2020 amendments to the Constitution of Russia explained

The amendments of 2020, which were proposed in January 2020, are the second substantial amendments to the Constitution of Russia of 1993. To introduce these amendments, Vladimir Putin, president of Russia, held a national vote. They were approved on 1 July by a popular vote.

With Putin's signing an executive order on 3 July to officially insert the amendments into the Russian Constitution, they took effect on 4 July.[1]

History

Since the ratification of the Constitution in 1993, several amendments were proposed. In 2008, in order to extend the presidential and State Duma terms, as well as require an annual report by the prime minister for the Duma members, four articles were changed. In early 2014, eight more amendments were ratified and one repealed, which resulted in the abolition of the High Court of Arbitration and the adjustment of prosecutor assignments. In mid-2014, two more articles were changed in order to allow the president to choose up to 10% (17 members) of the Federation Council.[2]

President Putin made new proposals during his annual address to the Federal Assembly on 15 January 2020.[3] The amendments were prepared by a commission appointed by Putin, headed by academician Taliya Habrieva, Senator Andrey Klishas, and MP Pavel Krasheninnikov.[4] [5]

According to Articles 136 and 108, amendments to the provisions of Chapters 3–8, require the same approval as a federal constitutional law, that is, a two-thirds supermajority vote in the State Duma (the lower house), a three-fourths supermajority vote in the Federation Council (the upper house), and ratification by two-thirds of the 85 regional legislatures of the federal subjects (57 regional ratifications required for an amendment to come into effect).

The president formally submitted the bill to the State Duma on 20 January.[6] On 11 March, the State Duma, dominated by pro-government parties, swiftly approved the proposals in the third reading with no objection.[7] By 13 March, legislative assemblies of all 85 federal subjects approved the amendments to the Constitution.[8] On 16 March the Constitutional Court of Russia gave their approval to the amendments.[9]

Background

According to Point 3 of Article 81 of the Constitution of Russia, the same person cannot hold a position of the presidency of the Russian Federation more than two terms in a row.[10] This meant that Vladimir Putin, who was elected president in 2012 and re-elected in 2018, would not have been able to participate in the 2024 presidential election.[11] In 2018 Putin claimed he would not hold the presidency for more than two consecutive terms and denied the possibility of his participation in the 2024 election.[12] [13]

Amendments to the Constitution of Russia solved the so-called "2024 problem"[14] regarding the end of Putin's presidential term in that year.[15]

According to a Gallup International opinion poll conducted in December 2017, if the person for whom voters wanted to vote (in 77% of cases this was Vladimir Putin) was not on the ballot in the elections, 46% would not have known who else to vote for and 19% would have invalidated their ballots.[16] Valery Fedorov, the Director of the Russian Public Opinion Research Center,[17] claimed the Russian population had not thought about this problem.[18] Focus group participants gathered by the Levada Center identified two main solutions: preservation of presidential powers by Vladimir Putin and the appointment of a successor.[19] In 2018, Valery Zorkin proposed changing the constitution so Putin could remain in office.[20] However, later in March, Putin explicitly said he was not going to change the Constitution in an interview with Megyn Kelly.[21] Sergei Markov said that Putin repeatedly ruling out the abolition of term limits led to discussions of possible scenarios for 2024 to a standstill.[22] In the end, despite earlier promises, the restrictions that prevented Putin from remaining president of the Russian Federation were changed.[23]

According to political analyst Kirill Rogov, the constitutional design of Russian statehood remained unclear due to the unsuccessful experience of the "tandem" and the lack of institutions of distributed power.[24] In addition to the obvious conflict between Putin's political regime and the official state system, there were also security issues for Putin and his family if he completely leaves office, as well as issues with the constitution which guarantees that as an eventual certainty.[25]

Proposed amendments

In 2020, 41 articles were rewritten and five more were added. Excluding the 1st, 2nd and the 9th chapters, which can be changed only by calling together a Constituent Assembly and developing a new Constitution, around 60% of articles were altered. The main amendments focus on how power is distributed between the branches of government: moving away from the super-presidential system that was established in 1993 and simultaneously creating a new one based on the principle of checks and balances.

In general, the following amendments were proposed:[26] [27] [28] [29] [30]

Along with the redistribution of power initiatives, the first draft included a couple of social- and economically directed amendments. Specifically, Putin has suggested to require the minimum wage to be above the poverty line and to guarantee an annual increase in pension payments. The amendments from this block were developed by a special group consisting of parliament members, scientists and public representatives. As a result of their work, the Constitution was supplemented by articles imposing a distinct government attitude towards such things as public health, science, culture, voluntary work and young people. In addition, the amendments have a few innovations, such as regarding the Russian language as a "language of the state-forming people", protecting "historical truth" and mentioning faith in God in regards to heritage. Most of these amendments do not embody new concepts, but rather duplicate norms that are already found in federal laws. One of the amendments banned the ceding of Russian territory to foreign powers.[33] [34]

Enactment

See main article: 2020 Russian constitutional referendum. The amendments have been put to a national vote initially called for April 2020 but later postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. They were rescheduled for 1 July 2020 (with early voting allowed from 25 June 2020).

The voting procedure was decided on already during the development process. Before that there was no concept of a "nationwide voting". The approved procedure is noticeably different from a regular voting or a referendum: just a month of preparation instead of 90–100 days; the observers can be only from the Public Chambers, which are formed by federal and regional authorities; "informing the public" regarding the content of the amendments instead of agitation; no minimum voter turn-out; an online-voting option.

With 98% of the ballot counted, and with 78% voting in favor versus 22% against, the amendments easily passed.

Criticism

The amendments were seen as allowing President Vladimir Putin to continue serving as president after 2024. Under the previous version of the constitution, Putin would have been required to step down in 2024.[35]

The main debates around the whole arrangement were caused by the change of the amending procedure of the Constitution itself (which are stated in chapter 9). A new three-step procedure was imposed. After approval by federal and regional parliaments, only the third article describing the enforcement procedure of the change was enacted. After the Constitutional Court had validated the document, the second article was enacted, which regulated the nationwide voting procedure. The first article, which consists of all the amendments, can be enacted only when approved by the majority of voters.

The amendments also received criticism for contradicting the first two chapters of the Constitution. In particular, criticisms targeted the amendments which involved religious issues, the superiority of the Constitution above the interstate authority, the President's right to remove judges, and the consolidation of local authority into a "single public authority system." However, after examination of the amendments in question, as well as the one discounting previous presidential terms before the amendment enters into force, the Constitutional Court found no contradictions.

Some consider the introduction and adoption of the amendments as being a form of self-coup or autocoup as it removed term limits on the Presidency and grants Putin more authority.[36]

Foreign analysis

The New York Times wrote that the proposed prohibition of same-sex marriage was "an effort to raise turnout for a constitutional referendum that could keep him in power and has stirred big enthusiasm among Russians".[30]

The Guardian wrote that move, announced by Putin in January, was initially seen as a way for him to hold on to power after 2024, when as things stand he will no longer be able to serve as president because of term limits."[31] The Guardian further noted that "Putin's direct support for the amendments makes it likely they will go through. He has taken an increasingly conservative turn in his fourth term as president".[31]

Will Partlett has written that the amendments are an example of "theatrical constitution-making" that is being used to support authoritarian populism in Russia. The amendments therefore constitutionalise legislative trends toward centralism, personalism, and protectionism.[37]

The position of the Venice Commission

On 16 March 2020, 128 Russian lawyers, political scientists and human rights defenders, including the member of the Constitutional Conference of the Russian Federation Georgy Satarov, the professor of the Higher School of Economics, doctor of sciences in jurisprudence Irina Alebastrova, the professor of the Institute of Political Studies Sergei Guriev, and human rights defender Lev Ponomaryov, addressed to the Council of Europe with the petition requesting a legal assessment to the amendments to the Constitution. The petition was posted on Change.org where it garnered over 200,000 signatures by 27 May. On that day the Council of Europe decided to send the request to the Venice Commission. The Commission should check for compliance with European and international standards of democracy and the rule of law, as well as with Russia's legal obligations as a member of the Council of Europe.[38]

On 18 June, the opinion of the Venice Commission on the draft amendments to the Constitution (as signed by the president of the Russian Federation on 14 March) related to the execution in the Russian Federation of decisions by the European Court of Human Rights was published.[39] The Commission indicated that there is no choice to execute or not to execute the European Court of Human Rights judgment: under Article 46 of the European Convention on Human Rights the judgments of the ECtHR are binding. The proposed amendments use the notion "contrary to the Constitution", which is too broad a formula, broader than that of current Article 79 of the Constitution ("limiting the rights and freedoms of the individual and the citizen or contradicting the fundamentals of the constitutional system of the Russian Federation"). These concerns should be seen against the backdrop of the proposed amendment to Article 83 of the Constitution, empowering the Council of the Federation to dismiss the judges of the Constitutional Court at the request of the President.[40]

On 23 March 2021, the opinion of the Venice Commission on constitutional amendments to the Constitution and the procedure for their adoption was published.[41] The Commission welcomed that the amendments bring about several positive changes (the increased protection of social rights, the two-term limitation of the mandate of the President, the possibility for the President to refer to the Constitutional Court the use of a presidential veto, the constitutionalisation of the State Council, which has, already for two decades, operated based solely on an executive legal act, the extension of parliamentary control, including the possibility of carrying out inquiries into the heads of state bodies and the competence to "hear" the annual report of the Prosecutor of the Russian Federation, the introduction of a fixed six-year term for most of the Senators of the Federation Council).[42] Nonetheless, the Commission has identified some serious flaws in the Constitution and the procedure of its adoption.[43]

The Commission indicated that on a general note raising to the constitutional level (constitutionalising) existing provisions of ordinary law creates a risk of excluding the issues in question from open debate and thus restricts democracy. Constitutionalised norms become more rigid; they cannot be reviewed by the Constitutional Court and become, on the contrary, the Court's yardstick for evaluating other legal provisions.

The Commission concluded that the amendments disproportionately strengthened the position of the President of the Russian Federation and have done away with some of the checks and balances originally foreseen in the Constitution.[44] [45] The ad hominem exclusion from the term limits of the current and previous Presidents (Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev) contradicts the very logic of the adopted amendment limiting the President's mandate to two terms.[46] The unusually wide scope of immunity, taken together with rules of impeachment that make it very difficult to dismiss a President raise serious concerns as to the accountability of the President. The President has acquired additional powers at the expense of the Chair of the Government. The increase in the number of Senators appointed by the President may give the latter additional leverage, thus raising doubts as to whether the Federation Council will be independent enough from the executive to be able to exercise the monitoring functions entrusted to it by the Constitution. Taken together, these changes go far beyond what is appropriate under the principle of separation of powers, even in presidential regimes.[47]

The Commission found that the amendments to the provisions relating to the judiciary, notably the power for the President to initiate the dismissal of apex court presidents as well as presidents, vice-presidents and judges of the cassation and appeal courts on very vague grounds affect the core element of judicial independence. Taken together, the amendments to the provisions on the judiciary amount to a danger to the rule of law in the Russian Federation.[48]

Furthermore, the Commission concluded that the amendments weaken constituent subjects and local self-government bodies.[49] The inclusion of provisions referring to the Russian nation creates a tension with the multi-ethnic character of the Russian Federation.

As to the procedure of the adoption of the amendments, the Venice Commission concluded that the speed of the preparation of such wide-ranging amendments was clearly inappropriate for the depth of the amendments considering their societal impact. This speed resulted in a lack of time for a proper period of consultation with civil society prior to the adoption of the amendments by parliament.[50] [51] As a Constitutional Assembly of Russia was not convened, the Constitution was adopted after it was voted by Parliament and by the subjects of the Federation. Following these steps, the amendments had to enter into force under Article 135 of the Constitution. A negative outcome of the additional steps which were introduced ad hoc, i.e. the review by the Constitutional Court and the all-Russian vote, could not have prevented the entry into force of the amendments. It follows that the introduction of these additional steps in the procedure used to amend the Constitution created an obvious tension with Article 16 of the Constitution which safeguards "the fundamental principles of the constitutional order of the Russian Federation".

See also

Notes and References

  1. Vladimir Putin.Putin signing amendments into law .
  2. News: Россия при новой Конституции . Russia under the new Constitution . 22 June 2020 . Ведомости . ru . 29 June 2020 . 26 November 2020 . https://web.archive.org/web/20201126133307/https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2020/06/21/833103-konstitutsii . live .
  3. Vladimir Putin. Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation .
  4. News: Odehnal . Bernhard . Besson . Sylvain . 31 August 2022 . Vom Kreml in die Schweiz: Putins Juristin ist in Montreux gemeldet . . 31 August 2022 . 31 August 2022 . https://web.archive.org/web/20220831065650/https://www.derbund.ch/putins-juristin-ist-in-montreux-gemeldet-107721979487 . live .
  5. Web site: Путин создал рабочую группу по подготовке поправок в Конституцию. Interfax. ru. 2020-01-15. 2024-05-25.
  6. https://sozd.duma.gov.ru/bill/885214-7 Закон Российской Федерации о поправке к Конституции Российской Федерации "О совершенствовании регулирования отдельных вопросов организации публичной власти"
  7. Web site: (третье чтение в целом) О проекте закона Российской Федерации о поправке к Конституции Российской Федерации № 885214-7 "О совершенствовании регулирования отдельных вопросов организации и функционирования публичной власти". ГОСУДАРСТВЕННАЯ ДУМА . ru . 12 March 2020. 30 May 2020 . https://web.archive.org/web/20200530010036/http://vote.duma.gov.ru/vote/110468 . dead.
  8. https://tass.ru/politika/7968459 | Все регионы поддержали закон о внесении изменений в Конституцию.
  9. Web site: Russia's Top Court Approves Putin Reform Plan to Stay President Until 2036 . AFP . 16 March 2020 . The Moscow Times . en . 17 March 2020 . 29 November 2020 . https://web.archive.org/web/20201129044319/https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/03/16/russias-top-court-approves-putin-reform-plan-to-stay-president-until-2036-a69643 . live .
  10. Web site: Constitution of Russia. Chapter 4. The President of the Russian Federation. Article 81 . Constitution.ru . 22 March 2018 . 16 April 2016 . https://web.archive.org/web/20160416081229/http://www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-05.htm . live .
  11. Web site: All RFE/RL sites . Putin's 2024 Problem: Election Win Raises Curtain On Clouded Future . Rferl.org . 18 March 2018 . 22 March 2018 . 21 March 2018 . https://web.archive.org/web/20180321122454/https://www.rferl.org/a/putin-2024-election-raises-curtain-on-clouded-future/29107186.html . live .
  12. Web site: Путин ответил на вопрос о возможном участии в выборах-2024 . 18 March 2018 . РИА Новости . ru . 8 December 2018 . 9 December 2018 . https://web.archive.org/web/20181209125117/https://ria.ru/20180318/1516701655.html . live .
  13. Web site: Путин не намерен занимать пост президента более двух сроков подряд. Коммерсант. 25 May 2018. 25 May 2018. 26 May 2018. https://web.archive.org/web/20180526041845/https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3641992. live.
  14. Рубрики журнала The New Times Проблема 2024 .
  15. Book: Фёдоров . В. В. . Ю. М. Баскакова, Л. Г. Бызов, О. Л. Чернозуб, М. В. Мамонов, И. В. Гаврилов, М. А. Вядро . ВЫБОРЫ НА ФОНЕ КРЫМА: электоральный цикл 2016—2018 гг. и перспективы политического транзита . ВЦИОМ . 2018 . 978-5-04-152324-4.
  16. Web site: Gallup: без участия Владимира Путина выборы рискуют провалиться . www.dp.ru . 2 September 2020 . 7 April 2019 . https://web.archive.org/web/20190407030302/https://www.dp.ru/a/2017/12/20/Gallup_bez_uchastija_Vladi . live .
  17. Director of Russian Public Opinion Research Center.
  18. Web site: Михаил Ростовский . 14 March 2019 . Конец эпохи Путина: как это будет Путеводитель по будущей смене власти в России . 1 August 2019 . Газета «Московский комсомолец» . ru . 31 July 2019 . https://web.archive.org/web/20190731150232/https://www.mk.ru/politics/2019/03/14/konec-epokhi-putina-kak-eto-budet.html . live .
  19. Web site: Денис Волков . 14 May 2019 . Что думают российские избиратели о проблеме-2024 . 1 August 2019 . rbc.ru . ru . 1 August 2019 . https://web.archive.org/web/20190801110453/https://www.rbc.ru/newspaper/2019/05/15/5cda6f089a794770fbfb5ec9 . live .
  20. Web site: Anastasia Stognei . 12 October 2018 . Proposed constitutional changes reveal Kremlin splits over Putin's '2024 problem' . 1 August 2019 . thebell.io . en . 1 August 2019 . https://web.archive.org/web/20190801101202/https://thebell.io/en/russian-political-veteran-suggests-constitutional-tweaks-to-solve-putin-s-2024-problem/ . live .
  21. Web site: 10 March 2018 . Путин заявил, что не намерен менять Конституцию . 8 December 2018 . РИА Новости . ru . 9 December 2018 . https://web.archive.org/web/20181209123819/https://ria.ru/20180310/1516070848.html . live .
  22. News: Ilya Arkhipov & Henry Meyer . 12 July 2019 . Putin Seeks to Lock in Parliament Control . 1 August 2019 . bloomberg.com . 28 July 2019 . https://web.archive.org/web/20190728182343/https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-07-12/putin-seeks-to-lock-in-parliament-control-amid-falling-ratings . live .
  23. Web site: Andrew Hammond . 4 March 2018 . Putin win will put politics in flux . 1 August 2019 . gulfnews.com . 1 August 2019 . https://web.archive.org/web/20190801105604/https://gulfnews.com/opinion/op-eds/putin-win-will-put-politics-in-flux-1.2182488 . live .
  24. Web site: Кирилл Рогов . Пятый срок . ru . inliberty.ru . 18 March 2018 . 1 August 2019 . 1 August 2019 . https://web.archive.org/web/20190801123520/https://www.inliberty.ru/article/shulman/ . live .
  25. Web site: Дилемма Путина: уйти нельзя остаться . ru . newtimes.ru . 19 February 2019 . 1 August 2019 . 28 July 2019 . https://web.archive.org/web/20190728182334/https://newtimes.ru/articles/detail/177294 . live .
  26. Web site: Critics say Russian vote that could allow Putin to rule until 2036 was rigged . . 2 July 2020 . 2 July 2020 . 6 January 2021 . https://web.archive.org/web/20210106012225/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jul/02/vladimir-putin-wins-russia-vote-that-could-let-him-rule-until-2036 . live .
  27. https://sozd.duma.gov.ru/bill/885214-7 Закон Российской Федерации о поправке к Конституции Российской Федерации
  28. Web site: Рабочая группа назвала требующие корректировки статьи Конституции . РБК . 20 January 2020 . 20 January 2020 . 30 May 2020 . https://web.archive.org/web/20200530010105/https://www.rbc.ru/politics/20/01/2020/5e25889f9a79477b5a1aeb55?from=from_main . live .
  29. Web site: Law on amendment to Russian Federation Constitution . President of Russia . 14 March 2020 . 15 March 2020 . 25 January 2021 . https://web.archive.org/web/20210125163333/http://en.kremlin.ru/acts/news/62988 . live .
  30. News: Kramer . Andrew E. . Putin Proposes Constitutional Ban on Gay Marriage . 8 June 2020 . . 3 March 2020 . By including an amendment defining marriage as between a man and a woman, "they are reinventing the vote as a referendum for traditional values," said Ekaterina Schulmann, a Moscow-based political scientist. . 18 January 2021 . https://web.archive.org/web/20210118115735/https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/03/world/europe/putin-proposes-constitutional-ban-on-gay-marriage.html . live .
  31. News: Putin submits plans for constitutional ban on same-sex marriage . 8 June 2020 . the Guardian . 2 March 2020 . en . "For me, the most important proposal would fix the status of marriage as a union between a man and a woman," Pyotr Tolstoy, a vice-speaker in the Duma, told reporters . 2 January 2021 . https://web.archive.org/web/20210102183446/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/02/vladimir-putin-submits-plan-enshrine-marriage-between-man-woman-russia . live .
  32. News: Putin Proposes to Enshrine God, Heterosexual Marriage in Constitution . 8 June 2020 . The Moscow Times . 2 March 2020 . en . Putin's fourth stint in the Kremlin has seen a strong pivot to more conservative policies, with groups promoting fundamentalist Orthodox Christian views gaining more legitimacy and liberal viewpoints attacked as Moscow's relations with the West have soured. . 9 December 2020 . https://web.archive.org/web/20201209071641/https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/03/02/putin-proposes-to-enshrine-god-heterosexual-marriage-in-constitution-a69491 . live .
  33. News: Putin wants constitutional ban on Russia handing land to foreign powers . Reuters . 3 March 2020 . 1 July 2021 . 9 July 2021 . https://web.archive.org/web/20210709182955/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-putin-territory-idUSKBN20Q1DE . live .
  34. Russia's Constitutional Reforms of 2020 . 10.30965/24518921-00503003 . 2020 . Teague . Elizabeth . Russian Politics . 5 . 3 . 301–328 . 225209627 . free . 1 July 2021 . 2 December 2021 . https://web.archive.org/web/20211202015521/https://brill.com/view/journals/rupo/5/3/article-p301_3.xml?language=en . live .
  35. News: Higgins . Andrew . 1 July 2020 . The Theatrical Method in Putin's Vote Madness . en-US . The New York Times . 3 July 2020 . 0362-4331 . 3 July 2020 . https://web.archive.org/web/20200703215420/https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/01/world/europe/putin-referendum-vote-russia.html . live .
  36. Web site: Guriev . Sergei . 18 January 2020 . Putin's Meaningless Coup by Sergei Guriev . 8 December 2022 . Project Syndicate . en . 8 September 2022 . https://web.archive.org/web/20220908230426/https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/putin-speech-power-after-term-ends-by-sergei-guriev-2020-01 . live .
  37. William Partlett, Russia's 2020 Constitutional Amendments: A Comparative Perspective .
  38. News: Vorobyeva . Vera . 28 May 2020 . В Совете Европы рассмотрели петицию россиян о правовой экспертизе поправок в Конституцию . ru . Znak.com . 29 March 2021 . 5 June 2020 . https://web.archive.org/web/20200605172200/https://www.znak.com/2020-05-27/v_sovete_evropy_rassmotreli_peticiyu_rossiyan_o_pravovoy_ekspertize_popravok_v_konstituciyu . dead .
  39. Web site: 18 June 2020 . Venice Commission of the Council of Europe adopts opinion on the Russian constitutional amendments related to the execution of European Court's decisions in Russia . en . . 29 March 2021 . 7 March 2021 . https://web.archive.org/web/20210307230241/https://www.coe.int/en/web/moscow/-/venice-commission-adopts-opinion-on-the-russian-constitutional-amendments-related-to-the-execution-of-european-court-s-decisions-in-russia . live .
  40. News: Khimshiashvili . Polina . 18 June 2020 . Венецианская комиссия посоветовала изменить поправку об увольнении судей . ru . . 29 March 2021 . 20 June 2020 . https://web.archive.org/web/20200620231121/https://www.rbc.ru/politics/18/06/2020/5eeb818d9a79474d77fb7a49 . live .
  41. Web site: 23 March 2021 . Venice Commission adopts new opinion on 2020 constitutional amendments and the procedure for their adoption in the Russian Federation . en . . 29 March 2021 . 26 April 2021 . https://web.archive.org/web/20210426155131/https://www.coe.int/en/web/moscow/-/venice-commission-adopts-new-opinion-on-2020-constitutional-amendments-and-the-procedure-for-their-adoption-in-the-russian-federation . live .
  42. News: . 23 March 2020 . Венецианская комиссия оценила поправки в конституцию России . ru . BFM.ru . 29 March 2021 . 24 March 2021 . https://web.archive.org/web/20210324175505/https://www.bfm.ru/news/467964 . live .
  43. News: Dmitriev . Denis . 26 March 2021 . Самые, пожалуй, авторитетные юристы-конституционалисты в мире оценили поправки к Конституции России. Многие им не понравились — но не все . ru . . 29 March 2021 . 26 March 2021 . https://web.archive.org/web/20210326155333/https://meduza.io/feature/2021/03/26/pozhaluy-samye-avtoritetnye-yuristy-konstitutsionalisty-v-mire-otsenili-popravki-k-konstitutsii-rossii-mnogie-im-ne-ponravilis-no-ne-vse . live .
  44. News: . 23 March 2021 . Венецианская комиссия: поправки к Конституции были чрезмерно поспешными и усилили власть президента . ru . Openmedia.io . 29 March 2021 . 23 March 2021 . https://web.archive.org/web/20210323202539/https://openmedia.io/news/n3/venecianskaya-komissiya-popravki-k-konstitucii-byli-chrezmerno-pospeshnymi-i-chrezmerno-usilili-vlast-prezidenta/ . live .
  45. News: . 23 March 2021 . Венецианская комиссия нашла в исправленной Конституции диспропорциональное усиление позиции Путина . ru . Rosbalt.ru . 29 March 2021 . 24 March 2021 . https://web.archive.org/web/20210324093530/https://www.rosbalt.ru/world/2021/03/23/1893397.html . live .
  46. News: . 24 March 2021 . Венецианская комиссия выразила сожаление по поводу "обнуления" президентских сроков Владимира Путина . ru . Obshchaya Gazeta . 29 March 2021 . 29 April 2021 . https://web.archive.org/web/20210429145130/https://og.ru/ru/news/118499 . dead .
  47. News: . 23 March 2021 . Венецианская комиссия: поправки к Конституции РФ выходят за рамки уместного даже при президентских режимах . ru . . 29 March 2021 . 27 March 2021 . https://web.archive.org/web/20210327190522/https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2021/03/23/venetsianskaia-komissiia-popravki-k-konstitutsii-rf-vykhodiat-za-ramki-umestnogo-dazhe-pri-prezidentskikh-rezhimakh . live .
  48. News: . 27 March 2021 . "Серьёзная угроза верховенству права". Доклад Венецианской комиссии Совета Европы о поправках к Конституции РФ . ru . . 29 March 2021 . 28 March 2021 . https://web.archive.org/web/20210328100652/https://echo.msk.ru/programs/graniweek/2811370-echo/ . live .
  49. News: . 23 March 2021 . Комиссия Совета Европы: Поправки к Конституции усилили власть президента РФ и убрали ряд сдержек и противовесов . ru . . 29 March 2021 . 24 March 2021 . https://web.archive.org/web/20210324204305/http://www.kasparov.ru/material.php?id=605A19006658F . live .
  50. News: . 23 March 2021 . Венецианская комиссия опубликовала выводы о поправках к Конституции РФ . ru . . 29 March 2021 . 24 March 2021 . https://web.archive.org/web/20210324175647/https://www.svoboda.org/a/31165863.html/ . live .
  51. News: . 23 March 2021 . В Совете Европы обнародовали заключение по поправкам в Конституцию России . ru . . 8 May 2022 . 18 March 2024 . https://web.archive.org/web/20240318213903/https://ria.ru/20210323/popravki-1602487209.html?nw=1616506292000 . live .