| Litigants: | California Federal S. & L. Assn. v. Guerra |
| Arguedate: | October 8 |
| Argueyear: | 1986 |
| Decidedate: | January 13 |
| Decideyear: | 1987 |
| Fullname: | California Federal Savings & Loan Association et al. v. Guerra, Director, Department of Fair Employment and Housing, et al. |
| Usvol: | 479 |
| Uspage: | 272 |
| Parallelcitations: | 107 S. Ct. 683; 93 L. Ed. 2d 613 |
| Prior: | 758 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1985) |
| Holding: | § 12945(b)(2) is not preempted by Title VII, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, because it is not inconsistent with the purposes of Title VII, nor does it require the doing of an act that is unlawful under Title VII. |
| Majority: | Marshall |
| Joinmajority: | Brennan, Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor (Parts I, II, III-B, III-C, IV) |
| Concurrence: | Stevens |
| Concurrence2: | Scalia |
| Dissent: | White |
| Joindissent: | Rehnquist, Powell |
California Federal S. & L. Assn. v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987), is a US labor law case of the United States Supreme Court about whether a state may require employers to provide greater pregnancy benefits than required by federal law, as well as the ability to require pregnancy benefits to women without similar benefits to men. The court held that The California Fair Employment and Housing Act §12945(b)(2), which requires employers to provide leave and reinstatement to employees disabled by pregnancy, is consistent with federal law.
An amendment to the California Fair Employment and Housing Act §12945(b)(2) passed in 1978 required that employers must grant a job-protected reasonable leave of absence for employees disabled by pregnancy. Lillian Garland had worked for California Federal Savings and Loan for about 4 years before needing to take time out to have her baby. She ultimately trained the woman to take her place during her time off as indicated by her doctor and upon her return, was to be told that the person that she had trained was given the job. She filed suit alleging violations of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, which prohibited discrimination on the basis of pregnancy in employment. Cal Fed argued that the California statute requiring employers to grant leave for pregnant employees constituted discrimination under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.
Justice Thurgood Marshall, writing for the majority, held that the California statute was not preempted. Brennan, Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor concurred. Marshall said the following.
Justice Scalia wrote a separate concurrence. Justice White (joined by Rehnquist and Powell) dissented.