9M14 Malyutka Explained

9M14 Malyutka
AT-3 Sagger
Origin:Soviet Union
Type:Anti-tank missile
Is Explosive:yes
Is Missile:yes
Service:1963–present
Used By:Soviet Union and others
Wars:Vietnam War
Yom Kippur War
Western Sahara War
Ethiopian Civil War
Lebanese Civil War[1]
Iran–Iraq War
Gulf War
Croatian War of Independence
2006 Lebanon War
First Chechen War
Second Chechen War
Libyan Civil War
Syrian Civil War
Iraqi Civil War (2014–2017)[2]
Yemeni Civil War (2015–present)
Saudi Arabian-led intervention in Yemen
Saudi–Yemeni border conflict (2015–present)
Tigray War
2023 Israel–Hamas war
Designer:Design Bureau of Machine-Building (KBM, Kolomna)
Design Date:1961–1962
Manufacturer:Soviet Union, Russia as successor state and other countries under license and domestic versions
Unit Cost:$10,500 per missile (AT-3D, export cost 2019)[3]
Production Date:1963
Variants:9M14M, 9M14P1, Malyutka-2, Malyutka-2F
Weight:10.9 kg (9M14M)
11.4 kg (9M14P1)
12.5 kg (Malyutka-2)
~12 kg (Malyutka-2F)
30.5 kg (Launcher and guidance)[4] [5]
Length:860 mm
1,005 mm combat ready (Malyutka-2)
Width:393 mm (wingspan)
Diameter:125 mm
Range:500–3,000 m
Sights:9S415 guidance unit
Filling Weight:2.6 kg (9M14M, 9M14P1)
3.5 kg (Malyutka-2, Malyutka-2F)
Speed:115m/s (9M14M, 9M14P1)
130m/s (Malyutka-2, Malyutka-2F)[6]
Guidance:MCLOS, SACLOS (Later variants)

The 9M14 Malyutka (Russian: Малютка|links=no; "Little one", NATO reporting name: AT-3 Sagger) is a manual command to line of sight (MCLOS) wire-guided anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) system developed in the Soviet Union. It was the first man-portable anti-tank guided missile of the Soviet Union and is probably the most widely produced ATGM of all time—with Soviet production peaking at 25,000 missiles a year during the 1960s and 1970s. In addition, copies of the missile have been manufactured under various names by at least six countries.

Although they have been supplanted by more advanced anti-tank guided missiles, the Malyutka and its variants have seen widespread use in nearly every regional conflict since the 1960s and are still kept in large stockpiles and sometimes used to this day by non state actors such as Hezbollah.[7]

Development

Development began in July 1961 with the government assigning the project to two design teams: Tula and Kolomna.[8] The requirements were:

The designs were based on the Western ATGMs of the 1950s, such as the French ENTAC and the Swiss Cobra. In the end, the prototype developed by the Kolomna Machine Design Bureau, who were also responsible for the 3M6 Shmel, was chosen. Initial tests were completed by 20 December 1962, and the missile was accepted for service on 16 September 1963.[9]

Description

The missile can be fired from a portable suitcase launcher (9P111), ground vehicles (BMP-1, BRDM-2) and helicopters (Mi-2, Mi-8, Mi-24, Soko Gazelle). The missile takes about five minutes to deploy from its 9P111 fibreglass suitcase, which also serves as the launching platform.

The missile is guided to the target by means of a small joystick (9S415), which requires intensive training of the operator. The operator's adjustments are transmitted to the missile via a thin three-strand wire that trails behind the missile. The missile climbs into the air immediately after launch, which prevents it from hitting obstacles or the ground. In flight, the missile spins at 8.5 revolutions per second—it is initially spun by its booster, and the spin is maintained by the slight angle of the wings. The missile uses a small gyroscope to orient itself relative to the ground; as a result, the missile can take some time to bring back in line with the target, which gives it a minimum range of between 500mand800mm (1,600feetand2,600feetm). For targets under 1,000 m, the operator can guide the missile by eye; for targets beyond this range the operator uses the eight-power, 22.5-degree field of view, 9Sh16 periscope sight.

The engagement envelope is a 3km (02miles) wide, 45-degree arc centered on the missile's launch axis. At ranges under 1.5km (00.9miles), this arc reduces until, at the 500m (1,600feet) range, the missile can only hit targets 50m (160feet) either side of the center line. Accuracy falls off away from the launch axis—falling to approximately half its optimal accuracy at the extremes.

While early estimates of the missile hitting the target ranged from 60 to 90%, experience has shown that it can drop to an efficiency between 2 and 25% in case of less than optimal conditions and lack of skill from the operator. In fact, MCLOS requires considerable skill on the part of the operator, nevertheless, the weapon has always been quite popular with its operators and has enjoyed a constant updating effort both in the Soviet Union/Russia and in other countries.

The two most serious defects of the original weapon are its minimum range of between 500mand800mm (1,600feetand2,600feetm) (targets that are closer cannot be effectively engaged) and the amount of time it takes the slow moving missile to reach maximum range—around 30 seconds—giving the intended target time to take appropriate action, either by retreating behind an obstacle, laying down a smoke-screen, or by returning fire on the operator.https://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/amd-us-archive/fm100-2-3%2891%29.pdf

Later versions of the missile addressed these problems by implementing the much easier to use guidance system (though only available for ground vehicle and helicopter mounts), as well as upgrading the propulsion system to increase the average flight speed. The latest updates feature tandem-charge warheads or standoff probes to counteract explosive reactive armor, as well as thermal imaging systems. Even in these latest versions, the Malyutka is probably the most inexpensive ATGM in service today.

History

In Soviet service, the man-portable version was deployed as part of the anti-tank platoon of motor rifle battalions. Each platoon had two Malyutka sections, each with two teams. Each team had two launcher stations. One assistant gunner in each team served as an RPG-7 gunner. The RPG-7 was needed to cover the 500 meter deadzone created by the minimum range of the missile.

It is also an integrated part of the BMP-1, BMD-1, and BRDM-2 vehicles.

Vietnam War

On 23 April 1972, the recently organized Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) 20th Tank Regiment was attacked by the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) employing the Malyutka for the first time.[10] The 20th was the only South Vietnamese armor unit equipped with the M48 Patton tank. This first employment of the Malyutka destroyed one M48A3 and one M113 armored cavalry assault vehicle (ACAV), and a second ACAV was damaged.[11]

During this engagement with the weapon, the ARVN tankers appeared fascinated by the missile's slow and erratic flight,[11] but through experience, they soon deployed countermeasures against the weapon system. Upon launching by the enemy, ARVN crewmen would fire all their weapons towards the missile's firing position, which would make the gunner flinch and lose control of his missile. Although the gunner could take cover away from the launch site, the joystick control wire only allowed 15 meters of clearance. During the engagement, the ARVN eventually lost eight tanks to the 9M14M missile, but had developed tactics to defend themselves against it.[10]

During the Battle of Kontum (1972), 33 missiles were fired and 32 hit, destroying four tanks, two howitzers, six bunkers and seven other targets.[12]

During the Battle of Cửa Việt (1973), the PAVN put up fierce resistance to the attack, destroying 26 M48s and M113s with 9M14 missiles.[13]

Vietnam claims that throughout the war, PAVN gunner Dao Van Tien fired 134 missiles and 130 hit, destroying 23 tanks and APCs, 12 howitzers, 27 bunkers and 17 other targets.[14]

Yom Kippur War

The missile was employed by Arab armies during the initial phases of the Yom Kippur War.[15] Later in the war, the Israelis adopted new tactics and learned to neutralize the threat by employing large concentrations of artillery fire to either distract or kill the missile operators.[15] Other improvised methods used by the Israelis to defeat the Malyutkas involved firing in front of the tank to create dust, moving back and forth and firing at the source of the missile.[16] These Israeli tactics were later adopted by NATO forces to counter the threat posed by Warsaw Pact ATGMs.[16] In total, Malyutkas knocked out more than 800 Israeli tanks and other combat vehicles during the war.[17]

Libyan Civil War

Rebels of the Free Libyan Army have been filmed using Malyutkas during the Libyan Civil War.[18] [19]

Syrian Civil War

See main article: Syrian Civil War. Syrian rebels have also uploaded videos of themselves firing Malyutkas against government forces since late 2012.[20]

2023 Hamas-led attack on Israel

See main article: 2023 Hamas-led attack on Israel. On 7th October 2023, a Palestinian faction, Al-Quds Brigades uploaded a video of them on Telegram supposedly operating a Malyutka inside a building located adjacent with the Israeli border against an Israeli vehicle near Nahal Oz.[21] However, the article cited has mistaken the Malyutka used as an Iranian RAAD.[22] Similar rockets were fired in large numbers by Hezbollah on Israeli targets along the northern Israeli border during the war.

Models

Production

The Malyutka and modern derivatives are still produced in several versions in following countries:

Operators

Current

Non-state

Former

See also

References

External links

Notes and References

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