| Depsang Bulge | |
| Pushpin Map: | Kashmir |
| Pushpin Map Alt: | Location in the Kashmir region |
| Pushpin Map Caption: | Location in the Kashmir region |
| Pushpin Label Position: | right |
| Coordinates: | 35.15°N 88°W |
| Subdivision Type: | Country |
| Subdivision Name: | India (claimed) China (controlled) |
| Subdivision Type1: | Province/Region |
| Subdivision Name1: | Ladakh Xinjiang |
| Established Date: | 1960 |
| Unit Pref: | Metric |
| Area Total Km2: | 900 |
| Length Km: | 19 |
| Width Km: | 5 |
| Elevation M: | 5000 |
The Depsang Bulge or Burtsa Bulge[1] is a 900-square-kilometre areaof mountain terrain in the disputed Aksai Chin region, which was conceded to India by China in 1960, but has remained under Chinese occupation since the 1962 Sino-Indian War.[2] The area is immediately to the south of the Depsang Plains and encloses the basin of the Burtsa Nala (or Tiannan River,), a stream originating in the Aksai Chin region and flowing west to merge with the Depsang Nala near the village of Burtsa in Ladakh, eventually draining into the Shyok River. The area is perceived to be of strategic importance to both the countries, sandwiched by strategic roads linking border outposts.[3] Since 2013, China has made attempts to push the Line of Actual Control further west into Indian territory, threatening India's strategic road.
The Depsang Bulge is immediately to the south of the Depsang Plains. The "bulge", in theoretical Indian territory (had China's 1960 claim line been implemented), encloses the basin of the Burtsa Nala ("Tiannan River" to the Chinese), one of five rivers that drain into the Shyok River after rising in Aksai Chin. Near the campsite of Burtsa, a halting place on the traditional caravan route, the Depsang Nala flowing from the north joins the Burtsa Nala. The combined river flows west to join the Murgo Nala near Murgo and eventually drains into the Shyok River.[4] All the streams bring snow-melt water, reaching the highest volume in the afternoons, and diminishing to practically nothing at other times.[5]
The Depsang Bulge contains the basin of the upper course of the Burtsa Nala, to the east of Burtsa and the traditional travel route. Based on various Indian news reports, it would appear that the Depsang Bulge area is over 19 km long east to west and about 5 km wide, giving an area of roughly 900 km2.[6] [7] Burtsa is at an elevation of 4800 metres, the source of Burtsa Nala at 5300 metres, and the surrounding hills rise up to 5500–5600 metres. Just beyond the hills to the south is another nala called the Jeong Nala ("Jiwan Nala" to the Indian military, "Nacho Chu" or "Nao Chu" on older maps), which does not have a "bulge" (Map 2).
Numerous tributary streams from the surrounding hills drain into the Burtsa Nala within the Depsang Bulge. Of particular note are two streams, both joining the main nala near a location called "Y-junction". The northern stream, Raki Nala, flows down from the Depsang Plains and hence, connects the Depsang Bulge to the Depsang Plains. The southern stream connects it to the Jeong Nala valley. Indian troops have traditionally used these two valleys to patrol the periphery of the Depsang Bulge.[8]
The so-called 1956 claim line of China is part of the "Big map of the People's Republic of China", published in 1956. It has special significance in that Chinese premier Zhou Enlai certified it to the Indian premier Jawaharlal Nehru, in a December 1959 letter, as showing the correct boundary of China.[9] The Chinese boundary in this map ran east of all but one of the rivers that drain into the Shyok River. (Map 2, green line)
In June 1960, when the Chinese delegates met the Indian delegates for border discussions, they revealed a new expanded boundary, which has come to be called "the 1960 claim line".[10] This line dissected all the rivers that drained into Shyok, except for the Burtsa Nala. (Map 2, brown line) Why the Burtsa Nala should have been singled out for this special treatment has not been explained. But the resulting "bulge" in the Indian territory around the Burtsa Nala has been dubbed the Depsang Bulge in popular parlance.
Prior to the 1962 war, the Indian Army had established half a dozen posts on the hills to the north of the Depsang Bulge. These were mostly of platoon to section strength, manned by Jammu and Kashmir Militia (Ladakh Scouts). The Chinese PLA launched its attack on 20 October 1962, with overwhelming strength, a superiority of 10 to 1 in numbers, and eliminated most of them. The remaining posts were recalled to Burtsa and other rear locations.[11] The Chinese forces advanced to their 1960 claim line in most locations.
However, at Depsang Bulge, the Chinese troops advanced further than the 1960 claim line, "straightening out the bulge".[2] (Map 2, orange line, and Map 3, yellow line) Thus, a third line emerged, from the ceasefire line of 1962. More detailed maps of the ceasefire line show a smaller bulge in Indian territory at the mouth of the valley.The US Office of the Geographer's "Large-Scale International Boundaries" (LSIB) dataset shows this boundary (red line in Map 4).
A fourth line was contained in a map attached to a letter written by the Chinese premier Zhou Enlai to heads of certain non-aligned countries (or "African and Asian nations") in the midst of the 1962 war. A more detailed version of the Chinese map was in fact used by the non-aligned nations in arriving at their Colombo proposals. (Map 3) However the Chinese apparently continue to use their version of the map, which they misleadingly call the "LAC of 1959". It is apparently not drawn to scale. But they interpret the ceasefire line here running very near the confluence of the Depsang Nala with the Burtsa Nala.[12] [13]
The Indian depiction of the ceasefire line, as shown in Maps 2 and 3, is at a considerable distance from the confluence. Indeed, the Indian base at the confluence, Burtsa, is one of the locations where defences continued to be organised even as the clashes subsided.[14] The Indian version of the ceasefire line was supported by the non-aligned countries in their Colombo proposals, (Map 3) as well as the US Government (Map 2).
After the 1962 war, both India and China were preoccupied with other issues and essentially left the border alone for several decades. By 1976, the Chinese preoccupation with the Tibetan rebels had ended and India also acquired much better information about the border. The Indian Cabinet established a China Study Group to recommend "patrolling limits, rules of engagement, and the pattern of Indian presence" along the border. Consequently, both sides gradually moved up to the line, asserting their presence. The patrols often crisscrossed, and the different perceptions of the LAC became manifest.
Between 2003 and 2008, China embarked on large-scale infrastructure development in the run-up to the Beijing Olympics.[15] Starting in 2010, the Aksai Chin Road (G219) was re-paved at a cost of $476 million.[16] Along with it, numerous improvements to the border infrastructure in Aksai Chin also became visible, increasing the pressure on the LAC. An existing road to the Heweitan military base (roughly at the head of the Jeong Nala) was improved and extended to join the Tianwendian Highway in the north. This new strategic road, labelled "Tiankong Highway", ran immediately next to the Depsang Bulge in the east. (Map 4)In 2009, a loop road was constructed in the Depsang Plains in an area called "Trig Heights", close to the LAC (or, in the Indian view, across their perceived LAC).[17] [18] Branching off from the loop road, an access road through the Raki Nala valley to Burtsa Nala was also constructed.[17] [19] By 2013, the Chinese had the ability to ply vehicles in the Raki Nala river bed. (Map 5)[20] [21]
Coupled with these constructions, the Indian Army also reported a steep rise in incursions by the Chinese PLA into Indian territory: 50 incursions during 2005, 70 in 2009 in the Trig Heights area, and 30 incursions in 2009 in the Depsang Bulge area. Given that the Indians regard the entire Depsang Bulge as Indian territory, all the constructions in the area were "Chinese intrusions".[22]
The Indians were also improving their border infrastructure during this period, albeit at a slower pace. The air strip at Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO), at the northern perimeter of the Depsang Plains, was reactivated in 2008, after a gap of 43 years. The Chinese immediately objected to this action.[23] India also commissioned a road link to DBO in 2001, scheduled to be completed by 2012. The initial road did not meet the all-weather requirement, and it had to be rebuilt on an improved alignment later, but several sections of it were available for winter use by 2013.[24]
On the night of 15 April 2013, three weeks before a scheduled visit of Chinese Premier Li Keqiang to India, a platoon of Chinese troops intruded into Indian territory and erected a tented post. The Indian border police spotted an advance patrol of theirs the next morning at a distance of 600 metres from the Indian post. Aerial reconnaissance detected the tented post on the Raki Nala, on the site of an old Indian post. It had 19 Chinese soldiers (later mentioned as 40), including five officers, two dogs, and three SUVs.[25] [21] The Chinese held placards reading "this is Chinese territory, go back".[26]
The location of the standoff was described as being 19 km inside Indian territory. Years later, the location was stated as the so-called "bottleneck" in the Burtsa Nala valley, where the rocky formation of the valley prohibits vehicular movement.[27] [28] The "bottleneck" is also close to a point called "Y-junction", where a branch valley emanates to the southeast, allowing the Indian patrols to reach other points on the LAC.
The Indian border troops set up their own tented camp 300 metres away as per the agreed protocol. India's China Study Group met and recommended stern measures to signal India's displeasure. However, prime minister Manmohan Singh decided that it should be treated as a "localised problem".[29] The local commanders of both the sides met at the Chushul–Moldo Border Personnel Meeting point. While the Indian side asked the Chinese to withdraw to original positions as per the 1976 border patrolling agreement, the Chinese produced a map they described as the "LAC of 1959". According to the map, the entire Depsang Bulge belonged to China.[30]
Indian ambassador in China S. Jaishankar picked up the matter with Deng Zhen Hua, the Director-General of boundary affairs in the Chinese Foreign Ministry, and asked for the incursion to be rolled back. Around the same time, the Indian troops in the Chumar sector in southern Ladakh constructed a tin shed at their patrol point close to the LAC. Director-General Deng asked for the structure to be removed. At the border personnel meeting on 23 April, the Chinese officers repeated the demand and also asked for the removal of "bunkers" at Fukche (also in southern Ladakh). The Indian government in Delhi sent additional diplomatic signals to force the pace of negotiations and the Indian forces detained two Chinese officials who came to investigate the shed at Chumar. The Chinese eventually disengaged on 5 May and took some retaliatory actions at Chumar.
After the 2013 standoff, India established a permanent post to the west of the Y-junction and bottleneck, from where Indian troops observed and stopped any Chinese patrols attempting to cross beyond that point. Indian patrols, however, continued their old patrol routes on foot going through the Y-junction. These patrols reached Patrol Point 10 upstream along the Raki Nala, and made a circuit through Patrol Points 11, 11A, 12, and 13, returning to the Y-junction.[31]
During the 2020–2022 China–India skirmishes, it was reported that a standoff was occurring again at the "bottleneck" or "Y-junction". As the Indian patrols attempted to go beyond the bottleneck by foot, Chinese troops were reportedly coming up in vehicles and blocking their passage.[32] [33] In order to avoid confrontation with the Chinese troops, the Indian patrols were apparently asked to not go beyond the bottleneck point.[34] Thus they were unable to reach Patrol Point 10 in the Raki Nala valley and related Patrol Points 11, 11A, 12, and 13 along their perceived Line of Actual Control.[8]
Indian government officials have claimed that the Chinese obstruction at the bottleneck has been going on since the 2017 Doklam standoff, and hence, it was a "legacy issue" unrelated to the 2020 standoff.[35] [36] Former Army officers have however contested the assertion, claiming that regular patrols have been going on ever since the 2013 Depsang standoff ended.[37]
"For many kilometres there was no drinking water and we had to trek 26 km in a single day.... it was late in the evening that we were criss-crossing the nala. It was dangerous and tiring to cross it, as it was now in floods and with no end in sight."
'It is important to note that [Zhou Enlai], in a letter of December 17, 1959, stated that the 1956 map "correctly shows the traditional boundary between the two countries in this sector."'
"As a matter of strategy, Mehta [Indian lead] sought to have the Chinese record their Western Sector claims on an authoritative map or a list of map coordinates. That way the conferees could see what the discrepancies between the claims of the two sides actually were."
"There was a rush of Indian soldiers and militiamen for reaching the rendezvous—Sasar Brangza, Burtse, Murgo or Sultan Chushku... On October 28 at 1400 hours the TAC HQ received the news that Major Randhawa was organising the defences of these camps."
"While the Indian Army asked the PLA to withdraw to its original positions as per the 1976 border patrolling agreement, the PLA produced a map, which was part of the Annexure to a letter written by Zhou to Nehru and the Conference of African-Asian leaders in November 1959 [''sic''; the correct date is November 1962], to buttress its case that the new position was well within the Chinese side of the LAC."
"The last report which was received on October 28 at 1400 hours showed that the number of stragglers at Burtse, Murgo and Sultan Chushku was about 150. These men needed food, clothing and medical attendance.... Major Randhawa was organising the defences of these camps. The task was not easy, specially in the face of the shortage of clothing, food and accommodation."
"In 2003, China initiated a major highway renovation project, which led to an upgrading of 51,000 km of roads in Tibet by the Beijing Olympics in 2008.... According to official Indian estimates, the road development undertaken by Beijing has given it the capability to move 11,500 tonnes per day whereas only 200 tonnes per day are required to sustain major military operations for sustained periods."
"The PLA had set up tents on an old patrol base of the Indian Army, as a result of which a new fortification close to Raki Nullah was hurriedly put up by Indian troopers to tackle the PLA incursion."
"However, the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) vetoed the move, as Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was of the belief that Depsang was a localized problem and would be sorted out diplomatically."
"... the PLA produced a map, which was part of the annexure to a letter written by Zhou to Nehru and the Conference of African-Asian leaders in November 1959, to buttress its case that the new position was well within the Chinese side of the LAC.... according to this map, the strategic Depsang Bulge, which gave India an option of countering any PLA attack towards DBO, belonged to China."