Cyclic redundancy check explained

A cyclic redundancy check (CRC) is an error-detecting code commonly used in digital networks and storage devices to detect accidental changes to digital data.[1] [2] Blocks of data entering these systems get a short check value attached, based on the remainder of a polynomial division of their contents. On retrieval, the calculation is repeated and, in the event the check values do not match, corrective action can be taken against data corruption. CRCs can be used for error correction (see bitfilters).[3]

CRCs are so called because the check (data verification) value is a redundancy (it expands the message without adding information) and the algorithm is based on cyclic codes. CRCs are popular because they are simple to implement in binary hardware, easy to analyze mathematically, and particularly good at detecting common errors caused by noise in transmission channels. Because the check value has a fixed length, the function that generates it is occasionally used as a hash function.

Introduction

CRCs are based on the theory of cyclic error-correcting codes. The use of systematic cyclic codes, which encode messages by adding a fixed-length check value, for the purpose of error detection in communication networks, was first proposed by W. Wesley Peterson in 1961.[4] Cyclic codes are not only simple to implement but have the benefit of being particularly well suited for the detection of burst errors: contiguous sequences of erroneous data symbols in messages. This is important because burst errors are common transmission errors in many communication channels, including magnetic and optical storage devices. Typically an n-bit CRC applied to a data block of arbitrary length will detect any single error burst not longer than n bits, and the fraction of all longer error bursts that it will detect is approximately .

Specification of a CRC code requires definition of a so-called generator polynomial. This polynomial becomes the divisor in a polynomial long division, which takes the message as the dividend and in which the quotient is discarded and the remainder becomes the result. The important caveat is that the polynomial coefficients are calculated according to the arithmetic of a finite field, so the addition operation can always be performed bitwise-parallel (there is no carry between digits).

In practice, all commonly used CRCs employ the finite field of two elements, GF(2). The two elements are usually called 0 and 1, comfortably matching computer architecture.

A CRC is called an n-bit CRC when its check value is n bits long. For a given n, multiple CRCs are possible, each with a different polynomial. Such a polynomial has highest degree n, which means it has terms. In other words, the polynomial has a length of ; its encoding requires bits. Note that most polynomial specifications either drop the MSB or LSB, since they are always 1. The CRC and associated polynomial typically have a name of the form CRC-n-XXX as in the table below.

The simplest error-detection system, the parity bit, is in fact a 1-bit CRC: it uses the generator polynomial  (two terms),[5] and has the name CRC-1.

Application

A CRC-enabled device calculates a short, fixed-length binary sequence, known as the check value or CRC, for each block of data to be sent or stored and appends it to the data, forming a codeword.

When a codeword is received or read, the device either compares its check value with one freshly calculated from the data block, or equivalently, performs a CRC on the whole codeword and compares the resulting check value with an expected residue constant.

If the CRC values do not match, then the block contains a data error.

The device may take corrective action, such as rereading the block or requesting that it be sent again. Otherwise, the data is assumed to be error-free (though, with some small probability, it may contain undetected errors; this is inherent in the nature of error-checking).[6]

Data integrity

CRCs are specifically designed to protect against common types of errors on communication channels, where they can provide quick and reasonable assurance of the integrity of messages delivered. However, they are not suitable for protecting against intentional alteration of data.

Firstly, as there is no authentication, an attacker can edit a message and recompute the CRC without the substitution being detected. When stored alongside the data, CRCs and cryptographic hash functions by themselves do not protect against intentional modification of data. Any application that requires protection against such attacks must use cryptographic authentication mechanisms, such as message authentication codes or digital signatures (which are commonly based on cryptographic hash functions).

Secondly, unlike cryptographic hash functions, CRC is an easily reversible function, which makes it unsuitable for use in digital signatures.[7]

Thirdly, CRC satisfies a relation similar to that of a linear function (or more accurately, an affine function):[8]

\operatorname{CRC}(xy)=\operatorname{CRC}(x)\operatorname{CRC}(y)c

where

c

depends on the length of

x

and

y

. This can be also stated as follows, where

x

,

y

and

z

have the same length

\operatorname{CRC}(xyz)=\operatorname{CRC}(x)\operatorname{CRC}(y)\operatorname{CRC}(z);

as a result, even if the CRC is encrypted with a stream cipher that uses XOR as its combining operation (or mode of block cipher which effectively turns it into a stream cipher, such as OFB or CFB), both the message and the associated CRC can be manipulated without knowledge of the encryption key; this was one of the well-known design flaws of the Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) protocol.[9]

Computation

See main article: Computation of cyclic redundancy checks.

To compute an n-bit binary CRC, line the bits representing the input in a row, and position the -bit pattern representing the CRC's divisor (called a "polynomial") underneath the left end of the row.

In this example, we shall encode 14 bits of message with a 3-bit CRC, with a polynomial . The polynomial is written in binary as the coefficients; a 3rd-degree polynomial has 4 coefficients . In this case, the coefficients are 1, 0, 1 and 1. The result of the calculation is 3 bits long, which is why it is called a 3-bit CRC. However, you need 4 bits to explicitly state the polynomial.

Start with the message to be encoded:

11010011101100

This is first padded with zeros corresponding to the bit length n of the CRC. This is done so that the resulting code word is in systematic form. Here is the first calculation for computing a 3-bit CRC:

11010011101100 000 <--- input right padded by 3 bits
1011               <--- divisor (4 bits) = x³ + x + 1
------------------
01100011101100 000 <--- result

The algorithm acts on the bits directly above the divisor in each step. The result for that iteration is the bitwise XOR of the polynomial divisor with the bits above it. The bits not above the divisor are simply copied directly below for that step. The divisor is then shifted right to align with the highest remaining 1 bit in the input, and the process is repeated until the divisor reaches the right-hand end of the input row. Here is the entire calculation:

11010011101100 000 <--- input right padded by 3 bits
1011               <--- divisor
01100011101100 000 <--- result (note the first four bits are the XOR with the divisor beneath, the rest of the bits are unchanged)
 1011              <--- divisor ...
00111011101100 000
  1011
00010111101100 000
   1011
00000001101100 000 <--- note that the divisor moves over to align with the next 1 in the dividend (since quotient for that step was zero)
       1011             (in other words, it doesn't necessarily move one bit per iteration)
00000000110100 000
        1011
00000000011000 000
         1011
00000000001110 000
          1011
00000000000101 000
           101 1
-----------------
00000000000000 100 <--- remainder (3 bits).  Division algorithm stops here as dividend is equal to zero.

Since the leftmost divisor bit zeroed every input bit it touched, when this process ends the only bits in the input row that can be nonzero are the n bits at the right-hand end of the row. These n bits are the remainder of the division step, and will also be the value of the CRC function (unless the chosen CRC specification calls for some postprocessing).

The validity of a received message can easily be verified by performing the above calculation again, this time with the check value added instead of zeroes. The remainder should equal zero if there are no detectable errors.

11010011101100 100 <--- input with check value
1011               <--- divisor
01100011101100 100 <--- result
 1011              <--- divisor ...
00111011101100 100

......

00000000001110 100
          1011
00000000000101 100
           101 1
------------------
00000000000000 000 <--- remainder

The following Python code outlines a function which will return the initial CRC remainder for a chosen input and polynomial, with either 1 or 0 as the initial padding. Note that this code works with string inputs rather than raw numbers:def crc_remainder(input_bitstring, polynomial_bitstring, initial_filler): """Calculate the CRC remainder of a string of bits using a chosen polynomial. initial_filler should be '1' or '0'. """ polynomial_bitstring = polynomial_bitstring.lstrip('0') len_input = len(input_bitstring) initial_padding = (len(polynomial_bitstring) - 1) * initial_filler input_padded_array = list(input_bitstring + initial_padding) while '1' in input_padded_array[:len_input]: cur_shift = input_padded_array.index('1') for i in range(len(polynomial_bitstring)): input_padded_array[cur_shift + i] \ = str(int(polynomial_bitstring[i] != input_padded_array[cur_shift + i])) return .join(input_padded_array)[len_input:]

def crc_check(input_bitstring, polynomial_bitstring, check_value): """Calculate the CRC check of a string of bits using a chosen polynomial.""" polynomial_bitstring = polynomial_bitstring.lstrip('0') len_input = len(input_bitstring) initial_padding = check_value input_padded_array = list(input_bitstring + initial_padding) while '1' in input_padded_array[:len_input]: cur_shift = input_padded_array.index('1') for i in range(len(polynomial_bitstring)): input_padded_array[cur_shift + i] \ = str(int(polynomial_bitstring[i] != input_padded_array[cur_shift + i])) return ('1' not in .join(input_padded_array)[len_input:])

>>> crc_remainder('11010011101100', '1011', '0')'100'>>> crc_check('11010011101100', '1011', '100')True

Mathematics

See main article: Mathematics of cyclic redundancy checks. Mathematical analysis of this division-like process reveals how to select a divisor that guarantees good error-detection properties. In this analysis, the digits of the bit strings are taken as the coefficients of a polynomial in some variable x—coefficients that are elements of the finite field GF(2) (the integers modulo 2, i.e. either a zero or a one), instead of more familiar numbers. The set of binary polynomials is a mathematical ring.

Designing polynomials

The selection of the generator polynomial is the most important part of implementing the CRC algorithm. The polynomial must be chosen to maximize the error-detecting capabilities while minimizing overall collision probabilities.

The most important attribute of the polynomial is its length (largest degree(exponent) +1 of any one term in the polynomial), because of its direct influence on the length of the computed check value.

The most commonly used polynomial lengths are 9 bits (CRC-8), 17 bits (CRC-16), 33 bits (CRC-32), and 65 bits (CRC-64).[5]

A CRC is called an n-bit CRC when its check value is n-bits. For a given n, multiple CRCs are possible, each with a different polynomial. Such a polynomial has highest degree n, and hence terms (the polynomial has a length of). The remainder has length n. The CRC has a name of the form CRC-n-XXX.

The design of the CRC polynomial depends on the maximum total length of the block to be protected (data + CRC bits), the desired error protection features, and the type of resources for implementing the CRC, as well as the desired performance. A common misconception is that the "best" CRC polynomials are derived from either irreducible polynomials or irreducible polynomials times the factor , which adds to the code the ability to detect all errors affecting an odd number of bits. In reality, all the factors described above should enter into the selection of the polynomial and may lead to a reducible polynomial. However, choosing a reducible polynomial will result in a certain proportion of missed errors, due to the quotient ring having zero divisors.

The advantage of choosing a primitive polynomial as the generator for a CRC code is that the resulting code has maximal total block length in the sense that all 1-bit errors within that block length have different remainders (also called syndromes) and therefore, since the remainder is a linear function of the block, the code can detect all 2-bit errors within that block length. If

r

is the degree of the primitive generator polynomial, then the maximal total block length is

2r-1

, and the associated code is able to detect any single-bit or double-bit errors.[10] We can improve this situation. If we use the generator polynomial

g(x)=p(x)(1+x)

, where

p

is a primitive polynomial of degree

r-1

, then the maximal total block length is

2r-1

, and the code is able to detect single, double, triple and any odd number of errors.

A polynomial

g(x)

that admits other factorizations may be chosen then so as to balance the maximal total blocklength with a desired error detection power. The BCH codes are a powerful class of such polynomials. They subsume the two examples above. Regardless of the reducibility properties of a generator polynomial of degree r, if it includes the "+1" term, the code will be able to detect error patterns that are confined to a window of r contiguous bits. These patterns are called "error bursts".

Specification

The concept of the CRC as an error-detecting code gets complicated when an implementer or standards committee uses it to design a practical system. Here are some of the complications:

With multi-byte CRCs, there can be confusion over whether the byte transmitted first (or stored in the lowest-addressed byte of memory) is the least-significant byte (LSB) or the most-significant byte (MSB). For example, some 16-bit CRC schemes swap the bytes of the check value.

x0

or 1 term). This convention encodes the polynomial complete with its degree in one integer.

These complications mean that there are three common ways to express a polynomial as an integer: the first two, which are mirror images in binary, are the constants found in code; the third is the number found in Koopman's papers. In each case, one term is omitted. So the polynomial

x4+x+1

may be transcribed as:

x4+(0x3+0x2+1x1+1x0)

(MSB-first code)

(1x0+1x1+0x2+0x3)+x4

(LSB-first code)

(1x4+0x3+0x2+1x1)+x0

(Koopman notation)In the table below they are shown as:

Obfuscation

CRCs in proprietary protocols might be obfuscated by using a non-trivial initial value and a final XOR, but these techniques do not add cryptographic strength to the algorithm and can be reverse engineered using straightforward methods.[11]

Standards and common use

Numerous varieties of cyclic redundancy checks have been incorporated into technical standards. By no means does one algorithm, or one of each degree, suit every purpose; Koopman and Chakravarty recommend selecting a polynomial according to the application requirements and the expected distribution of message lengths. The number of distinct CRCs in use has confused developers, a situation which authors have sought to address.[12] There are three polynomials reported for CRC-12, twenty-two conflicting definitions of CRC-16, and seven of CRC-32.[13]

The polynomials commonly applied are not the most efficient ones possible. Since 1993, Koopman, Castagnoli and others have surveyed the space of polynomials between 3 and 64 bits in size,[14] [15] [16] [17] finding examples that have much better performance (in terms of Hamming distance for a given message size) than the polynomials of earlier protocols, and publishing the best of these with the aim of improving the error detection capacity of future standards. In particular, iSCSI and SCTP have adopted one of the findings of this research, the CRC-32C (Castagnoli) polynomial.

The design of the 32-bit polynomial most commonly used by standards bodies, CRC-32-IEEE, was the result of a joint effort for the Rome Laboratory and the Air Force Electronic Systems Division by Joseph Hammond, James Brown and Shyan-Shiang Liu of the Georgia Institute of Technology and Kenneth Brayer of the Mitre Corporation. The earliest known appearances of the 32-bit polynomial were in their 1975 publications: Technical Report 2956 by Brayer for Mitre, published in January and released for public dissemination through DTIC in August,[18] and Hammond, Brown and Liu's report for the Rome Laboratory, published in May.[19] Both reports contained contributions from the other team. During December 1975, Brayer and Hammond presented their work in a paper at the IEEE National Telecommunications Conference: the IEEE CRC-32 polynomial is the generating polynomial of a Hamming code and was selected for its error detection performance.[20] Even so, the Castagnoli CRC-32C polynomial used in iSCSI or SCTP matches its performance on messages from 58 bits to 131 kbits, and outperforms it in several size ranges including the two most common sizes of Internet packet. The ITU-T G.hn standard also uses CRC-32C to detect errors in the payload (although it uses CRC-16-CCITT for PHY headers).

CRC-32C computation is implemented in hardware as an operation of SSE4.2 instruction set, first introduced in Intel processors' Nehalem microarchitecture. ARM AArch64 architecture also provides hardware acceleration for both CRC-32 and CRC-32C operations.

Polynomial representations

The table below lists only the polynomials of the various algorithms in use. Variations of a particular protocol can impose pre-inversion, post-inversion and reversed bit ordering as described above. For example, the CRC32 used in Gzip and Bzip2 use the same polynomial, but Gzip employs reversed bit ordering, while Bzip2 does not.Note that even parity polynomials in GF(2) with degree greater than 1 are never primitive. Even parity polynomial marked as primitive in this table represent a primitive polynomial multiplied by

\left(x+1\right)

. The most significant bit of a polynomial is always 1, and is not shown in the hex representations.
NameUsesPolynomial representationsParity[21] Primitive[22] Maximum bits of payload by Hamming distance[23]
NormalReversedReciprocalReversed reciprocal≥ 1615141312111098765432[24]
CRC-1most hardware; also known as parity bit0x10x10x10x1rowspan="2"

x+1

CRC-3-GSMmobile networks[25] 0x30x60x50x54

x3+x+1

CRC-4-ITUITU-T G.704, p. 120x30xC0x90x9rowspan="2"

x4+x+1

CRC-5-EPCGen 2 RFID[26] 0x090x120x050x14rowspan="2"

x5+x3+1

CRC-5-ITUITU-T G.704, p. 90x150x150x0B0x1Arowspan="2"

x5+x4+x2+1

CRC-5-USBUSB token packets0x050x140x090x12rowspan="2"

x5+x2+1

CRC-6-CDMA2000-Amobile networks[27] 0x270x390x330x33
CRC-6-CDMA2000-Bmobile networks0x070x380x310x23
CRC-6-DARCData Radio Channel[28] 0x190x260x0D0x2C
CRC-6-GSMmobile networks0x2F0x3D0x3B0x37112525

x6+x5+x3+x2+x+1

CRC-6-ITUITU-T G.704, p. 30x030x300x210x21rowspan="2"

x6+x+1

CRC-7telecom systems, ITU-T G.707, ITU-T G.832, MMC, SD0x090x480x110x44rowspan="2"

x7+x3+1

CRC-7-MVBTrain Communication Network, IEC 60870-5[29] 0x650x530x270x72
CRC-8DVB-S2[30] 0xD50xAB0x570xEA228585

x8+x7+x6+x4+x2+1

CRC-8-AUTOSARautomotive integration,[31] OpenSafety[32] 0x2F0xF40xE90x9733119119

x8+x5+x3+x2+x+1

CRC-8-Bluetoothwireless connectivity[33] 0xA70xE50xCB0xD3rowspan="2"

x8+x7+x5+x2+x+1

CRC-8-CCITTITU-T I.432.1 (02/99); ATM HEC, ISDN HEC and cell delineation, SMBus PEC0x070xE00xC10x83rowspan="2"

x8+x2+x+1

CRC-8-Dallas/Maxim1-Wire bus[34] 0x310x8C0x190x98rowspan="2"

x8+x5+x4+1

CRC-8-DARCData Radio Channel0x390x9C0x390x9Crowspan="2"

x8+x5+x4+x3+1

CRC-8-GSM-Bmobile networks0x490x920x250xA4rowspan="2"

x8+x6+x3+1

CRC-8-SAE J1850AES3
OBD
0x1D0xB80x710x8Erowspan="2"

x8+x4+x3+x2+1

CRC-8-WCDMAmobile networks[35] 0x9B0xD90xB30xCDrowspan="2"

x8+x7+x4+x3+x+1

CRC-10ATM; ITU-T I.6100x2330x3310x2630x319rowspan="2"

x10+x9+x5+x4+x+1

CRC-10-CDMA2000mobile networks0x3D90x26F0x0DF0x3EC
CRC-10-GSMmobile networks0x1750x2BA0x1750x2BA
CRC-11FlexRay[36] 0x3850x50E0x21D0x5C2rowspan="2"

x11+x9+x8+x7+x2+1

CRC-12telecom systems[37] [38] 0x80F0xF010xE030xC07rowspan="2"

x12+x11+x3+x2+x+1

CRC-12-CDMA2000mobile networks0xF130xC8F0x91F0xF89
CRC-12-GSMmobile networks0xD310x8CB0x1970xE98
CRC-13-BBCTime signal, Radio teleswitch[39] [40] 0x1CF50x15E70x0BCF0x1E7Arowspan="2"

x13+x12+x11+x10+x7+x6+x5+x4+x2+1

CRC-14-DARCData Radio Channel0x08050x28040x10090x2402
CRC-14-GSMmobile networks0x202D0x2D010x1A030x3016
CRC-15-CAN0xC599[41] [42] 0x4CD10x19A30x62CCrowspan="2"

x15+x14+x10+x8+x7+x4+x3+1

CRC-15-MPT1327[43] 0x68150x540B0x28170x740A
CRC-16-ChakravartyOptimal for payloads ≤64 bits0x2F150xA8F40x51E90x978A
CRC-16-ARINCACARS applications[44] 0xA02B0xD4050xA80B0xD015
CRC-16-CCITTX.25, V.41, HDLC FCS, XMODEM, Bluetooth, PACTOR, SD, DigRF, many others; known as CRC-CCITT0x10210x84080x8110x8810rowspan="2"

x16+x12+x5+1

CRC-16-CDMA2000mobile networks0xC8670xE6130xCC270xE433
CRC-16-DECTcordless telephones[45] 0x05890x91A00x23410x82C4rowspan="2"

x16+x10+x8+x7+x3+1

CRC-16-T10-DIFSCSI DIF0x8BB7[46] 0xEDD10xDBA30xC5DBrowspan="2"

x16+x15+x11+x9+x8+x7+x5+x4+x2+x+1

CRC-16-DNPDNP, IEC 870, M-Bus0x3D650xA6BC0x4D790x9EB2rowspan="2"

x16+x13+x12+x11+x10+x8+x6+x5+x2+1

CRC-16-IBMBisync, Modbus, USB, ANSI X3.28, SIA DC-07, many others; also known as CRC-16 and CRC-16-ANSI0x80050xA0010x40030xC002rowspan="2"

x16+x15+x2+1

CRC-16-OpenSafety-Asafety fieldbus0x59350xAC9A0x59350xAC9A
CRC-16-OpenSafety-Bsafety fieldbus0x755B0xDAAE0xB55D0xBAAD
CRC-16-Profibusfieldbus networks[47] 0x1DCF0xF3B80xE7710x8EE7
Fletcher-16Used in Adler-32 A & B ChecksumsOften confused to be a CRC, but actually a checksum; see Fletcher's checksum
CRC-17-CANCAN FD[48] 0x1685B0x1B42D0x1685B0x1B42D
CRC-21-CANCAN FD0x1028990x1322810x0645030x18144C
CRC-24FlexRay0x5D6DCB0xD3B6BA0xA76D750xAEB6E5rowspan="2"

x24+x22+x20+x19+x18+x16+x14+x13+x11+x10+x8+x7+x6+x3+x+1

CRC-24-Radix-64OpenPGP, RTCM104v30x864CFB0xDF32610xBE64C30xC3267Drowspan="2"

x24+x23+x18+x17+x14+x11+x10+x7+x6+x5+x4+x3+x+1

CRC-24-WCDMAUsed in OS-9 RTOS. Residue = 0x800FE3.[49] 0x8000630xC600010x8C00030xC000314483885838388583

x24+x23+x6+x5+x+1

CRC-30CDMA0x2030B9C70x38E743010x31CE86030x30185CE3rowspan="2"

x30+x29+x21+x20+x15+x13+x12+x11+x8+x7+x6+x2+x+1

CRC-32ISO 3309 (HDLC), ANSI X3.66 (ADCCP), FIPS PUB 71, FED-STD-1003, ITU-T V.42, ISO/IEC/IEEE 802-3 (Ethernet), SATA, MPEG-2, PKZIP, Gzip, Bzip2, POSIX cksum,[50] PNG,[51] ZMODEM, many others0x04C11DB70xEDB883200xDB7106410x82608EDB1012213457911712682974916074294967263

x32+x26+x23+x22+x16+x12+x11+x10+x8+x7+x5+x4+x2+x+1

(Castagnoli)iSCSI, SCTP, G.hn payload, SSE4.2, Btrfs, ext4, Ceph0x1EDC6F410x82F63B780x05EC76F10x8F6E37A068204717752432147483615

x32+x28+x27+x26+x25+x23+x22+x20+x19+x18+x14+x13+x11+x10+x9+x8+x6+1

(Koopman)Excellent at Ethernet frame length, poor performance with long files 0x741B8CD70xEB31D82E0xD663B05D0xBA0DC66B24161815216360114663

x32+x30+x29+x28+x26+x20+x19+x17+x16+x15+x11+x10+x7+x6+x4+x2+x+1

CRC-32K2 (Koopman)Excellent at Ethernet frame length, poor performance with long files 0x325834990x992C1A4C0x325834990x992C1A4C316261343273865506
CRC-32Qaviation; AIXM[52] 0x814141AB0xD58282810xAB0505030xC0A0A0D5rowspan="2"

x32+x31+x24+x22+x16+x14+x8+x7+x5+x3+x+1

Adler-32Often confused to be a CRC, but actually a checksum; see Adler-32
CRC-40-GSMGSM control channel[53] [54] [55] 0x00048200090x90004120000x20008240010x8002410004rowspan="2"

x40+x26+x23+x17+x3+1=(x23+1)(x17+x3+1)

CRC-64-ECMAECMA-182 p. 51, XZ Utils0x42F0E1EBA9EA36930xC96C5795D7870F420x92D8AF2BAF0E1E850xA17870F5D4F51B49rowspan="2"

x64+x62+x57+x55+x54+x53+x52+x47+x46+x45+x40+x39+x38+x37+x35+x33+

x32+x31+x29+x27+x24+x23+x22+x21+x19+x17+x13+x12+x10+x9+x7+x4+x+1

CRC-64-ISOISO 3309 (HDLC), Swiss-Prot/TrEMBL; considered weak for hashing[56] -- date of PDF=1 Dec 2009; date of referenced C file=2 Mar 2006; date in C file comments=28 Sep 2002 -->0x000000000000001B0xD8000000000000000xB0000000000000010x800000000000000Drowspan="2"

x64+x4+x3+x+1

Implementations

CRC catalogues

See also

Further reading

External links

Notes and References

  1. Pundir . Meena . Sandhu . Jasminder Kaur . A Systematic Review of Quality of Service in Wireless Sensor Networks using Machine Learning: Recent Trend and Future Vision . Journal of Network and Computer Applications . 188 . 2021 . 10.1016/j.jnca.2021.103084 . 103084 . Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) mechanism is used to protect the data and provide protection of integrity from error bits when data is transmitted from sender to receiver..
  2. Book: Schiller, Frank . Mattes . Tina . Fault Detection, Supervision and Safety of Technical Processes 2006 . Analysis of CRC-Polynomials for Safety-Critical Communication by Deterministic and Stochastic Automata . Elsevier . 2007 . 978-0-08-044485-7 . 10.1016/b978-008044485-7/50159-7 . 944–949 . Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) is an efficient method to ensure a low probability of undetected errors in data transmission using a checksum as a result of polynomial division..
  3. Web site: An Algorithm for Error Correcting Cyclic Redundance Checks. drdobbs.com. 28 June 2017. https://web.archive.org/web/20170720165847/http://www.drdobbs.com/an-algorithm-for-error-correcting-cyclic/184401662. 20 July 2017. dead.
  4. Peterson . W. W. . Brown . D. T.. January 1961. Cyclic Codes for Error Detection. Proceedings of the IRE. 10.1109/JRPROC.1961.287814. 49. 1. 228–235. 51666741 .
  5. Book: Ergen, Mustafa. 2.3.3 Error Detection Coding. Mobile Broadband. Springer. 21 January 2008. 29–30. 10.1007/978-0-387-68192-4_2. 978-0-387-68192-4.
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  7. Web site: Stigge. Martin. Plötz. Henryk. Müller. Wolf. Redlich. Jens-Peter. Reversing CRC – Theory and Practice. May 2006. 17 . SAR-PR-2006-05 . Humboldt University Berlin. 4 February 2011. The presented methods offer a very easy and efficient way to modify your data so that it will compute to a CRC you want or at least know in advance.. dead. https://web.archive.org/web/20110719042902/http://sar.informatik.hu-berlin.de/research/publications/SAR-PR-2006-05/SAR-PR-2006-05_.pdf. 19 July 2011.
  8. Web site: algorithm design – Why is CRC said to be linear? . Cryptography Stack Exchange . 5 May 2019.
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  11. Web site: Ewing. Gregory C.. March 2010. Reverse-Engineering a CRC Algorithm. Christchurch. University of Canterbury. 26 July 2011. 7 August 2011. https://web.archive.org/web/20110807100031/http://www.cosc.canterbury.ac.nz/greg.ewing/essays/CRC-Reverse-Engineering.html. live.
  12. Web site: A Painless Guide to CRC Error Detection Algorithms V3.0 . 23 May 2019 . Williams . Ross N. . 24 September 1996 . https://web.archive.org/web/20180402205812/http://www.wolfgang-ehrhardt.de/crc_v3.html . 2 April 2018 . dead .
  13. Web site: Cook . Greg . Catalogue of parametrised CRC algorithms . 18 September 2020 . 15 August 2020 . 1 August 2020 . https://web.archive.org/web/20200801122415/https://reveng.sourceforge.io/crc-catalogue/all.htm . live .
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  18. Brayer . Kenneth . August 1975 . Evaluation of 32 Degree Polynomials in Error Detection on the SATIN IV Autovon Error Patterns . . ADA014825 . 31 December 2021 . 31 December 2021 . https://web.archive.org/web/20211231093215/https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA014825 . live .
  19. Hammond . Joseph L. Jr. . Brown . James E. . Liu . Shyan-Shiang . May 1975 . Development of a Transmission Error Model and an Error Control Model . NASA Sti/Recon Technical Report N . 31 December 2021 . ADA013939 . 1975STIN...7615344H . 76 . 1975 . 15344 . 31 December 2021 . https://web.archive.org/web/20211231093212/https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA013939 . live .
  20. Brayer . Kenneth . Hammond . Joseph L. Jr. . December 1975 . Evaluation of error detection polynomial performance on the AUTOVON channel . NTC 75 : National Telecommunications Conference, December 1–3, 1975, New Orleans, Louisiana . 1 . Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers . ((8–21–5)) . 32688603 . 75 CH 1015-7 CSCB. 1975ntc.....1....8B .
  21. CRCs with even parity detect any odd number of bit errors, at the expense of lower hamming distance for long payloads. Note that parity is computed over the entire generator polynomial, including implied 1 at the beginning or the end. For example, the full representation of CRC-1 is 0x3, which has two 1 bits. Thus, its parity is even.
  22. Web site: 32 Bit CRC Zoo. users.ece.cmu.edu. 5 November 2017. 19 March 2018. https://web.archive.org/web/20180319125501/http://users.ece.cmu.edu/~koopman/crc/crc32.html. live.
  23. Payload means length exclusive of CRC field. A Hamming distance of d means that d − 1 bit errors can be detected and ⌊(d − 1)/2⌋ bit errors can be corrected
  24. is always achieved for arbitrarily long messages
  25. Book: ETSI TS 100 909. V8.9.0. January 2005. European Telecommunications Standards Institute. Sophia Antipolis, France. 21 October 2016. 17 April 2018. https://web.archive.org/web/20180417050648/http://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_ts/100900_100999/100909/08.09.00_60/ts_100909v080900p.pdf. live.
  26. Book: Class-1 Generation-2 UHF RFID Protocol. 1.2.0. EPCglobal. 23 October 2008. 4 July 2012. 35. 19 March 2012. https://web.archive.org/web/20120319154207/http://www.gs1.org/gsmp/kc/epcglobal/uhfc1g2/uhfc1g2_1_2_0-standard-20080511.pdf. live. (Table 6.12)
  27. Book: 3rd Generation Partnership Project 2. October 2005. Physical layer standard for cdma2000 spread spectrum systems. Revision D version 2.0. 2–89–2–92. 14 October 2013. https://web.archive.org/web/20131116065606/http://www.3gpp2.org/public_html/specs/C.S0002-D_v2.0_051006.pdf. 16 November 2013. dead.
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