| Committee on Jewish Law and Standards | |
| Formation: | 1927 |
| Founder: | Rabbinical Assembly |
The Committee on Jewish Law and Standards is the central authority on halakha (Jewish law and tradition) within Conservative Judaism; it is one of the most active and widely known committees on the Conservative movement's Rabbinical Assembly. Within the movement it is known as the CJLS. The current chairman of the CJLS is Rabbi Pamela Barmash.
The Committee on Jewish Law was created by the Rabbinical Assembly (RA) in 1927. Max Drob was the first chair of the committee. The committee was tasked with including representatives from the "Various tendencies" of the Rabbinical Assembly. Of the ten members of the committee, four were to represent a "more conservative tendency," four were to represent "the liberal tendency," and two more were to be chosen by the eight. The more conservative rabbis on the initial committee were Louis Epstein, Louis Finkelstein, Julius Greenstone, and Chairman Drob. The liberals were Mordecai Kaplan, Jacob Kohn, Herman Rubenovitz, and Solomon Goldman. The two additional members were Harry S. Davidowitz and Morris Levine.[1] Drob viewed the creation of the committee as "the first step towards the organization of an American beit din hagadol [supreme court of Jewish law] which will study the problems arising in our new environment and solve them in the spirit of our Torah."[2]
Drob was succeeded by Julius Greenstone, who chaired the committee from 1932 to 1936 and Louis Epstein (1936–1940). Boaz Cohen, a professor at the Jewish Theological Seminary of America, served as chair from 1940 to 1948.[3]
In 1948, the committee was expanded to 25 members and renamed the Committee on Jewish Law and Standards.[4] The new name signaled the Rabbinical Assembly's hopes that Jewish practice should be guided by the highest moral standards along with traditional law. The committee was tasked with "raising the standards of piety, understanding, and participating in Jewish life" among Conservative Jews.[5] In 1986 Amy Eilberg became the first woman appointed to serve on the committee.[6]
After the reconstitution of the committee in 1948, the following rabbis served as chair:[7]
Other rabbis who have served on the Committee on Jewish Law and Standards include:
Secretaries of the committee have included the following rabbis:
Secretaries of the committee have included the following people who were not, at the time, rabbis:
Ex officio members of the committee have included the following rabbis:
Ex officio members of the committee who were not rabbis have included the following:
Consultants to the Committee on Jewish Law have included the following rabbis:
In 1950, Rabbi Milton Steinberg was notably still listed as a consultant to the committee while also being listed as deceased.[9]
In 1949, the Rabbinical Assembly commissioned a "Special Committee on Scope of the Law Committee." This special committee was chaired by Rabbi Israel H. Levinthal and included Rabbis Morris Adler, Ben Zion Bokser, Max D. Davidson, Ira Eisenstein and Theodore Friedman.[10] The special committee lasted through 1950.[11]
Conservative rabbis hold that the boundaries of Jewish law are determined through the halakhic process, a religious-ethical system of legal precedents. In this system, one may re-interpret or change the law through a formal argument. These arguments are effectively peer-reviewed. When a rabbi proposes a new interpretation of a law, that interpretation is not normative for the Jewish community until it becomes accepted by other committed and observant members in the community. New legal precedents are based on the standard codes of Jewish law, and the responsa literature. The Hebrew term for the responsa is '"She'elot U-Teshuvot"', literally "Questions and Answers".
There is no formal peer-review process for the entire Jewish community in general, since the Jewish community has no one central body that speaks for all of Judaism. However, within certain Jewish communities formal organized bodies exist: Each strand of Orthodox Hasidic Judaism has their own rebbe, who is their ultimate decisor of Jewish law. Within Modern Orthodox Judaism, there is no one committee or leader, but Modern Orthodox rabbis generally agree with the views set by consensus by the leaders of the Rabbinical Council of America. Within Conservative Judaism, the Rabbinical Assembly has the Committee on Jewish Law and Standards.
Conservative Judaism teaches that one can make use of literary and historical analysis to understand how Jewish law has developed, and to help them understand how such laws should be understood in our own day. It generally view the laws and customs from the various law codes as the basis for normative Jewish law. Solomon Schechter writes "however great the literary value of a code may be, it does not invest it with infallibility, nor does it exempt it from the student or the Rabbi who makes use of it from the duty of examining each paragraph on its own merits, and subjecting it to the same rules of interpretation that were always applied to Tradition".
In fundamental ways Orthodox Judaism has a significantly different understanding of how halakha is determined; thus Orthodox rabbis generally do not respect the decisions of the CJLS as valid or normative.
The CJLS is composed of 25 rabbis (voting members), and five laypeople, who participate in deliberations but who do not have a vote. When any six (or more) members vote in favor of a position, that position becomes an official position of the committee. Any particular issue can generate from one to four official positions. When multiple positions are validated, they usually have much common ground.
When more than one position is validated, a congregation's rabbi functions as its mara de-atra (local authority), adopting for their congregation the position he or she considers most compelling. As Aaron Mackler states:
"The positions authorized by the Committee offer important guidance for Conservative Jews and others. Still, each Conservative rabbi has the authority to make halakhic judgments. Eash rabbi formulates decisions about numerous issues not discussed explicitly by the Committee, relying on other halakhic sources and his or her own judgment. For issues the Committee has addressed, each rabbi may choose among various positions endorsed by the Committee, or may even find a different position best mandated by halakhah."[12]
Gordon Tucker has argued that RA members should give "extraordinary weight" to CJLS decisions, while remaining free to disagree with then:
Because it is a body that seeks to coalesce judgment around particular halakhic opinions, and not simply to give voice to individually held positions, it is right and proper that six members of the CJLS be required to define an authoritative position. Because it is a body that is ultimately here to provide service and guidance to Rabbinical Assembly members, it is also right and proper that authoritative opinions not be categorized by the number of votes they received, and that they not be binding on Rabbinical Assembly members in a coercive sense, but rather only in the sense that we are bound by our covenant to one another to give extraordinary weight to CJLS responsa in reaching our own legal decisions. Should an RA member choose, upon study and consideration, not to follow any CJLS position on a given matter, he or she would thus be unable to claim any authority or backing for that position from the CJLS, a "sanction" which in some circumstances could be substantial, in others not.[13]
While responsa are not enforceable on rabbis, there are a few standards of rabbinic practice which are enforced by the RA. Willful violations of these standards have led to resignations or expulsions from membership of the Rabbinical Assembly (RA). At present, three standards of rabbinic practice have been issued, containing four rules:
1) A complete prohibition on rabbis and cantors to officiate in any way at intermarriages.
2) A complete prohibition against officiating at the remarriage of a Jew whose previous marriage has not been halakhically terminated, whether by a halakhic divorce [get], hafka'at Kiddushin [annulment], or death.
3a) A complete prohibition against taking any action that would intimate that native Jewishness can be confirmed in any way but matrilineal descent.
3b) A complete prohibition against supervising a conversion to Judaism that does not include circumcision for males, and immersion in a Mikvah for both males and females.
A separate article exists on Conservative responsa, the body of responsa created by Conservative rabbis (primarily by the CJLS.)
A key practical difference between Conservative and Orthodox approaches to halakhah is that Conservative Judaism holds that rabbis in our day and age are empowered to issue takkanot (decrees) modifying Biblical prohibitions, when perceived to be necessary.
The Conservative position is that the Talmud states that in exceptional cases rabbis have the right to uproot Biblical prohibitions for a variety of reasons; it gives examples of how this was done in practice, e.g. Talmud Bavli, tractate Yevamot 89a-90b, and tractate Nazir 43a. See the discussion by Rabbi Arnold Goodman in Solemnizing the Marriage Between a Kohen and a Divorcee p. 2 (bottom) p. 3 (top.) Goodman notes that "Later authorities were reluctant to assume such unilateral authority... Later authorities thus imposed severe limitations on the conditions and situations where it would be appropriate and necessary to uproot.." but then states on p. 3 that "Yet the right to uproot was never completely prohibited. There was often the need for an escape hatch, and the right of Rabbinic authorities to do so was articulated by the Rashba as follows: It was not a matter of the sages deciding on their own to uproot a matter of the Torah, but it is one of the mitzvot in the Torah to obey the 'judges in your day' and anything they see necessary to permit is permissible from the Torah." (Chidushai Rashba, Nedarim, p. 90b)
Conservative Jewish philosophy does not allow the use of popular will to overturn Biblical or rabbinic laws. Conservative Judaism requires responsa citing a full range of precedential authorities as part of any halakhic decision. Changes in halakhah must come about through the halakhic process. For examples of this view see Rabbi David Golinkin's essay "The Whys and Hows of Conservative Halakhah," Elliot N. Dorff's "The Unfolding Tradition" (esp. introduction and chapter 1), Joel Roth "The Halakhic Process" (Chapter 1, but throughout the entire book)
The CJLS has on a number of occasions accepted teshuvot which include moral and aggadadic reasoning alongside and within a precedent-based halakhic framework. As such they often come to conclusions that differ from their Orthodox peers.
The CJLS has passed takkanot which significantly change Jewish law. The following is a list of such takkanot; note that the reasoning behind these changes is not here explained in depth; for details please see the Conservative Halakha article.
In other areas the CJLS did not issue takkanot, but found procedures to follow classical halakhah while maintaining what they view as the highest standards of moral behavior. For instance:
There exist significant disagreements in the interpretation of Jewish law between all Jewish groups, even different groups within the same denomination (for instance, there are half a dozen large, different Orthodox Jewish rabbinical groups, none of which accepts the rulings of the other as necessarily correct or authoritative.
Rabbi Joel Roth (cited above as one of the two opinions on the issue of homosexuals serving as rabbis) left the CJLS after the ruling on homosexual rabbis. He does not agree with Rabbi David Wolpe that the Conservative movement is not halakhic, and in fact publicly reaffirmed his commitment to staying in the Conservative movement and in the movement's Rabbinical Assembly. However, he felt that the members of the CJLS were no longer following the parameters of the halakhic system, and as such quit the CJLS.
Of the criticism of the committee are its voting methods. Currently, as stated, a position must garner six votes to be held as legitimatized view. In times past, it was one. This has caused many to claim that the committee is very waved by popular opinion and creates inner fractions instead of attempting to making a conclusive ruling.
When dealing with rulings on Jewish law between entirely different denominations (Orthodox vs. Conservative, Conservative vs. Reform, etc.) it is thus to be expected that significant disagreements can be found.
As well, there is also a more extreme criticism that that the committee is a failure in being able to balance modernity and traditional practice. Citing for example the "takana" of driving on Shabbat for the exclusive purpose of going back and forth to synagogue, critics note today few Conservative actually just drive to synagogue (including the Rabbinical and Lay leadership) while some do not drive at all. Meaning that neither those who drive nor decide to refrain completely from driving have any revelancy to the original committee's decision, which in effect just allowed the doing whatever the individual member of the movement wanted to do based on everything but the committee itself. The explanation by many critics that the committee would rather try to please everyone within its broad tent than make a decision that would be considered more correct but in any way controversial (thus the wanting to approve all sides of all controversies.) Also explained as an overemphasis of modern political and philosophical thought over traditional Jewish thought.