Litigants: | Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe |
Arguedate: | November 13 |
Argueyear: | 2002 |
Decidedate: | March 5 |
Decideyear: | 2003 |
Fullname: | Connecticut Department of Public Safety, et al., Petitioners v. John Doe, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated |
Usvol: | 538 |
Uspage: | 1 |
Parallelcitations: | 123 S. Ct. 1160; 155 L. Ed. 2d 98 |
Prior: | Doe v. Dep't of Pub. Safety ex rel. Lee, 271 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 2001) |
Holding: | The Second Circuit's judgment must be reversed because due process does not require the opportunity to prove a fact that is not material to the State's statutory scheme. Mere injury to reputation, even if defamatory, does not constitute the deprivation of a liberty interest. |
Majority: | Rehnquist |
Joinmajority: | O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer |
Concurrence: | Scalia |
Concurrence2: | Souter |
Concurrence3: | Stevens (in judgment) |
Joinconcurrence2: | Ginsburg |
Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003), was a United States Supreme Court case regarding the constitutionality of the Connecticut sex offender registration requirement which required public disclosure of information on sex offenders after they had been released from incarceration.[1]
A state statute required Connecticut's Department of Public Safety (PDS) to collect information gathered from sex offenders who registered into a sex offender registry and publicize it on an Internet website and to make the registry available to the public in specific state offices, as Connecticut's version of Megan's Law.[1]
The website contained the following disclaimer:
John Doe, a convicted sex offender who was thereby subject to the law, filed suit in Federal court, claiming that the law violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The District Court issued an injunction regarding the law's public disclosure provisions. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that such disclosure did indeed violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because registrants were not provided with a hearing prior to the public disclosure.[2] [3]
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was correct in enjoining the public disclosure of Connecticut's sex offender registry.[1]
In a unanimous opinion, the Second Circuit Court's judgment was reversed on the basis that due process does not require the opportunity to prove a fact that is not material to the State's statutory scheme. Injury to reputation in itself, even if defamatory, does not constitute deprivation of liberty.[3]