowager Longyu issued in 1912 the Imperial Edict of the Abdication of the Qing Emperor in the name of Puyi (Xuantong Emperor), which provided the legal basis for the Republic of China to inherit all Qing territories and be considered as the sole rightful successor to the Qing dynasty, while simultaneously reaffirming that both the Manchus and Mongols belonged to the Chinese nation.[46] [47] [48] [49] Recognition of the Mongols and Manchus has continued under the People's Republic of China.

See also

References

Works cited

Notes and References

  1. 葉碧苓《九一八事變後中國史學界對日本「滿蒙論」之駁斥—以〈東北史綱〉第一卷為中心之探討》,〈國史館學術集刊〉第11期,2007-03-01,第105-142頁
  2. 方修琦,萧凌波,魏柱灯《8~19世纪之交华北平原气候转冷的社会影响及其发生机制》,〈中国科学〉第43卷第5期,2013年
  3. Web site: 黃克武 . 「 中國本部 ―― 邊疆 」 的語彙轉變與國家形構. 2018-07-31 . https://web.archive.org/web/20180731093159/http://www.mh.sinica.edu.tw/gs/download/plan1/%E9%BB%83%E5%85%8B%E6%AD%A6_%E3%80%8C%E4%B8%AD%E5%9C%8B%E6%9C%AC%E9%83%A8%E2%80%95%E2%80%95%E9%82%8A%E7%96%86%E3%80%8D%E7%9A%84%E8%AA%9E%E5%BD%99%E8%BD%89%E8%AE%8A%E8%88%87%E5%9C%8B%E5%AE%B6%E5%BD%A2%E6%A7%8B.pdf . 2018-07-31 . live .
  4. Book: Barabantseva, Elena . Overseas Chinese, Ethnic Minorities and Nationalism . 2010 . Taylor & Francis . 74 . 9781136927355 .
  5. Book: Zhang. Binglin. 中華民國解 [On the Chinese Republic]]. 1907. 中國以先漢郡縣為界,而其民謂之華民。[…]故以中華民國之經界言之,越南、朝鮮二郡必當恢復者也;緬甸一司則稍次也;西藏、回部、蒙古三荒服則任其去來也。.
  6. Book: Ge. Zhaoguang. 宅兹中国:重建有关"中国"的历史论述. 2011. 252–253.
  7. Ge. Zhaoguang. 2005. 重建關於「中國」的歷史論述──從民族國家中拯救歷史,還是在歷史中理解民族國家?. 二十一世紀. 43. 23 June 2022.
  8. Chen. Bo. 2016. 日本明治时代的中国本部概念. 学术月刊. 7. 23 June 2022.
  9. Ye. Biling. 2007. 九一八事變後中國史學界對日本「滿蒙論」之駁斥──以《東北史綱》第一卷為中心之探討. 國史館學術集刊. 11. 105–142. 23 June 2022.
  10. Web site: 蒙元滿清:科舉制度導致中國歷史上兩次亡國. 曾節明. 共識網. 2014-11-09 . dead . https://web.archive.org/web/20180406231036/http://culture.dwnews.com/history/big5/news/2014-11-09/59617649.html. 2018-04-06. 2018-04-06.
  11. Molly Lortie, 歷史不是站在中國這邊的;藏人行政中央:西藏從來就不是中國的一部分, Tibet Post International, 2015
  12. http://news.bbc.co.uk/chinese/trad/hi/newsid_1340000/newsid_1346900/1346944.stm 歷史檔案:西藏五十年
  13. Book: Tangritagh. Hür. 東突厥斯坦:維吾爾人的真實世界. 2016. 前衛出版社 . 9789578018075.
  14. 杨芳洲,民族主义只能对外不能对内
  15. James Leibold. Han cybernationalism and state territorialization in the People's Republic of China. China Information. 2016. 30. 1. 3–28. 10.1177/0920203X16631921 . 147437123 . free.
  16. Book: The Early Mongols Language, Culture and History . Studies in Honor of Igor de Rachewiltz on the Occasion of his 80th Birthday . Volker Rybatzki . Alessandra Pozzi . Peter W. Geier . John R. Krueger . 9780933070578 . Indiana University Press . 2009 . 116.
  17. 陈得芝 . 2009 . 关于元朝的国号、年代与疆域问题 . 北方民族大学学报 . 87 . 3.
  18. Hodong Kim . 2015 . Was 'da Yuan' a Chinese Dynasty? . Journal of Song-Yuan Studies . 45.
  19. Joseph Esherick, "Empire to Nation: Historical Perspectives on the Making of the Modern World", Page 232.
  20. Santa Barbara, "A Union of Religion and Politics: The Tibetan Regency of Ngawang Tsültrim", Page 4, 18
  21. Book: Husain, Asad. British India's Relations with the Kingdom of Nepal, 1857–1947. Taylor & Francis. 2023. 9781000855562. 380.
  22. Book: Zheng. Huanzhao. "诗教"传统的历史中介:梁启超与中国现代文学启蒙话语的发生. 2017. 162. 社会科学文献出版社 . 9787520118842.
  23. Book: Borjigin. Kublai. 蒙古國牒状 [Ultimatum from the Mongol State]]. 1266. 況我祖宗,受天明命,奄有區夏。[…]日本密邇高麗,開國以來,亦時通中國。.
  24. Book: Tudan. Gonglü. 建國號詔 [Edict on the Proclamation of the Dynastic Name]]. 1271. 誕膺景命,奄四海以宅尊﹔必有美名,紹百王而紀統。肇從隆古,匪獨我家。且唐之為言蕩也,堯以之而著稱﹔虞之為言樂也,舜因之而作號。馴至禹興而湯造,互名夏大以殷中,世降以還,事殊非古。雖乘時而有國,不以利而制稱。為秦為漢者,著從初起之地名﹔曰隋曰唐者,因即所封之爵邑。.
  25. Book: Robinson. David. In the Shadow of the Mongol Empire: Ming China and Eurasia. 2019. 50. Cambridge University Press . 9781108482448.
  26. Book: Robinson. David. Empire's Twilight: Northeast Asia Under the Mongols. 2009. 293. Harvard University Press . 9780674036086.
  27. Book: Brook. Timothy. Walt van Praag. Michael van. Boltjes. Miek. Sacred Mandates: Asian International Relations since Chinggis Khan. 2018. 45. University of Chicago Press . 9780226562933.
  28. Book: Song. Lian. 元史 [History of Yuan]]. 18. 朕惟太祖聖武皇帝受天明命,肇造區夏,聖聖相承,光熙前緒。.
  29. Letter of Öljeitu to Philippe le Bel (1305). Variously interpreted as "真命皇帝天順萬夷之寶", "真命皇帝天順萬事之寶", "真命皇帝和順萬夷之寶", or "真命皇帝至順萬夷之寶". Now in the Bibliothèque nationale de France.
  30. Book: Song. Lian. 元史 [History of Yuan]]. 22. 仰惟祖宗應天撫運,肇啟疆宇,華夏一統,罔不率從。.
  31. Li. Dalong. 2007. "中国"与"天下"的重合:古代中国疆域形成的历史轨迹──古代中国疆域形成理论研究之六. 中国边疆史地研究. 3. 23 June 2022.
  32. Book: Fan. Wenlan. Cai. Meibiao. 中国通史 第七册. 2008. 78.
  33. Book: Ge. Jianxiong. 悠悠我思. 2017. 6. City University of HK Press . 9789629373283.
  34. Book: Huang. Xingtao. 重塑中華:近代中國「中華民族」觀念研究. 2017. 21. 三聯書店(香港)有限公司 . 9789620438202. 朕前特差能算善畫之人,將東北一帶山川地里俱照天上度數推算,詳加繪圖視之,混同江自長白山流出,由船廠打牲烏拉向東北流,會於黑龍江入海,此皆係中國地方。鴨綠江自長白山東南流出,向西南而往,由鳳凰城朝鮮國義州兩間流入於海。鴨綠江之西北係中國地方,江之東南係朝鮮地方,以江為界。……土門江西南係朝鮮地方,江之東北係中國地方,亦以江為界,此處俱已明白。.
  35. Book: Aisin Gioro. Yinzhen. 大義覺迷錄 [Records of Great Righteousness Resolving Confusion]]. 1. 1730. 在逆賊等之意,徒謂本朝以滿洲之君,入為中國之主,妄生此疆彼界之私,遂故為訕謗詆譏之說耳。不知本朝之為滿洲,猶中國之有籍貫。舜為東夷之人,文王為西夷之人,曾何損於聖德乎?[…]自我朝入主中土,君臨天下,并蒙古極邊諸部落,俱歸版圖,是中國之疆土開拓廣遠,乃中國臣民之大幸,何得尚有華夷中外之分論哉!.
  36. [s:Convention Between Great Britain and China Respecting Tibet|Convention Between Great Britain and China Respecting Tibet]
  37. [s:Treaty of Nanking|Treaty of Nanking]
  38. [s:Burlingame Treaty|Burlingame Treaty]
  39. Book: Rowe, Rowe . China's Last Empire - The Great Qing . 2010 . Harvard University Press . 211 . 9780674054554 .
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  41. Book: Chen. Xiaohua. 四库学 第一辑. 2017. 17. 社会科学文献出版社 . 9787520118101.
  42. Book: Liao. Yifang. 王權的祭典:傳統中國的帝王崇拜. 2020. 437. 國立臺灣大學出版中心 . 9789863503934.
  43. Web site: 辛亥时期"五族共和"论的思想渊源 . 2012-03-01 . 2012-07-01 . https://archive.today/20120701142658/http://article.chinalawinfo.com/Article_Detail.asp?ArticleID=64541 . live .
  44. Web site: 从王朝到民族国家清末立宪再审视 . 2020-01-29 . https://web.archive.org/web/20190502100006/http://www.mzb.com.cn/res/Home/1009/%E9%80%9A%E8%AE%AF72%E6%9C%9F.doc . 2019-05-02 . live .
  45. Book: Empires: A Historical and Political Sociology. Krishan Kumar. Polity Press. 2020. 9781509528387. 96.
  46. Book: Zhang. Yuanqi. Xu. Shichang. 清室退位詔書 [Imperial Edict of the Abdication of the Qing Emperor]]. 1912. 總期人民安堵,海宇乂安,仍合滿、漢、蒙、回、藏五族完全領土為一大中華民國。.
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  48. Book: Zhai. Zhiyong. 憲法何以中國. 2017. 190. City University of HK Press . 9789629373214. 21 July 2021. 23 June 2021. https://web.archive.org/web/20210623161632/https://books.google.com/books?id=ziEwDwAAQBAJ&q=%E4%BB%8D%E5%90%88%E6%BB%BF%E3%80%81%E6%BC%A2%E3%80%81%E8%92%99%E3%80%81%E5%9B%9E%E3%80%81%E8%97%8F%E4%BA%94%E6%97%8F%E5%AE%8C%E5%85%A8%E9%A0%98%E5%9C%9F%E7%82%BA%E4%B8%80%E5%A4%A7%E4%B8%AD%E8%8F%AF%E6%B0%91%E5%9C%8B&pg=PA190. live.
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