Orsha offensives (1943) explained

Conflict:Orsha offensives
Partof:The Eastern Front of World War II
Date:October 12, 1943 – November 19, 1943
Place:Orsha region, Belarus, Soviet Union
Result:German defensive victory
Combatant2: Germany
Commander1: Vasily Sokolovsky
Commander2: Gotthard Heinrici
Strength1:Western Front
310,900 men, with steady reinforcements
Strength2:4th Army
193,510 men; heavy fortifications
Casualties1:Unknown
Casualties2:Unknown

The Orsha offensives were a series of battles fought in Belarus between the Red Army and the Wehrmacht during the autumn of 1943, and into the following winter. Orsha was a main road junction with the north–south route from Leningrad to Kiev and the east–west route from Minsk to Moscow. After the failure of Operation Typhoon in the winter of 1941, Army Group Centre had spent the most part on the defensive in the central sector of the front. The time afforded to them in 1942, a distinct period of inactivity in this area, allowed the Wehrmacht to build formidable defensive positions.

Prelude

After their defeat in the Battle of Smolensk, the Wehrmacht retreated on a broad front to the Panther-Stellung line. The German 4th Army (Heinrici)—part of Army Group Centre—took defensive positions near Orsha. To the north, the 3rd Panzer Army (Reinhardt) took up defensive lines around Vitebsk, and to the south the 9th Army (Model) held the area east of Bobrujsk. The Soviet Stavka saw the liberation of Ukraine as their primary goal, so the Lower Dnieper Offensive had priority in equipment and reinforcements.

The battles

The 4th Army was in retreat to the Panther-Wotan line, pursued by the Soviets. Troops from the Soviet Western Front then launched a heavy attack on both sides of the Minsk-Moscow highway. One thrust was directed at Orsha, a main road junction, and another at Bogushevsk.[1]

Literature

Frieser K-H., Schmider K. & Schönherr K. (2007) Das deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Vol. 8, Die Ostfront 1943/44, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart: 1350 pp.

Notes and References

  1. Glantz D.M. (1995) The failures of historiography: Forgotten battles of the German‐Soviet war (1941–1945), Journal of Slavic Military Studies 8(4): 768–808