Barry R. Weingast Explained

Barry R. Weingast
Birth Name:Barry Robert Weingast
Birth Date:1 September 1952
Birth Place:Los Angeles, California, U.S.
Education:University of California, Santa Cruz (BA)
California Institute of Technology (PhD)

Barry Robert Weingast (born September 1, 1952)[1] is an American political scientist and economist, who is currently the Ward C. Krebs Family Professor at Stanford University and a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution. Weingast's research concentrates on the relationship between politics and economics, particularly economic reform, regulation, and the political foundation of markets.[2]

Early life

He was born in Los Angeles, California. After his secondary education, he studied at the University of California, Santa Cruz where he obtained a B.A. in mathematics in June 1973. Thereafter, he moved on to graduate studies in economics at the California Institute of Technology, which awarded him a Ph.D. in June 1978 for his thesis, "A representative legislature and regulatory agency capture."[3]

Academic career

Following his graduate studies, he became an assistant professor of economics at the Washington University in St. Louis (WUSTL) in 1977, where he also worked as a research associate at the Center for the Study of American Business before he was promoted to associate professor in 1983 and to full professor in 1986. Later, Weingast became affiliated with the Hoover Institution, first as a senior research fellow in 1987 and then as a senior fellow in 1990, which he still holds. After he left WUSTL in 1988, he was appointed as professor of political science at Stanford University in 1992, reflecting his transition from economics to political science after he left WUSTL. His current position, the Ward C. Krebs Family Professor, was awarded to him by Stanford University in 1997.

In addition to his professorship in political science, Weingast has held a courtesy appointment in economics at Stanford University since 1989 and works at several institutes affiliated with Stanford University, including the Stanford Center for International Development, the Stanford Center for International Studies, and the Woods Institute for the Environment. Before that, he was a visiting professor or scholar at the University of California, Berkeley, Cornell Law School, Virginia Law School and the Graduate School of Business at Stanford University. Weingast has also been a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences since 1996.

In the past, he has acted as the Chair and as the Director of Graduate Studies of Department of Political Science at Stanford University and as the Director and President of the International Society for the New Institutional Economics. He is also a member of the American Economic Association, American Political Science Association and the Economic History Association, among others, and he is on the board of directors of the Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Constitutional Political Economy, Journal of Policy Reform, Public Choice and Business and Politics.[4]

Research

His research interests focus on political economy, new institutional economics, regulation, and the application of rational choice theory to legal, legislative, and constitutional institutions.[5] The bibliographic database IDEAS/RePEc ranks him among the top 5% of economists according to different metrics, including average rank score, number of citations, and number of distinct works.[6] His most cited research article, co-authored with Nobel Memorial Prize laureate Douglass C. North in 1989, analyzes the development of constitutional arrangements in 17th-century England after the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and posits based on evidence from capital markets that new institutions successfully enabled the government to commit credibly to upholding property rights.[7] Further important research contributions to economics by Weingast include the following:

Weingast's recent work includes: the central role of violence in the political-economics of development (with Gary W. Cox and North); the political and constitutional foundations of Ancient Athens (with Federica Carugati and Josiah Ober).

References

  1. https://politicalscience.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/staff_cv/CV_Weingast_December_2013.pdf Curriculum vitae of Barry R. Weingast on the website of the Department of Political Science, Stanford University
  2. Web site: Barry R Weingast . 19 November 2014 . dead . https://web.archive.org/web/20141129040816/https://politicalscience.stanford.edu/faculty/barry-r-weingast . 29 November 2014 .
  3. Web site: Archived copy . 2014-11-19 . dead . https://web.archive.org/web/20141129040805/https://politicalscience.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/staff_cv/CV_Weingast_December_2013.pdf . 2014-11-29 .
  4. Web site: Archived copy . 2014-11-19 . dead . https://web.archive.org/web/20141129040805/https://politicalscience.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/staff_cv/CV_Weingast_December_2013.pdf . 2014-11-29 .
  5. Web site: Archived copy . 2014-11-19 . dead . https://web.archive.org/web/20141129040805/https://politicalscience.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/staff_cv/CV_Weingast_December_2013.pdf . 2014-11-29 .
  6. Web site: Barry R. Weingast | IDEAS/RePEc.
  7. North . Douglass C. . Weingast . Barry R. . 1989 . Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England . The Journal of Economic History . en . 49 . 4 . 803–832. 10.1017/S0022050700009451 .
  8. The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics . Journal of Political Economy . 89 . 4 . 642–664 . Weingast, Barry R . Shepsle, Kenneth A . Johnsen, Christopher . amp . 2 February 1981. 19 November 2014 . 10.1086/260997. 52083598 .
  9. Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control . Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization . 3 . 2 . 242–277 . McCubbins, Mathew D . Noll, Roger G . Weingast, Barry R . amp. 2 February 1987. 19 November 2014.
  10. Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild . Journal of Political Economy . 102 . 4 . 745–776 . Greif, Avner . Milgrom, Paul . Weingast, Barry R . amp . 2 February 1994. 19 November 2014 . 10.1086/261953. 154501745 .
  11. Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives . Journal of Economic Perspectives . 11 . 4 . 83–92 . Yingyi Qian . Barry R. Weingast . amp . 2 February 1997. 19 November 2014 . 10.1257/jep.11.4.83. free .

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