| Conflict: | Prelude to the Russo-Georgian War |
| Partof: | 2006-2008 Georgia-Russia diplomatic crisis Georgian-Abkhaz conflict Georgian-Ossetian conflict |
| Date: | - |
| Place: | Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) |
| Result: | Russian invasion of Georgia |
| Combatant1: |  Georgia |
| Combatant2: | |
| Commander2: | Vladimir Putin Dmitry Medvedev Sergey Lavrov Anatoly Serdyukov Sergey Bagapsh Mirab Kishmaria Eduard Kokoity Vasily Lunev |
The prelude to the Russo-Georgian War is the series of events, including diplomatic tensions, clashes, and skirmishes, that directly preceded the August 2008 war between Georgia and the Russian Federation. Though tensions had existed between the two countries for years and more intensively since the Rose Revolution, the diplomatic crisis increased significantly in the spring of 2008, namely after Western powers recognized the independence of Kosovo in February and following Georgian attempts to gain a NATO Membership Action Plan at the 2008 Bucharest Summit; and while the eventual war saw a full-scale invasion of Georgia by Russia, the clashes that led up to it were concentrated in the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two separatist Georgian regions that received considerable Russian support over the years.
In the first months of 2008, Moscow took a series of steps that solidified its presence in Abkhazia by lifting its embargo on the region on 6 March and establishing official ties with both it and South Ossetia on 16 April. During this time, Georgia reported an increase in military buildup in the secessionist republic, in response to which it launched a drone reconnaissance program over Abkhazia to document what it alleged were Russian troop movements. The downing of a Georgian drone by a Russian military jet on 20 April was followed by a unilateral decision by Russia to increase the size of its peacekeeping force in the region and the deployment of Railway Troops at the end of May to repair parts of a strategic railroad in Abkhazia. The arrival of railway troops was followed by a series of explosions throughout Abkhazia that Tbilisi claimed to have been part of a campaign to justify the presence of Russian peacekeepers. These explosions included a deadly blast targeting separatist officials and civilians on 6 July.
Until the end of June, much of the conflict between Russia and Georgia was concentrated in Abkhazia, as were international efforts to negotiate a peace settlement. Among the latter were the Hadley-Bryza Plan which saw the Bush administration attempt to negotiate an end to the conflict between Tbilisi and Sokhumi and the Steinmeier Plan, designed by Germany to postpone debates on the political status of Abkhazia while encouraging economic partnership and trust-building measures between the two. In both cases, as well as in other, less important efforts by the European Union and the OSCE, the potential deals failed as Russian-backed Abkhaz separatists refused to reach a compromise before a complete Georgian withdrawal from the Kodori Valley, the last Georgian-held stronghold in Abkhazia and location of several clashes in previous years, including the Achamkhara incident in July 2008.
In early July, the theater had moved to South Ossetia, where skirmishes between Ossetian militias and Georgian troops turned deadly on 3 July following the attempted assassination of pro-Georgian South Ossetian leader Dmitry Sanakoyev. The International Independent Fact-Checking Mission on the Conflict in Georgia has described the events of July and early August as "low-intensity warfare". International concerns for an impending war increased as Russia held the Kavkaz-2008 military exercises in the North Caucasus, involving tens of thousands of troops training for an intervention in what some described as being Georgia. By the end of July, clashes between Georgian and South Ossetian positions in Tskhinvali and neighboring villages became daily by the end of July, only to become increasingly violent in August. On 7 August, the day when Georgia accuses Russia of having brought into South Ossetia several troops outside of its peacekeeping capacity, a series of clashes killed both Georgian and South Ossetian troops, peacekeepers, and civilians. Despite a number of unilateral ceasefires declared that day by Georgia, violence continued and culminated with the launch of a Georgian operation into Tskhinvali, usually seen as the start of the war.
Experts and governments have come at odds over which side to blame for the escalation of tensions during the months that led to the war. Tbilisi and many of its partners have accused Russia of purposely preventing conflict resolution and organizing provocations to destabilize an already fragile situation on the ground, while Moscow and the separatist governments have claimed that the Georgian government organized a series of false-flag operations to justify a military solution to the frozen conflicts.
Relations between Georgia and the Russian Federation developed in a difficult context of conflicts and civil strife throughout the former Soviet Union when the latter dissolved in 1991. In the early days of the independent Georgian Republic, its president Zviad Gamsakhurdia maintained a staunchly anti-Russian stance, accusing Moscow of seeking to destabilize Georgia and supporting separatists in South Ossetia. In turn, the Kremlin backed a coup against Gamsakhurdia in the winter of 1991-1992, bringing to power former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. Shevardnadze found himself at odds with Russia as the latter backed Abkhaz separatists in a deadly war in 1992-1993 that led to the ethnic cleansing of Georgians in Abkhazia and the displacement of close to 250,000 Georgians. Georgia nonetheless joined the Moscow-led Commonwealth of Independent States in 1993 in exchange for Russia's assistance in helping the Shevardnadze government put an end to the civil war pitting him against Gamsakhurdia.
Under the respective presidencies of Shevardnadze and Boris Yeltsin, Georgia and Russia sought to build friendly relations. The two countries signed a free trade agreement in 1994 and Russia supported a global trade embargo against separatist-held Abkhazia in 1996. At the 1999 Istanbul OSCE Summit, Moscow agreed to withdraw its military bases from Georgia by 2001. This trend was however strained as Georgia showed signs of seeking to align with the United States. The rise to power in Russia of Vladimir Putin brought a more assertive Russian position towards its neighborhood, with the new Russian leader postponing the withdrawal of bases from Georgia and unilaterally engaging in a bombing campaign in Georgia's Pankisi Valley in search of hidden Chechen terrorists.
The Rose Revolution of November 2003 that brought to power in Georgia the pro-Western government of Mikheil Saakashvili further complicated ties with Russia, despite attempts by both sides to normalize relations in the immediate aftermath of the revolution, as seen with Russia's assistance in the Palm Revolution of Adjara, the participation of Russian corporations in the major privatization drive at the center of Georgia's economic reforms, and the final withdrawal of Russian bases from Akhalkalaki and Batumi in 2007. Georgia's Rose Revolution was soon followed by Ukraine's Orange Revolution and similar movements across the post-Soviet space, while Saakashvili sought to form alliances with liberal and democratic groups throughout Eastern Europe, seeking to replace the CIS with the pro-Western GUAM and openly declaring Georgia's desire to join NATO. Tbilisi found a close ally in the United States, leading to what US diplomat Ronald Asmus would describe as a "de facto cold war between Moscow and Tbilisi," while the International Independent Fact-Checking Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (IIFFMCG) would later describe bilateral ties as "the most precarious ever between the Russian Federation and a neighboring state formerly belonging to the USSR." By the time the war began in 2008, there were reportedly 100 permanent American military advisers in the Georgian Armed Forces and more in the power structures and administrative organs of the country. Under Saakashvili, Georgia also sought to integrate into the European Union, with the country being included in the European Neighborhood Policy in 2004.
This foreign policy orientation went against Russia's imposed conditions for a normalization of bilateral ties, which were the renunciation of Georgia's NATO orientation, the recognition of Russia's special interests in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the authorization of a Russian military intervention in the Pankisi Valley. Meanwhile, Tbilisi sought a rapid settlement of the separatist conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia that would result in their reintegration into Georgia, a position that made improvements with Russia, according to the IIFFMCG's analysis, "almost impossible."
Russia considerably increased pressure on Georgia as soon as January 2006, when the explosion of a gas pipeline in North Ossetia caused Georgia to be left without most of its energy resources in the middle of winter. Tbilisi responded by cutting its dependence on Russian gas and developing a strategy to transform the South Caucasus into an independent energy corridor bringing Azerbaijani and Central Asian energy resources to Europe while bypassing Russia. In June 2008, American political scientist Zbigniew Brzezinski theorized that the Kremlin was seeking to gain control of the strategic Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline by causing conflict in Georgia. In the spring of 2006, Russia imposed a trade embargo on Georgia, banning the imports of mineral waters and wine in an attempt to apply economic pressure on the country, while hostile rhetoric increased on both sides, with President Saakashvili accusing domestic opposition forces of collaborating with Russia and comparing Russia to the "barbarous tribe of Huns".
In September 2006, Georgian law enforcement detained 10 Georgian citizens and four Russian GRU officers in Tbilisi over espionage charges, causing a diplomatic crisis and Russia recalling its ambassador from Georgia. Days later, the Georgian police besieged the Russian military headquarters in Tbilisi in search of alleged suspects involved in a 2005 terrorist attack in Gori. In response, Abkhaz and South Ossetian separatist leaders Sergei Baghapsh and Eduard Kokoity were invited to meet with Putin in Russia, while the latter imposed a travel ban to and from Georgia. The 2006 espionage controversy led to an anti-Georgian campaign in Moscow, with local police launching raids on Georgian-owned businesses, the withdrawal of Georgian-origin students from public schools, and the mass deportation of Georgian migrants from Russia, leading to three deaths in the process. British expert Mark Galeotti believes that Russia drew up plans to remove Saakashvili from power in 2006, when the North Caucasus Military District began staging increasingly elaborate and large military exercises, while Putin later admitted he had ordered the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces to draw up plans for an invasion of Georgia following the espionage scandal.
Military tensions began in March 2007, when Russian helicopters shelled Georgian positions in the Kodori Valley, a high-mountain region within Abkhazia under Georgian control. On August 7, 2007, an unexploded Russian air-to-surface missile was found in the village of Tsitelubani, near the South Ossetian conflict zone, though various theories have surfaced about this latter incident, from that of a false-flag operation by Georgia to a special operation by Russian military hardliners without the direct knowledge of the Kremlin. Two weeks later, Georgian forces allegedly downed a Russian military aircraft over the Kodori Valley.
Despite these tensions, Mikheil Saakashvili used his second inauguration speech in January 2008 to speak at length about the normalization of ties with Russia. He called "spoiled relations with Russia" the biggest regret of his first term and invited Putin to visit Georgia, while Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov attended the inauguration. On February 21, Saakashvili met with Putin at the latter's residence in Novo-Ogaryovo, agreed on a lifting of the travel ban, and launched negotiations to establish joint border controls at the Roki Tunnel and Psou river, two contentious points with the separatist regions. These negotiations would prove to be fruitless as Russia unilaterally lifted the trade embargo on Abkhazia in March, starting a series of events that eventually led to the war in August. The failure to open joint border checkpoints also resulted in Georgia's refusal to lift its veto on Russia's admission into the World Trade Organization, with Tbilisi suspending talks on the matter on April 29.[1]
In 2008, tensions had reached a low point. One senior Russian official later listed Russia's reasons for engaging in a war against Georgia, including establishing full control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia by removing Georgian-held enclaves, pushing the conflict line deeper into Georgian territory, forcing Georgia to sign a non-use-of-force treaty with the separatist republics, weakening Saakashvili's power and strengthening his domestic opposition by putting him under constant internal pressure, and putting an end to Georgia's NATO integration attempts. Meanwhile, historian Ucha Bluashvili analyzed that Saakashvili's will to launch a direct operation to bring the separatist territories back under control was inspired by his original success in Adjara, a belief that the international community would pay closer attention to the South Caucasus in case of military conflict, a conviction within his administration that Russia would not directly intervene and that the next US presidential administration following George W. Bush would not be as supportive of Georgia, and similarities with the 1999 Croatian Operation Whirlwind. However, most experts believed that Georgia would seek to avoid confrontation with Russia as Saakashvili's bid for NATO integration required domestic stability, the Georgian economy would not be able to sustain a protracted military operation, and any military conflict would risk losing the support of the Western bloc.
See also: Abkhazia conflict and Georgian-Ossetian conflict. Since the last years of the Soviet Union, Georgia has been rocked by separatist conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two autonomous regions backed by Russia. Open warfare began in South Ossetia in January 1991 when Georgian president Zviad Gamsakhurdia launched the National Guard on its capital Tskhinvali to confront armed separatist groups. The war ended with the overthrow of Gamsakhurdia a year later, resulting in the displacement of 60,000 Ossetians and 10,000 Georgians, while ceasefire terms were negotiated under the Sochi Agreement of June 1992, dividing South Ossetia into Ossetian-controlled and Georgian-controlled enclaves, creating a Joint Peacekeeping Force with Georgian, Russian, and North Ossetian battalions (known as the JPKF), and creating a tripartite Joint Control Commission (JCC) to regulate the situation in the conflict zone. In December 1993, an OSCE mission was established to assist with the political settlement of the conflict.
In Abkhazia, years of ethnic tensions between the Abkhaz minority in the autonomous republic and its Georgian majority culminated in an open war when Georgian central troops launched a military operation there in August 1992, under the guise of protecting the Transcaucasian Railway. The war lasted for more than a year and resulted in one of the bloodiest conflicts in the post-Soviet space, with nearly 30,000 deaths and 200,000 Georgian IDPs following the Fall of Sokhumi in September 1993. The Moscow Ceasefire Agreement of May 1994, later endorsed by the United Nations Security Council, created a peacekeeping force of up to 3,000 men supplied by the CIS, although Russia was its sole provider. It also established both demilitarized Security Zones and Restricted Weapons Zones on both sides of the ceasefire line, which was set as the Enguri River. In addition, the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) was created in August 1993 and strengthened in July 1994 to supervise the implementation of the ceasefire. In December 1993, the UN Secretary General's Group of Friends of Georgia was created by the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany for international cooperation to mediate the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict and in 1997, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed a Special Representative on Abkhazia.
Though the South Ossetian conflict remained mostly frozen throughout the 1990s with no progress in bilateral talks but several high-level meetings between both sides, the Abkhaz conflict remained a high-tense situation over the refusal by Abkhaz separatists to allow the return of Georgian internally-displaced persons. In January 1996, the CIS imposed a trade embargo on Abkhazia to pressure it into compromising with the central Georgian government over the IDP issue, but the lack of political will prevented any settlement and a brief armed confrontation in 1998 forced another 30,000-40,000 Georgians out of Abkhazia. UN Special Representative Dieter Boden proposed in 2001 a conflict settlement solution, known as the Boden Plan and later endorsed by the UN Security Council, that would have granted Abkhazia the status of a sovereign entity within Georgia while rejecting its secession claims and ruling out any unilateral changes to the confederate system, but Sokhumi rejected it and tensions continued to increase until another armed clash in 2001 in the Kodori Valley, a high-mountainous region in northern Abkhazia under Georgian control since the end of the 1992-1993 war, a clash that killed nine UNOMIG officers. By 2003, there were signs of progress in conflict settlement, with the Geneva Process established as a platform for regular direct negotiations between Abkhazia and Georgia under the mediation of the Group of Friends in February and the Sochi Process launched by Eduard Shevardnadze and Vladimir Putin in March to discuss the rehabilitation of the Transcaucasian Railway in Abkhazia.
Though Russia was formally a mediator and peacekeeper in both the Georgian-Ossetian and Georgian-Abkhaz conflicts, it continued to support indirectly the separatists in both conflicts. By 2000, Russia had imposed a visa regime on Georgia but not on Abkhazia and South Ossetia and around the same time, Moscow launched a "passportization" program to distribute Russian passports to locals in both breakaway republics. In 2007, Russia paid 600 million rubles in direct pensions to Abkhaz residents and 100 million to South Ossetians, while Georgia accused Russia of engaging in a "progressive annexation" of the two regions by integrating them into its economic, legal, and security space. The domestic government structures in Tskhinvali and Sokhumi were overwhelmingly run by the Kremlin, with key power positions handed over to Russian nationals. The IIFFMCG later described the situation in the early 2000s as both regions being "largely under the influence of Russia, if not more directly, then at least by means of a vetoing position." Both the UN and the OSCE agreed to let Russia be the sole peacekeeping force in the conflict zones, something that analysts have argued was done out of a lack of attention in the South Caucasus by Western powers. In 2003, the European Union appointed a Special Representative for the South Caucasus to help mediate conflicts in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, but with little effect. The International Crisis Group later described the European involvement in the region prior to 2008 as "working around the conflict instead of on the conflict." Under the Saakashvili administration, Tbilisi described Russian troops stationed in both regions "not as peacekeeping, but as keeping in pieces," referring to Moscow's alleged blocking of conflict settlement solutions. In July 2006, the Parliament of Georgia adopted a non-binding resolution rejecting Russia's role as a mediator and peacekeeper.
In South Ossetia, Eduard Kokoity, a strongman described as "fiercely anti-Georgian", came to power in 2001 and soon came at odds with the new Georgian government following the Rose Revolution. By that time, the region had become a haven for contraband and local markets became a major point of the drug trade between Russia and the Caucasus, causing Tbilisi to increase pressure on separatist authorities in the summer of 2004. An armed clash in August resulted in a failure by Tbilisi to establish control over Tskhinvali and permanently damaged the conflict resolution process in the region. In September 2004, the Saakashvili administration proposed a three-stage conflict settlement plan involving confidence-building measures, the return of IDPs, full demilitarization, and a broad constitutional autonomy for South Ossetia within a federal Georgian state, negotiations on which plan stalled rapidly. In January 2005, Saakashvili announced in Strasbourg another peace plan that involved constitutional guarantees for an elected autonomous government, an autonomous legislature with discretion on social, economic, education, cultural, law enforcement, and environmental affairs, and automatic representation in all branches of the central government. The plan also envisioned the establishment of free economic zones and the creation of a special commission to investigate war crimes committed in the 1990s. Though Tskhinvali originally rejected the peace plan, it was later endorsed in October by both Russia and South Ossetia when Georgia started an international campaign against Russia's peacekeeping status and in December, South Ossetia stalled the plan by making a counter-proposal that would have essentially implemented the same measures but over several decades.
Tbilisi engaged in a double-sided approach towards South Ossetia after the failure of the 2005 peace plan. It increased pressure and isolation of the Kokoity government while engaging in a soft power campaign to win the favor of the civilian population through subsidy programs, pensions, health care, and television campaigns. In July 2005, Georgia organized a donors' conference in Batumi for South Ossetia without the participation of Kokoity. In November 2006, while Kokoity was reelected, Georgia held a parallel election in the territories under its control in South Ossetia, which resulted in the election of Dmitry Sanakoyev as an "Alternative President", with jurisdiction over Georgian villages in the conflict zone. Months later, Tbilisi legitimized Sanakoyev as Head of a Provisional Administration of South Ossetia based in the village of Kurta and sought to change the JCC negotiating format into a 2+2+2 format (Georgia and Russia, the European Union and the OSCE, and the Kokoity and Sanakoyev administrations).
Russia increased its grip over the two regions during the Saakashvili years. In 2006, it built a 2,500-man-strong military base near Tskhinvali and renovated the Soviet-era Ugardanta Base in Java, staffing it with troops independent from the JPKF, while shootings between South Ossetian militias and Georgian police became increasingly frequent. In June 2007, Russia and South Ossetia vetoed a third peace proposal that would have made Moscow a guarantor of peace, abandoned Georgia's efforts to change the peacekeeping format, created a special travel regime for South and North Ossetians, and launched major economic programs, with doors left open for a rejection of future NATO integration, an agreement compared to the 1921 Treaty of Kars with Turkey. It was only in 2008 that the OSCE recognized that the "existing negotiating format on South Ossetia was not conducive to conflict resolution."[2] In Abkhazia, tensions increased after a special police operation in the Kodori Valley in 2006 expelled local warlords and allowed Tbilisi to establish full control of the valley, leading Sokhumi to demand the withdrawal of Georgian troops from the region. In March 2007, Russian helicopters fired at Georgian public infrastructure in the Kodori town of Chkhalta, while in September, a skirmish between Georgian special forces and a group of Abkhaz and Russian mercenaries led to the killing of several Russian GRU officers. In November 2007, a Russian peacekeeping unit tried to forcefully take control of a government-sponsored youth camp in the conflict zone village of Ganmukhuri, leading to Georgia launching a campaign to internationalize the peacekeeping force in Abkhazia.
On the other hand, Georgia was accused of engaging in hostile and militaristic rhetoric, especially related to Abkhazia, with Saakashvili promising IDPs a return to the region before "the next winter" during his 2008 presidential campaign. A January 2008 report by the UN Secretary-General talked of "a widespread sense of uncertainty and alarm was fueled by an almost daily flow of inaccurate reports originating in the Georgian media and the Georgian authorities themselves." Defense Minister Irakli Okruashvili, before his 2006 resignation, talked publicly of military intervention against Tskhinvali and hinted at plans that would happen "whether the West agreed or not." And yet, that rhetoric came in sharp contrast with the several peace plans made by the Saakashvili administration over the years, Tbilisi's efforts to increase both UN and EU presence in the regions, and Western powers' lack of responsiveness to these initiatives.
See also: Kosovo independence precedent. Tensions between Georgia and Russia also increased in the context of Kosovo's declaration of independence and its Western backing. Vladimir Putin had drawn comparisons between Kosovo on the one hand and Abkhazia and South Ossetia on the other already in 2006 following the independence of Montenegro, when the Kremlin affirmed "respect toward the principle of territorial integrity", while "pointing out that South Ossetia's right to self-determination is an equally respected principle in the world community.". Speaking shortly thereafter, Putin questioned, "if someone takes the view that Kosovo should be granted state independence, then why should we withhold the same from Abkhazia and South Ossetia?" At the 2006 Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit, Russia and China declared separatism as one of the "evil forces challenging global security.".
Western powers rejected the notion that a recognition of Kosovo could create an international precedent legitimizing separatist movements, despite warnings, among others by EU Common Foreign Policy High Representative Javier Solana who predicted "unintended consequences for Georgia" in case of a Western recognition of Kosovo. Proponents of Kosovo's independence issued verbal reassurances over the years to the Saakashvili administration that there would be no Kosovo-Abkhazia-South Ossetia parallel, despite warnings by Russia that there would be an "asymmetric response". At the 2007 Munich Security Conference, Putin warned Western powers that he would "not allow Russia to lose any more of its periphery." Days before Kosovo's independence declaration in February 2008, Putin announced that Russia had "homework" prepared in response to an incoming declaration.
In the months leading up to Kosovo's independence declaration, Mikheil Saakashvili sought to warn his allies about potential risks for Georgia. In official letters to U.S. President George W. Bush and other Western leaders, he called on them to "keep Georgia and its vulnerabilities in mind" when working on a solution for Kosovo. Tbilisi saw a forced unilateral declaration as the worst possible outcome for its interests, which made Saakashvili push for a final settlement of the Kosovo crisis with a mutual agreement of partition with Serbia, which would in turn have created a precedent for a peaceful settlement of the Abkhaz conflict. Ronald Asmus criticized the lack of any preventive strategy to "shield Tbilisi or to mitigate such consequences - except for weak diplomatic talking points" and argued that in preparation for a Russian retaliation, the United States and the European Union should have pushed for an expansion of UNOMIG and the OSCE mission in South Ossetia to help control dynamics on the ground.
On February 17, 2008, Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence and was immediately recognized by the United States and a majority of Western European powers. That same day, an informal gathering of CIS leaders in Moscow allowed Putin to call the development a "terrible precedent": In private conversations with Saakashvili, Putin detailed his plan to eventually lift the Abkhazia trade embargo and establish relations with both the latter and South Ossetia, moves that precipitated the prelude to the August war and even threatened to "transform Abkhazia into Northern Cyprus" by establishing a direct military occupation of the province. On February 18, the Russian Federal Assembly passed a joint declaration calling on the Russian Government to change its policy towards frozen conflicts in the near-abroad[3] and on March 13, the State Duma called a special session to discuss the recognition of separatist republics in the post-Soviet space. Boris Gryzlov, Chairman of the State Duma, held a meeting with separatist leaders Sergei Baghapsh and Eduard Kokoity and pledged that Russia would "reshape its relations" with self-proclaimed republics, while both used the Kosovo declaration as an opportunity to forge closer alliances with Russian hardliners.[4] But within days, Putin dismissed allegations he would outright recognize Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Moldova's Transnistria, stating that Russia "would not behave like a monkey."[5]
Putin told Saakashvili on February 17, "You understand, I cannot leave the West without a response after Kosovo, and I'm sorry but you are understood as part of this response," to which the Georgian leader responded with reciprocal threats hinting at supporting independence movements in the North Caucasus. Russian legal experts developed a rhetoric claiming that Abkhazia's case for independence had "more moral, historic, and legal grounds" than that of Kosovo's and rejected the latter's "special case" claim. These arguments were vehemently rejected by Western powers, who themselves called Kosovo's independence casus sui generis. In a memo, The Heritage Foundation pointed at key differences between Kosovo and Georgia's breakaway republics:[6] Kosovo spent seven years under direct UN administration before declaring independence, its recognition by the UN Security Council was only prevented by a Russian veto, independence for Kosovo was endorsed by UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari and was backed by the European Union, NATO, most members of the Kosovo Contact Group, and official UN bodies, and while Kosovo was itself a victim of ethnic cleansing, the same could not be said about Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Dutch academic Jelger Groeneveld underlined that Kosovo had to negotiate "standards before status", fulfilling over 100 conditions in good governance and securing the right to return to Serb IDPs before declaring its independence.[7] Georgian Professor Levan Alexidze rejected the notion that a "generally recognized precedent undermining the inalienability of the territorial integrity of states" had been created by Kosovo, because of the latter's unique international and humanitarian factors.[8] Marco Siddi of the University of Edinburgh argued that the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was a violation of international law just as much as that of Kosovo, as secession is only recognized under the principles of decolonization or deoccupation.[9] Gearóid Ó Tuathail of Virginia Tech described Russia's claims of "humanitarian action" in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which it compared to Western support for Kosovo, as "cynical",[4] while author Christopher Hitchens called the comparison "moral sloth".[10] Vladimir ðorñević of Masaryk University rejected considering Kosovo's independence recognition as a precedent as that principle was not applied by Russia towards any other separatist debates in the world, despite existing conflicts in Northern Cyprus, Artsakh, Somaliland, and others,[11] while a logical continuation of the Kremlin's arguments would have led to Russia recognizing Kosovo, which it has not to this day.[12] Professor William Slomanson of the Thomas Jefferson School of Law has called for the establishment of an international legal definition of legitimate separatism to avoid drawing similar parallels.[13]
In the wake of the Kosovo declaration of independence, Russia actively changed its policy towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but not towards Artsakh and Transnistria, indicated the precedent was used to apply pressure on Georgia,. while avoiding similar conflicts with Azerbaijan and Moldova. European Parliament Member Laima Andrikienė called on Russia to withdraw from the breakaway republics, abandon management of the frozen conflicts to the international community, and seek a "real chance to reach a long-awaited solution in everyone's interest" if it wanted to use Kosovo as an actual precedent.[14] At an UN Security Council session in August 2008, Costa Rica rejected similarities between the cases of Serbia and Georgia because of the use of force by Russia.[15] Russian allies mostly rejected the precedent as well, with Armenia, Kazakhstan,[16] and Tajikistan admitting they could not recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia without doing the same for Kosovo, though some aligned with Moscow's position: when recognizing the independence of Georgia's separatist republics, Nicaragua argued that "Kosovo should have remained part of Yugoslavia but South Ossetia and Abkhazia were different for ethnic, historical, and geographic reasons."[17]
Georgia met Kosovo's declaration of independence by entirely withdrawing from NATO's KFOR mission,[18] while Saakashvili held a meeting with UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to discuss the implications of Kosovo's independence on Georgia.[19]
The declaration of independence of Kosovo remains recognized as one of the causes that precipitated Russia's invasion of Georgia in August 2008 [20] [21] and its eventual recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, with Putin announcing a series of "pre-designed plans". Russian leaders later compared Russia's invasion of Georgia with NATO's 1999 Operation Allied Force.[4] Saakashvili, however, rejected the notion that tensions were launched by the Kosovo development: at a meeting with EU Foreign Ministers in May 2008, he pointed out to Russian advertisement campaigns pointing out to Abkhazia as a destination in the framework of the 2014 planned Sochi Winter Olympics, allegedly indicating already-existing plans to annex Abkhazia "much earlier than Kosovo's independence was recognized."[22]
Russia would use the case of Kosovo again as international precedent to justify its annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its recognition of the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics in 2022.[23]
Georgia had considerably increased its military resources in the years leading up to the war, especially since the Rose Revolution and Georgia's announced desire to join NATO. From 2004 to 2007, military spending went from 1% of the national GDP to 8%, with a historical record being reached in 2007 with 1.5 billion GEL, or 9.2% of Georgia's national GDP, and an 840% increase from 2004.[24] The number of active troops went from 20,000 in 2004[25] to 33,000 on the eve of the war, while the Saakashvili administration introduced a reservist training program in 2005 that trained 100,000 reservists by 2008. In December 2006, the Georgian Parliament adopted a law requiring all men from 27 to 40 years old to undergo 18 days of compulsory military training once every two years. Tbilisi justified its military buildup with a general militarization of the South Caucasus, both Armenia and Azerbaijan experiencing higher military expenditures in the same years, and with an attempt to rapidly modernize the Georgian Armed Forces to meet NATO standards. Critics of the latter have argued that official US recommendations at the time pointed out to defense spending increases as being "over target".[26]
In September 2007, a fifth brigade of 2,500 regular troops was added to the Georgian Armed Forces, bringing up the total of active servicemen to 32,000. Around the same time, the Georgian Ministry of Defense started the construction of a new military base in Khoni, near the Abkhaz conflict zone, the rehabilitation of the Kopitnari Military Airfield in Kutaisi, and the reconstruction of outdated military infrastructures in Vaziani, Vashlijvari, and Kobuleti.[27] Describing the overall trend in Georgia's military buildup, the IIFFMCG stated that "few did not see this as a message," while rhetoric from high-ranking hardliners close to the Saakashvili administration did little to quell those concerns. In March 2008, MP Givi Targamadze, the highly influential chairman of Parliament's Defense and Security Committee, stated his support for the reintegration of Abkhazia and South Ossetia "with the help of our armed forces."[28] During a high-stakes and confidential meeting between Abkhaz and Georgian officials in Sweden in June 2008, MP Nika Rurua added that restoring Georgia's territorial integrity "would be achieved through war or peace."[29]
Much of Georgia's military buildup happened with the direct assistance of the United States and other Western powers, notably Turkey, Germany, Bulgaria, and the Czech Republic, as well as allies like Ukraine and Israel.[30] According to Russian intelligence reports, before Russia's invasion of Georgia, Georgia was awaiting the delivery of high-technology weapons from France (including Mirage 2000 fighter jets and Mistral missile systems) and several Black Hawk helicopters from the United States.[31] The Saakashvili administration justified the upgrading of Georgia's weaponry with its increased involvement in international security missions, with Tbilisi recommitting its participation in the Iraq war in March 2008 for another six months[32] and announcing at the same time the deployment of 350 soldiers to Afghanistan by September.[33] In turn, Russia criticized the close military ties between Georgia and NATO states, notably the presence of Western military advisers in the country and the holding of international military exercises on Georgian territory. In the months preceding the war, Russian and Abkhaz intelligence accused Georgia of amassing troops in the Kodori Valley and of holding regular military exercises near the Abkhaz conflict line, though these allegations were not confirmed by UNOMIG.
In response to international concerns, Georgia took a series of steps to reform its military. In 2004, Mikheil Saakashvili appointed the first-ever civilian to the post of Minister of Defense, while the latter's staff soon moved to a mostly civilian make-up, though critics argued that spending lacked transparency nonetheless.[34] In May 2008, the Government of Georgia published a five-year budgetary plan that showed a progressive decrease in military expenditures to reach 2.3% of the national GDP by 2012.[35] In preparation for the incoming clash, the Government walked back its plan and increased defense spending in June by an additional 300 million laris.
Within days of Kosovo's declaration of independence, a series of events took place in Abkhazia that led to a rise in tensions between Georgia and Russia. On February 28, Russia announced the creation of voting precincts throughout Abkhazia and South Ossetia for the 2008 Russian presidential election, a move criticized by Tbilisi. Georgian MP Shota Malashkhia claimed that ethnic Georgians in Abkhazia's Gali district were coerced to vote in the elections, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs delivered a formal protest to Russian Ambassador Vyacheslav Kovalenko. On February 29, Abkhaz separatists launched large-scale military exercises in the Ochamchire district, close to the ceasefire line, exercises that would be repeated in late March. On March 5, the People's Assembly of the Republic of Abkhazia held an emergency session to discuss "attacks against residents of Gali, including kidnappings, pogroms, activities of Georgian terrorist and raiding groups, and more," at the end of which it issued a call for the withdrawal of all Georgian presence from the Kodori Valley and for Russia, the United Nations, the OSCE, and "other international organizations" to "influence the Georgian government" against the use of military force and to force them to "put an end to their terrorist activities."
On March 6, in parallel with a NATO informal meeting in Brussels to discuss granting Georgia a Membership Action Plan,[36] the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia announced Moscow's departure from the 1996 Decision of the Council of the Heads of State of the CIS On Measures to Regulate the Conflict in Abkhazia, also known as the Abkhazia Sanctions Treaty, a trade embargo on Abkhaz separatists first implemented to pressure them into allowing the return of Georgian IDPs. Though Russia had long been accused of regularly violating the treaty over the years and increasingly since the Rose Revolution, notably in private banking, energy, real estate, and transportation, Moscow justified its departure, citing a "change in the circumstances" on the ground and claiming that Sokhumi had been "fulfilling its obligations" in IDP resettlement, assessing that "most Georgian IDPs" had been returned to Gali,[37] a claim vehemently denied by Tbilisi. In its explanatory note, the Russian MFA also justified its departure from the sanctions treaty with Georgia's "installation of a subordinate administration" in the Kodori Valley, referring to the Government-in-exile of the pro-Georgian Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia.[38]
In withdrawing from the sanctions treaty, Russia called on other CIS member states to follow suit, although none would do so. Alexey Ostrovsky, chairman of the State Duma's Committee on CIS Affairs, argued that other states rejected Russia's call because of fears for their own domestic separatist issue, such as Moldova's Transnistria and Azerbaijan's Karabakh. Benita Ferrero-Waldner, European Commissioner for External Relations, accused Russia of "paving the way for recognition of Abkhazia",[39] a view disagreed by US Assistant State Secretary Dan Fried at the time, calling the idea of recognition "too extreme".[40] US officials, including UN Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, believed at the time that the withdrawal from sanctions were meant to facilitate the transfer of weapons to Abkhaz separatists.
Russian media reported that Vladimir Putin had warned Saakashvili about this decision already two weeks before during a meeting in Moscow.[41] Georgia nonetheless condemned Russia's move. The Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs called it "immoral and dangerous" as, it argued, it legitimized the ethnic cleansing of Georgians in Abkhazia and declared that a "new phase" was starting in the regional conflict.[42] Parliament Chair Nino Burjanadze accused Russia of being involved in a "formal annexation" of Abkhazia, a comment shared by Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt. Georgia's UN Ambassador Irakli Alasania called the decision a "serious threat of destabilization" and criticized the United Nations for having "failed to resolve the conflict".[43] Georgian MPs floated the idea of demanding 20 billion dollars from Russia for compensation for losses in Abkhazia and a resolution was drafted condemning Russia's lifting of sanctions and scrapping the CIS peacekeeping format,[44] a resolution eventually dropped in hopes for Russia to walk back its decision.[45]
Russia's withdrawal from the embargo was praised by the Abkhaz separatist authorities, who called on other states to follow Moscow's call.[46] Ambassador Kovalenko called on Tbilisi to also lift its sanctions on Abkhazia, calling it "a way out of the deadlock",[47] though officials in Moscow stated that the decision did not reject Russia's recognition of Georgia's territorial integrity. Leonid Slutsky, Chairman of the Duma's Foreign Affairs Committee, blamed the sanctions for the economic collapse and isolation of Abkhazia[48] and stated that the withdrawal was a form of "encouragement" to promote conflict resolution.
Though many observers believed that the decision in itself did not change the situation on the ground as the sanctions had become inoperative for years, Georgia views the March 6 withdrawal as the first of a series of events that severely increased tensions between Tbilisi and its breakaway regions, eventually leading up to the war in August. This development was also a turning point for many of Georgia's international supporters to adopt a more open stance on Russia's role in the conflict, with the United States starting to back Tbilisi's calls for an internationalization of the peacekeeping force in Abkhazia after March 6.[34] A September 2008 report by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe stated:[49] Despite Russian denials,[50] Tbilisi claimed that the withdrawal of sanctions opened the doors for the large-scale sale of weapons to Abkhazia and at a meeting of the National Security Council on March 7, Mikheil Saakashvili declared a "policy of zero tolerance" towards the militarization of Abkhazia.[51] And though sanctions on Abkhazia were lifted, Russia continued to enforce its 2006 embargo on the rest of Georgia.[52]
On March 7, the People's Assembly of Abkhazia adopted a resolution calling on the international community, and specifically Russia, to recognize Abkhazia's independence.[53] On March 15, during a speech to soldiers at the Gori military base, President Saakashvili rejected the signing of a non-use-of-force treaty with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, one of Russia's demands, as long as "existing agreements are being broken",[54] a statement criticized by South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity, who accused Tbilisi of being "incapable" of having a constructive dialogue with the separatists.[55]
See also: 2008 Bucharest summit. Georgia had indicated a desire to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization since the 1990s when it joined the Partnership for Peace in 1994, contributed troops to the Kosovo Force in 1999, and declared its intent to integrate the Alliance during the 2002 Prague Summit. Relations between Tbilisi and NATO increased following the Rose Revolution, with a NATO office opening in Georgia and a special representative of the NATO Secretary General appointed in 2004 and Georgia being granted Intensified Dialogue in 2006. At a January 5, 2008 nationwide referendum, 77% of Georgians voted in favor of NATO membership, which led to Georgia making a formal request for a Membership Action Plan (MAP) on February 14, a step it saw as a guarantee for stability. The Saakashvili administration's eagerness to join NATO was not, however, shared by many Western powers, with German leaders underlining their "skepticism" throughout the process. Regardless, the two sides took several steps to deepen ties in the months preceding the war: on March 12, Georgia joined NATO's Cooperative Airspace Initiative (an airspace control database exchange program)[56] and on March 26, the NATO-Georgia Council met for the first time in Brussels, bringing together ambassadors from each NATO member state and Georgia.
Russia was staunchly opposed to Georgia's integration into NATO, with Foreign Minister Lavrov declaring that Moscow would "spare no efforts to prevent" Georgia's membership.[57] On the one hand, the Kremlin emboldened separatists in Abkhazia and South Ossetia to apply pressure against Tbilisi, Russian NATO Ambassador Dmitry Rogozin warning that the "real secession of Abkhazia and South Ossetia" would begin as soon as NATO indicates that Georgia could join the Alliance[58] and arguing that their independence would be legitimized as both territories rejected NATO integration. Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin stated that Georgia would lose the regions "forever" by joining the Alliance.[59] The State Duma held discussions on a resolution calling on Vladimir Putin to recognize the independence of the breakaway republics were Georgia to join the Alliance.[60] On the eve of the Summit, Abkhaz leader Sergei Baghapsh called on NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer to take into consideration Sokhumi's concerns before the Alliance made a decision,[61] while Putin addressed both Baghapsh and his South Ossetian counterpart Eduard Kokoity in a letter, pledging "practical, not declaratory" assistance from Russia and calling both leaders "presidents". Moscow also issued indirect threats of conflict in case of the MAP being granted to Georgia and Ukraine: on March 25, Russian President-elect Dmitry Medvedev warned that a decision in favor of Tbilisi and Kyiv would "threaten European security",[62] while Russian diplomats underlined the "risk of war" if NATO were to expand to the South Caucasus.
Tbilisi sought to appease Russian concerns by stating openly that NATO integration was not meant as a threat to Russian interests. Parliament chairwoman Nino Burjanadze recognized that Georgia's NATO aspirations aggravated ties with Russia but expressed hope for an "eventual" improvement in bilateral relations.[63] These comments were in contrast with those of hardliners in the Georgian government, such as Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili, who stated openly that NATO membership would allow Georgia to open new energy routes to Europe bypassing Russia. Russian media engaged in a large-scale campaign against Georgia's NATO integration, described by Tajik journalist Oleg Panfilov as "information warfare", claiming that the "political elites" of Georgia were at odds with the views of "the people" and alleging that a new wave of NATO enlargement was part of a plan to launch a direct attack on Russia. In its campaign, Moscow sought to build on open divisions with NATO. On March 15, President Saakashvili stated that "huge pressure is being exerted on some European countries" to reject Georgia's MAP.[54]
Georgia's NATO integration was most backed by the United States, although high-level officials in the Bush administration, namely Condoleezza Rice and Robert Gates were at odds with the White House's most ardent neoconservatives, including Vice-President Dick Cheney, over when to grant the country the MAP. On February 14, the United States Senate passed Senate Resolution 439 urging the North Atlantic Alliance to grant both Georgia and Ukraine the MAP and President Bush gave his "unwavering support" on March 19 at a meeting with Saakashvili in the White House.[64] Shortly before the April Summit, the Bush administration issued a formal list of its positions, underling that "NATO must make clear that it welcomes the aspirations of Georgia and Ukraine for membership in NATO and offers them a clear path forward toward that goal."[65] During a visit to Kyiv on April 1, Bush once again reiterated his backing for the two countries' NATO integration, believing that granting the MAP would protect them from a growing Russian threat, would encourage them to pursue democratic reforms, and would be a reward for their "courage in being able to confront Russia to join the Western bloc." The United States was joined by a coalition of Central and Eastern European states in supporting granting Georgia the MAP, namely Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, and the Czech Republic, who lobbied the Bush administration for more active backing of Tbilisi and Kyiv, as well as Denmark and Canada.[66]
Ahead of the Bucharest Summit, the Alliance was evenly divided. Germany, whose relations with Washington had been strained since its opposition to the Iraq war, led the anti-MAP coalition, arguing that Georgia had failed democratic standards in its latest presidential election and fearing a souring of its relations with Moscow. On March 10, at a meeting with the Bundeswehr command in Berlin, Chancellor Angela Merkel rejected the notion that "states involved in domestic and regional conflicts" should apply for NATO membership and directly stated her opposition to Ukraine's and Georgia's integrations during a press conference with Vladimir Putin in Moscow. Germany was joined in its opposition with France, with Prime Minister François Fillon stating in an interview on French television that Paris would reject Georgia's request.[67] In an attempt to reach a compromise, President Bush opened a back channel for negotiations with Berlin and Paris through his National Security Council and though the sides sought a compromise through a proposal for a "Less than Membership Plan", talks failed when Saakashvili rejected it as "rubbish"[68] and German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier forced Merkel to back out of any deal. On April 4, Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy held a press conference ahead of the Bucharest Summit and formally opposed the integration of Georgia and Ukraine into the Alliance. In that, they were joined by Italy, Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Greece, Luxembourg, Turkey, and Norway. [69] Some states argued for the Alliance to review the question after the May Georgian parliamentary elections, while the strongest opponents wanted to see a resolution of the separatist conflicts before any decision could be made. Former Estonian Prime Minister Mart Laar criticized opponents of Georgia's NATO bid as "discouraging not only Tbilisi but other countries trying to embrace democracy."
The Bucharest NATO Summit took place on April 2-4, 2008 and was described as "the most contentious and dramatic NATO meeting ever." Discussions on Georgia within the North Atlantic Council spanned for more than 36 hours[70] but the sides failed to reach an agreement on granting Georgia a MAP. An original compromise between Bush and Merkel saw the Alliance declare granting Georgia and Ukraine the MAP an "ultimate goal", a draft that was vetoed by Lithuania, Romania, and Poland, who forced the NAC to pledge future membership to the two countries. American foreign policy expert Angela Stent has called this compromise "the worst of both worlds" as it failed to provide a clear timetable, even though the Allies agreed to review the situation at the next summit in December,[71] while sending Russia a signal that it could use existing conflicts to veto Georgia's NATO integration. Asmus criticized the Bush administration for never engaging in an all-out campaign to support Georgia's bid, while some have called the Bucharest Summit the first case of open divisions within the Alliance.
Russia extensively lobbied the Summit against Tbilisi's bid, first through Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko and then by Putin himself, who arrived in Bucharest after the Alliance's final decision [72] and congratulated Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer for "standing up to the Americans", while criticizing promises of future membership for Georgia and Ukraine and calling it a "direct threat" to Russia. British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, Merkel, and Sarkozy convinced Bush to sit down with Putin during the summit, a meeting during which the Russian leader spoke extensively against NATO enlargement and called Ukraine a "Soviet invention".[73]
The December deadline set by NATO has been described as an incentive for Russia to "do everything" to prevent the integration of Georgia. Days after the summit, Russian Armed Forces Chief of Joint Staff Yuri Baluyevsky announced "steps of a different nature" to block Georgia's path, a statement described as a direct military threat by Georgian officials. Russia's First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov discussed publicly the need to refocus Russian manufacture on the "needs for war", while Nikolay Bordyuzha, Secretary General of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, pledged to "respond to NATO's enlargement". The Saakashvili administration, influenced by the Bush White House, sought to put a positive spin to the Bucharest Summit decision, arguing that the promise for future membership was "even better" than the MAP, though privately, Georgian officials saw it as a "window of opportunity" for Russia to "blow up Georgia" before December to make the MAP unattainable. Analysts have argued that the Kremlin was emboldened to intervene in Georgia before the end of 2008 because of the Bucharest Summit. In a speech during the August war, Saakashvili blamed the conflict on NATO's failure to provide Georgia a clear path of integration in Bucharest, comparing the summit to the Munich Agreement:
According to Asmus, Russia was emboldened not by the MAP decision, but rather by obvious signs of division within NATO, interpreting it as a sign of weakness in the West. Much like Kosovo's declaration of independence, the Bucharest Summit helped trigger a series of events that eventually led to the war in August, and so despite attempts by Bush to appease Putin at a meeting in Sochi days after the summit.[74] Polish President Lech Kaczyński threatened to veto all future EU-Russia negotiations before Georgia was granted the MAP.[75] On the sidelines of the 34th G8 Summit in Japan, President Medvedev declared NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine a "red line" for Russia[76] and on July 12, a new foreign policy concept paper approved by the Russian government formally pitted Moscow's against Georgia's Euro-Atlantic integration.[77] Rogozin warned on July 8, a month before the Russian invasion, that Moscow "would not allow" NATO expansion in its "zone of interest". U.S. Senators Joe Biden and Richard Lugar later criticized NATO's "attempt to appease Russia by denying the MAP to Georgia and Ukraine" as Moscow soon began operations to "sabotage the peace process".
Though Russia formally played the role of mediator in the conflicts between Georgia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, it enjoyed a strong influence in the separatist governments years before 2008 and exerted control via key security officials and financial assistance to what Tbilisi called "Russian proxy regimes". In Abkhazia, these officials included, before 2008, Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Pavlyushko (previously head of the Russian peacekeeping contingent in the region), Chief of General Staff Anatoly Zaitsev (also a high-ranking official in the Russian Ministry of Defense), and Deputy Security Council Secretary Alexander Voinsky (also a Commander in the Russian Navy). In South Ossetia, the power elite was described by Russian journalist Julia Latynina as a "joint business venture between KGB generals and Ossetian entrepreneurs using money allocated by Moscow", while the Kremlin was thought to hold a "direct line" with the office of local leader Eduard Kokoity, though questions remain as to who exerted influence on the latter from the Russian side, and all security-related decisions were made by Russian officers. In early 2008, the key South Ossetian leaders thought to be appointed by Moscow included Interior Minister Mikhail Mindzaev (a Colonel of the Russian Militsiya), Security Council Chairman Anatoly Barankevich (a Russian Army Colonel), State Security Committee Chairman Boris Atoev (a Russian citizen and former Soviet-era intelligence official), and Border Security Head Valery Chugunov (also a Lieutenant General of the FSB). Kokoity's cabinet staff included high-ranking GRU officials, such as former Russian Deputy Interior Minister Sergey Shadrin, who worked as a law enforcement adviser to Kokoity. On March 1, 2008, Russian Major General Vasily Lunev transitioned from Deputy Commander of the Siberian Military District to Minister of Defense of South Ossetia, a position he later admitted having taken as an "order from his superior".
On March 7, Sokhumi and Tskhinvali both made formal requests for Russia to recognize their independence, a day after Moscow's lifting of the Abkhazia trade embargo. In response, the State Duma held public hearings on the question on March 13, featuring the testimonies of officials from Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria[78] in a closed session. In a report following the hearings, the Duma's CIS Affairs Committee issued a series of controversial recommendations, including a deepening of relations between Russia and the three breakaway republics, the establishment of diplomatic missions, the waiving of all trade tariffs on goods made by Russian-owned businesses in those republics, and increasing economic assistance to Russian citizens living there, although Duma Vice-Chairman Leonid Slutsky emphasized that "no decision was formally taken" against Georgia's territorial integrity. The Nezavisimaya Gazeta described the hearings as the "launch of recognition procedures". On March 21, the Duma adopted a non-binding resolution calling on the Putin administration to consider the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and to actively defend the rights of Russian citizens in those regions by increasing the size of the Russian peacekeeping forces there.[79] In response to the resolution, Georgia affirmed that Russia had "deprived itself of any political, legal or moral right to claim the role of a neutral and unbiased mediator in the conflict resolution process,"[80] though Saakashvili originally sought to downplay the move as a "simple tactic" to pressure Tbilisi[81] and claimed Putin had promised never to recognize the breakaway republics, a claim quickly denied by Lavrov.[82] Shortly after voting in favor of the resolution, MP Konstantin Zatulin handed that any recognition should be postponed to the end of the year to avoid an escalation of tensions in the early months of the Medvedev presidency.
On April 3, just as the North Atlantic Council was rejecting Georgia's MAP bid in Bucharest, Abkhaz leader Sergei Baghapsh visited Moscow and met with high-level diplomats.[83] According to Russian media, his visit included the launch of talks with Russia's Security Council on boosting bilateral ties, including through the provision of low-interest loans by the Russian Central Bank, a double taxation agreement, Abkhazia's integration into the Russian customs system, opening of maritime links, and reopening the Sokhumi International Airport.[84] On April 8, the Russian Ministry of Justice communicated to its Georgian counterpart its intention to launch direct ties with the Abkhaz authorities over the extradition of Russian citizens held in Abkhaz prisons,[85] a move condemned by Tbilisi and met with concern by the Council of Europe.[86] By April 14, Russian media had leaked information that the Kremlin was preparing an executive decree establishing diplomatic relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, though Russian commentators feared that such a step would have a "negative impact" on the anti-Saakashvili opposition in the upcoming parliamentary elections.
On April 16, Vladimir Putin signed a decree establishing formal relations between the Russian government and local authorities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia for a "comprehensive defense of the rights, freedoms, and lawful interests of Russian citizens".[48] The decree instructed Russian federal and regional agencies to cooperate with their counterparts in the breakaway states in economic, social, scientific, and cultural fields, recognized official documents issued by authorities in Sokhumi and Tskhinvali, as well as companies registered in the two regions, authorized direct assistance in law enforcement and judicial matters, and deputized the Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry's offices in Krasnodar and North Ossetia as consular offices with jurisdiction over Abkhazia and South Ossetia respectively.[87] [88] Citing Tbilisi's refusal to sign a non-use of force agreement and to withdraw from its positions in the Kodori Valley, the decree also provided for "additional future steps", including military agreements, the deployment of Russian forces in the Gudauta military base of Abkhazia, the reopening of a naval base in Ochamchire, and recognition if Georgia were to join NATO, while blaming Georgia for forcing locals of being "hostages to inter-nationality conflicts".[89] The Kremlin claimed that international law had set precedent for such decrees Despite a sharp rise in tensions following the decrees, Moscow denied having caused any crisis in bilateral relations and rejected the notion that the executive orders were aimed at establishing control over the breakaway regions.[90]
The April 16 decrees were praised by separatist authorities, with Abkhaz Foreign Minister Sergei Shamba claiming that Abkhazia was "very close to recognition" and that Sokhumi was "not afraid of any backlash from Tbilisi" and President Baghapsh convening a Security Council session to discuss next steps.[91] In Tskhinvali, Kokoity praised Putin's decision as "the only right solution to save the lives of Russian citizens" and called on Tbilisi to accept it "with calm".[92] Georgia called the decree a "flagrant violation" of its sovereignty, as well as an attempt to legalize the annexation of the two republics by Russia.[93] At a cabinet meeting held a day later, Mikheil Saakashvili described himself as "astonished and anxious about the provocative nature of Russia's moves" and called on Russia to "revise the decision",[94] while dispatching his European Integration State Minister Giorgi Baramidze to Brussels and his Foreign Minister Davit Bakradze to Washington to mobilize international support.[95] Also on April 17, Georgia formally requested an emergency session of the United Nations Security Council, though delays by the South African rotating presidency caused the session to be held only on April 23,[96] by which time most discussions had shifted to the downing of a Georgian drone over Abkhazia by a Russian military jet. Saakashvili convened a National Security Council meeting on April 23, during which he warned that Russia was seeking to annex Abkhazia, and after which he made a televised address accusing Moscow of seeking to "change the world order unilaterally for the first time since World War II" and alleging that hostile actions had started in August 2007 with the Tsitelubani episode.[97]
Reactions of the international community were much stronger following the April 16 decree than previous developments. US State Secretary Condoleezza Rice expressed her concern and held a phone call with her Russian counterpart over the matter,[98] while Republican presidential candidate John McCain called the decree "de facto annexation" and US OSCE Ambassador Julie Finley accused Russia of openly siding with the separatists.[99] On May 7, the US House of Representatives passed a non-binding resolution condemning Russia's provocative and dangerous actions and calling on Moscow to revoke the decree.[100] Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt denounced the decree and expressed his belief that it was done to derail a new Abkhazia peace plan proposed by the Saakashvili administration. Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves blamed the decree on NATO's failure to grant Georgia the MAP in Bucharest,[101] while the Riigikogu passed a resolution condemning Russia's decision to establish official links with the separatist authorities.[102] Statements of condemnations were also issued by the leaders of Ukraine, Lithuania, Slovakia,[103] and British Special Representative Brian Fall. The European Union called on Russia not to implement the decree,[104] while a European Parliament resolution approved on May 28 criticized the decree as "not contributing towards finding a peaceful solution to the Abkhaz conflict."[105] A group of 25 members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe issued a joint declaration calling for the UN to deploy a peacekeeping force in Abkhazia and South Ossetia to replace Russian forces. NATO Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer urged Russia to "reverse these measures" and called on Tbilisi to "continue to show restraint".[106] The Group of Friends of the UN Secretary-General found itself divided for the first time[107] when Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States issued a joint statement expressing high concerns against Russia, a statement that led Abkhazia's Shamba to criticize the organization as being biased.[108]
In the months leading up to the war, the leaders of the separatist republics also cultivated stronger ties with each other. On April 15, Kokoity traveled to Sokhumi to inaugurate the South Ossetian Embassy in Abkhazia, sign a bilateral customs agreement,[109] and issue a joint declaration accusing Georgia of arming itself in preparation for an invasion of the two territories.[110] Kokoity traveled again to Abkhazia on June 15 to discuss "the military threat from Georgia"[111] and a week later, the leaders of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria agreed on a common defense pact.[112] Abkhazia opened an embassy in Tiraspol in July.[113] At the same time, North Caucasus political and civil institutions made public calls for the recognition of independence of the two Georgian secessionist republics, with the South Russian Parliamentary Association approving a resolution calling on Moscow to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia,[114] the Liberal Democratic Party of North Ossetia launching a campaign for a referendum to "unite" South Ossetia to the Russian federal subject,[115] and Abkhaz People's Assembly chairman Nugzar Ashuba visiting Chechnya in July.[116]
Days after the decree was signed by Putin, Russia showed original signs of détente, with the Federation Council refusing to vote on the Duma's resolution calling for the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia,[117] while Putin himself hinted he would lift trade and transportation bans on Georgia,[118] largely out of fear that Tbilisi would delegitimize the Russian military presence in Abkhazia. Upon the inauguration of Dmitry Medvedev as President of Russia on May 7, many thought a formal change in government could deescalate tensions, with Bush asking him to repeal the decree during their first phone call[119] and Saakashvili telling his National Security Council he hoped Medvedev would "reverse course".[120] But these expectations proved to be in vain, as Medvedev himself hosted Baghapsh in Moscow on June 26, the first official bilateral meeting between a Russian president and an Abkhaz separatist leader. One of the most ardent supports of Abkhazia's independence in Russia was Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, whose statements led to Georgian MPs Nika Rurua and Irakli Kavtaradze to call for him to be declared persona non grata,[121] while Kokoity engaged directly with other Russian hardliners like communist Gennady Zyuganov and North Ossetian President Teimuraz Mamsurov. On July 1, reports showed that Gazprom was planning an oil and gas exploration survey off the coast of Abkhazia, while the corporation confirmed plans for a Russia-Abkhazia pipeline. The same day, ferry traffic between Sochi and Gagra was resumed after having been interrupted in 2003,[122] while Abkhaz authorities discussed the launch of direct flights with Russia using the Sokhumi airport, despite a ban by the International Civil Aviation Organization.
The April 16 decree was viewed by Georgia as an early step in the prelude to the war, while Russian diplomats hinted that a formal recognition could be possible following a direct military clash. British journalist Robert Parsons suggested that Russia was provoking Georgia into hasty actions. Attempts by Georgian Catholicos-Patriarch Ilia II to defuse tensions through direct talks with the Russian Orthodox Church[123] [124] also failed.
See main article: 2008 Georgian drone shootdowns. On 20 April 2008, a Georgian unarmed unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) was shot down over the Abkhaz conflict zone. Georgia alleged that a MiG-29 Fulcrum fighter, from the Gudauta military base, was responsible for the attack; however, this allegation was dismissed by Russian Air Force. Georgia had earlier denied Abkhaz separatist claim of having shot down the drone at 06:00 GMT. Abkhazia said that they were guarding their airspace and the downed drone was Hermes 450 from Israel.[125] According to deputy defence minister of the Republic of Abkhazia Garry Kupalba, an "L-39 aircraft of the Abkhaz Air Force" destroyed the drone. Furthermore, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement accusing Georgia of violating the 1994 Moscow agreement and United Nations resolutions on Abkhazia by deploying without authorisation a UAV which also can be used for adjusting of fire.[126]
However, the Ministry of Defense of Georgia made video footage captured by the drone public the next day. The video demonstrated the unarmed Georgian drone being attacked by supposedly Russian MiG-29 supposedly over the Black Sea. Russia denied that any Russian planes were flying in the area during the time of attack.[127] On 21 April 2008, President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili called Russian president Putin by a phone and discussed recent developments in Russian-Georgian relations.[128]
On 23 April 2008, a closed meeting of the United Nations Security Council was held in New York.[129] Georgia had requested the meeting to be convened. Georgian foreign minister Davit Bakradze also attended the meeting.[130] After the United Nations Security Council session, the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany expressed their concern over Russia's actions in Abkhazia in a statement and urged Moscow not to enforce its decision to deepen ties with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However, this was labeled as "a tall order" by Vitaly Churkin, Permanent Representative of Russia to the United Nations to the UN, who stressed that Russia would not annul its decision.[131] NATO's Special Representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia Robert Simmons said that the NATO supported the statement of the US, UK, France and Germany on Russia and that NATO questioned "the role of Russia as a mediator in the settlement of the Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts".[132]
An allegation of an attack by a NATO MiG-29 was made by the Russian Ambassador to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin. NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer reportedly commented that "he'd eat his tie if it turned out that a NATO MiG-29 had magically appeared in Abkhazia and shot down a Georgian drone."[133]
Early in May 2008, Russian and Abkhaz allegations that two more Georgian reconnaissance drones had been shot over Abkhazia were refuted by Georgia as "a provocation" intended to create "information-propagandistic support of Russia's military intervention."[134] On 12 May 2008, the Abkhaz authorities reported to have shot down 7th Georgian drone, but Georgia rejected this.[135]
On 26 May 2008, the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia released the conclusion of its independent investigation into 20 April incident. It confirmed that the Georgian video footage and radar data were authentic and the jet which destroyed the drone was indeed Russian. The conclusion report said that the jet flew towards the Russian territory after the incident, but it was unclear where the attacker took off, naming the Gudauta base as a possible locality.[136] Georgia hailed the report,[137] but Russia dismissed it.[138]
Georgian drone overflights over Abkhazia had been officially halted in early June, but Abkhazia accused Georgia of continuing to fly drones in the region.[139]
On 17 April 2008, President of Abkhazia Sergei Bagapsh warned that Abkhazia would deploy its armed forces in Gali District, Abkhazia and the Kodori Valley if Georgia did not withdraw its armed forces from Zugdidi Municipality and the upper Kodori Valley.[140]
On 26 April 2008, Valery Kenyaikin, Special Representative of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the development of relations with the CIS countries, said that the conflict between Georgia and Russia could escalate into a military confrontation because Russia was ready to defend the interests of the Russian citizens in the breakaway regions.[141] High-ranking European source told Nezavisimaya Gazeta that Russian escalation could force some European countries to change their position and support Georgia's accelerated membership of NATO.[142] In response to Kenyaikin's statement, Georgian foreign minister David Bakradze was planning to appeal to NATO for help. Russian foreign ministry official said that Russian peacekeepers would not leave Abkhazia without Abkhazia's consent and they would only leave Georgia proper on the other side of Enguri river.[143]
On 29 April, the Russian government said that Georgia was assembling 1,500 military troops and police in the upper Kodori Gorge area and was planning to attack Abkhazia.[144] President Saakashvili, in his televised address, pledged to pursue only a peaceful line in the conflict areas and called upon the Abkhaz and Ossetians to unite with Georgia in defying attempts by "outrageous and irresponsible" external actor to provoke bloodshed.[145] Russia announced it would boost its military in the region and Russian foreign minister Lavrov threatened to "retaliate" militarily against Georgia.[146] [147] Prime Minister of Georgia Lado Gurgenidze said Georgia would treat any additional troops in Abkhazia as aggressors. The European Union called on Russia to refrain from taking rash measures.[146] Carl Bildt commented on the developments in Abkhazia that Russia was provoking the war in Georgia.[148] The Georgian Foreign Ministry stated on 30 April that Russian armored vehicles, heavy artillery and additional military force had crossed the state border on the Psou River without Georgia's consent.[149] NATO official James Appathurai said Russia "increased tensions and undermined Georgia's territorial integrity."[150]
Russia's admission to the World Trade Organization (WTO) was suspended by Georgia on 29 April.[146]
On 29 April 2008, residents of Moscow noticed that new Russian tanks marched on Leningradsky Avenue and one of the tanks had the inscription "On Tbilisi". Russian blogger commented: "The war between Russia and Georgia is more real than ever."[151] [152] Russian Cossacks and North Caucasian volunteers declared their readiness to fight Georgia in the case of a renewed confrontation in Abkhazia.[153] Ataman of Don Cossacks Viktor Vodolatsky declared on 30 April that Cossacks were ready to defend the population of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Crimea.[154] Movladi Udugov stated on 3 May that Emir of the Imarat Kavkaz Dokka Umarov had authorized the establishment of the special group for monitoring the Russo-Georgian tensions and the Russian military deployments in the North Caucasus and gathering of intelligence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia 2 months ago.[155]
In early May, anonymous Russian official stated that Georgia had prepared a plan of the war against Abkhazia with help from foreign advisors and the foreign embassies were preparing to evacuate from Tbilisi. The Georgian foreign ministry ridiculed this assertion.[156] Minister for Defence of Abkhazia said, "If they [Georgians] invade us, we need two days to defend ourselves, and after two days we will reach Kutaisi (West Georgia) ourselves, we have enough troops and equipment."[157] On 6 May 2008, Georgian State Minister for Reintegration Temur Iakobashvili said Georgia was on the verge of war with Russia.[158] Iakobashvili also said, "We know what the signals are when you see propaganda waged against Georgia." Abkhaz foreign minister Sergei Shamba said that Abkhazia was ready to grant military control of the territory between the Psou and the Enguri rivers to Russia.[159] Alexey Ostrovsky, Chairman of the State Duma Committee for CIS Affairs and Relations with Compatriots, responded to Shamba's statement that Russia would not consider building the military bases in Abkhazia until the settlement of Abkhazia's status.[160] The United States Department of State spokesman said that Russia's recent actions "have significantly and unnecessarily heightened tensions in the region, and run counter to Russia's status as a facilitator of the U.N. Friends process on Abkhazia."[161] The United States Department of State demanded from Russia "to reconsider" "some provocative steps".[162] The United States House of Representatives denounced Russia's "provocative and dangerous statements and actions". Georgian media was reporting in early May that Russia would aid its citizens in Abkhazia. Newspaper Rezonansi reported that Russia and Abkhaz separatists would launch an offensive against the Kodori Gorge.[163]
According to the statement of the Russian Ministry of Defense issued on 8 May, the number of Russian peacekeepers deployed in Abkhazia was boosted to 2,542. But Russian troop levels remained under the cap of 3,000 troops imposed by a 1994 decision of CIS heads of state.[164] UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) said that its monitors had not detected any buildup either at the administrative border of Abkhazia or in Kodori Gorge. Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that the chief UN observer "agreed that actions by the Russian side do not contradict basic agreements on the conduct of the peacekeeping operation". But the mission later countered that it "has no authority to pronounce on the conformity between the CIS peacekeeping operation in the Zone of the Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict and CIS rules."[165] Sources in the Staff of the Russian Airborne Forces stated that a regular non-peacekeeping battalion of 400 heavily armed troops was sent to Abkhazia without Georgia's consent. On 12 May, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Matthew Bryza, during his visit to Tbilisi, criticized Russian military deployment to Abkhazia: "In my entire career, I have never heard of artillery being used to keep the peace."[166] On 18 May, Georgia demonstrated video footage captured by a drone to the BBC allegedly proving that Russian forces used heavy weaponry in Abkhazia and were combat troops, rather than peacekeepers; Russia denied the accusations.[167]
On 11 May 2008, the pro-Georgian government of Abkhazia in-exile said that a detachment of paratroopers had arrived in Tkvarcheli in preparation for the storm of the Kodori Gorge and that they were commanded by the former chief of the staff of the CIS Collective Peacekeeping Forces. Georgian media reported that high-ranking Russian officers arrived in Sukhumi to "coordinate the actions of the Russian military in Abkhazia."[168] It emerged on the internet that the Abkhaz forces and Russian generals had created a plan of the war with Georgia codenamed "Double Dbar - Double Attack", which intended not only the capture of the Kodori Gorge, but annexation of parts of western Georgia including Kutaisi. Russian forces would kill the Georgian residents of Gali district. However, if Georgia did not respond to this provocation militarily, then the Abkhaz post would be attacked by a group wearing NATO uniforms. This attack would be blamed on Georgia and Abkhazia would be recognized by Russia.[135]
Russian military expert Alexander Golts wrote in early May 2008, "Nobody wants war, but both sides are doing everything to spark a military conflict."[169] Georgian president Saakashvili said, "we were close to an armed conflict a few days ago, but now the tension has released a bit". Saakashvili asserted that he had been told by many Russian officials that it "has been decided not give up Abkhazia". Later, Russian military expert Pavel Felgenhauer wrote that Sergei Shamba's statement on the plan to carve out a "buffer zone" from Georgia probably suggested that Abkhazia intended to deport the residents of this area. According to Felgenhauer, although Georgia was being accused of preparing for the war, "there are no signs of combat arrangements in Georgia."[170]
Separatist leader Sergei Bagapsh said he was in favor of Russia establishing a military base in Abkhazia and called for the signing of a military treaty with Russia similar to the Taiwan Relations Act.[171] Alexander Zelin, commander of the Russian Air Forces, said if such a decision was made it would "promote the implementation of air defense tasks" and observed Russia had similar cooperation with Armenia.[172] On 16 May 2008, Yuri Baluyevsky, chief of the Russian General Staff denied Russia had any plans to build a military base in Abkhazia.[173]
On 15 May 2008, the Russian Defense Ministry published the information on military armaments given to Georgia by the West and claimed that "strengthening [Georgia’s] military capabilities serves as destabilizing role in military-political situation in the South Caucasus region." Georgian authorities said the information on the military equipment was "outdated".[174]
On 18 May 2008, five Russian peacekeepers were arrested along the administrative border with Abkhazia; however, they were later freed. According to Georgia, their armoured personnel carrier hit a Georgian car in the town of Zugdidi; however, Alexander Diordiev, a Russian peacekeeping official, said there was no crash and instead that Georgians provoked the peacekeepers in an attempt to discredit the Russians.[175] According to Diordiev, on the night of 17–18 May, the road near the village of Urta was closed for the peacekeepers who were moving hardware and then an already damaged car arrived. The Georgian police blamed car damage on the Russian peacekeepers and used the force against them.[176] Diordiev stated that the Georgians knew in advance about the redeployment of the hardware. A statement by the Russian Foreign Ministry, issued on 19 May 2008, said the Georgians' actions were of "true street bandits", saying the Georgians used "crude physical force" against the peacekeepers. The Russian peacekeepers were freed due to the efforts of the Collective Forces for the Support of Peace command and the UN mission.[177]
Nezavisimaya Gazeta reported on 19 May that Russian peacekeepers had recently been allowed to undertake military actions independently if necessary and Abkhaz foreign minister Sergei Shamba said this report was "credible."[178] [179]
On 21 May 2008, heavy gunfire was reported near the Abkhaz administrative border, with a Georgian interior ministry official saying two buses of passengers going to vote in the Georgian elections were attacked.[180] Some reports said the bridge, connecting Abkhazia and Georgian region of Mingrelia, was closed by Abkhaz separatists during the elections in Georgia.[181] [182] Georgian officials accused Abkhazia of the attacks and preventing Georgians from voting in the legislative elections. Abkhaz president Sergei Bagapsh denied these allegations, instead saying that the attack occurred on the Georgian territory and Georgians living in Abkhazia were not interested in voting. According to Abkhazia, in order to avert tensions, Russian peacekeepers were deployed along the border.[183]
The Georgian Foreign Ministry wrote a protest note to the CIS secretariat on 21 May. Georgia requested illegal Russian troops and weaponry to be removed from Abkhazia, saying that the recent deployment of troops and military hardware (an airborne battalion, 50 BMD-2 airborne combat vehicles, and two artillery batteries) contradicted a 1995 resolution adopted by the CIS presidents' council.[184]
On 9 June 2008, Georgian interior minister Vano Merabishvili commented on the statement of the Abkhaz authorities on the Kodori Gorge: "We do not want war, we are putting things in order on our territory." He explained that the Kodori Gorge was a criminal haven and Georgian authorities were forced to reestablish the control. He also said that Russia was ready to start the war in Abkhazia to prevent Georgia's NATO membership.[185]
On 12 June 2008, American political scientist Zbigniew Brzezinski said that Russia was trying to gain control of the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline by destabilizing the situation in Georgia.[186]
On 15 June 2008, media reports said that a Russian military base had been established near the village of Agubedia in Abkhazia's Ochamchira District. According to reports, heavy weaponry had been sent there. The reports were denied by the Russian Defense Ministry.[187] The Georgian-backed Abkhaz government-in-exile said on 17 June that Russia refused to allow UN monitors in the area.[188]
On 17 June 2008, a Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman warned that Georgian attempt to revise the peacekeeping operation in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict zone could "unfreeze" the conflict. According to him, due to this, the situation could "slip out of control" in the wider region.[189]
On 17 June 2008, four Russian peacekeepers and a military truck were captured near the border between Georgia proper and Abkhazia. Georgia's Interior Ministry said that the peacekeepers were moving 35 crates of ammunition, thus violating the existing agreements, while the Russian Defense Ministry said the detention was "in violation of all regulatory norms in the buffer zone." According to the Georgian police, after nine hours of interrogation, the peacekeepers were released.[190] Russian President Dmitry Medvedev told Georgian President Saakashvili by phone on 18 June that Russia would not tolerate "provocations" against Russian peacekeepers. Georgian Deputy Interior Minister Eka Zguladze said that seized armaments would not be returned to the peacekeepers since they "didn't present any legal documents related to the weapons, and the Georgian side wasn't informed about this."[191] Lieutenant General Alexander Burutin, a deputy head of the Russian General Staff, compared the arrest to "a bandit attack" on 19 June, saying Russian peacekeepers had every right to use their weapons.[192] Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said on 21 June that Russia would not tolerate such actions against peacekeepers.[193] [194]
A Russian military expert, Pavel Felgenhauer, commenting on the situation in the conflict zone on 19 June, predicted the war between Georgia and Abkhazia.[195] Felgenhauer said on 20 June that Vladimir Putin had already decided to start a war against Georgia in Abkhazia and South Ossetia supposedly in late August 2008. Provocations against Georgia would begin in Upper Abkhazia and South Ossetia, then the war would spread to the rest of Georgia.[196] [197]
On 23 June 2008, Sergei Bagapsh said that he was going to close off the sea for Georgia.[198]
On 24 June 2008, Russian peacekeepers established a curfew in the Gali district of Abkhazia and were in complete control of the car roads. Russian and Abkhaz forces were conducting a joint exercise near the Kodori Gorge.[199]
On 26 June 2008, Russian president Dmitry Medvedev officially received Sergei Bagapsh as president of Abkhazia in Moscow.[200] [201] Georgian deputy foreign minister Grigol Vashadze expressed his concern over the meeting, saying that such actions were contrary to the resolutions of the UN Security Council.[202] The Russian Foreign Ministry said they were surprised at the Georgian reaction.[203]
On 29 June, there were two blasts in Gagra and six people were wounded. Abkhaz president Bagapsh accused Georgia of pursuing "a policy of state terrorism."[204] According to the source of Gruziya Online, one Russian vacationer from Ural was killed in Gagra, but this was being covered up. On 30 June, there were two blasts in Sukhumi which wounded 6 people. Abkhaz authorities declared that similar explosive devices had been used in both Gagra and Sukhumi. Abkhaz president visited the location of the blasts in Sukhumi and announced closing of the border with Georgia.[205] [206]
Georgian foreign minister Eka Tkeshelashvili said on 15 May 2008 that deployment of additional Russian peacekeepers to South Ossetia would be seen by Georgia as a "gross encroachment on Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity".[207] In late May 2008, there were about 1,000 Russian peacekeepers present in South Ossetia.
Three blasts were reported to have occurred in South Ossetia. In one of the blasts, there was a bomb explosion near Georgian police vehicle and one serviceman was wounded. The South Ossetian authorities were accused by Georgian Deputy Defense Minister Batu Kutelia of resorting to "tactics of terrorism."[208]
On 20 May 2008, foreign ambassadors were asked by Taymuraz Mamsurov, president of the Russian Republic of North Ossetia, to help North Ossetia to unite with South Ossetia. Georgian Ambassador Erosi Kitsmarishvili said that international law would be violated by such merger.[209] South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity approved Mamsurov's proposal, saying "South Ossetia's main goal is unification with North Ossetia in the Russian Federation." Kokoity and Dmitry Medoyev suggested an interim period where South Ossetia would be recognized as independent and then formally integrated into Russia through a referendum.[210]
On the night of 14–15 June 2008, mortar fire and an exchange of fire broke out between South Ossetian and Georgian forces. One person was killed and four injured in the clashes, and several Georgian houses were reportedly damaged. South Ossetia's interior minister Mikhail Mindzaev claimed that their forces were responding to mortar fire launched from Georgian-controlled villages. He said that the crossfire lasted for about four hours while the commander of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces said that it lasted for about an hour and a half. Georgia refuted acting first and said that the Georgian-controlled villages of Ergneti, Nikozi and Prisi had been attacked by South Ossetia. A land mine wounded 14-year-old boy near Ergneti in another incident; he later died.[211] According to South Ossetia, five people were injured during the violence and one of them died later.[212]
The area of the clashes was visited by Russian, Georgian, and North Ossetian peacekeepers and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe observers.[212] They came under fire near Ergneti, with no injuries. The fire exchange began on the night of 15 June at 11:38 PM and lasted for half an hour. Automatic firearms and grenade launchers were used.[213]
Aleksandr Dugin, who was known for his strong ties with the Russian military and intelligence, visited South Ossetia in late June 2008.[214] On 30 June, he said at a press conference:
The Eurasian Youth Union held a session in Tskhinvali on 30 June. The assembly adopted a resolution promising to send thousands of armed volunteers to South Ossetia and Abkhazia to defend the local population from genocide. The resolution supported the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and their accession to the Russian Federation.[215]
On 30 June 2008, South Ossetian authorities accused Georgia of kidnapping a Russian citizen from Tskhinvali, who had arrived from Vladikavkaz to visit his relatives.[216]
On 16 May 2008, it was reported that Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) claimed to have captured a Chechen spy. The spy had been operating in Georgia's interests and was aiding rebels in Southern Russia.[217] The alleged agent was identified as Ramzan Turkoshvili, a Georgian-born Russian citizen. According to the unnamed FSB official, Georgian intelligence working with Zelimkhan Khangoshvili were responsible for drafting Turkoshvili. The detention was cast as proof that confirmed that Georgia was "participating in disruptive terrorist activities in the North Caucasus." The accusations were dismissed by Shota Utiashvili, the spokesman for Georgian Interior Ministry. Utiashvili labeled the claims as "a continuation of Russia's policy of provocation toward Georgia, which has taken a particularly acute form recently."[218]
See also: Russian Railway Troops. On 31 May 2008, Russia deployed railroad troops to repair a rail line in Abkhazia. According to the Russian defence ministry, railroad troops were not armed. Georgia stated that the development was an "aggressive" act.[219] Georgian deputy foreign minister Grigol Vashadze said, "Nobody needs to bring Railway Forces to the territory of another country, if a military intervention is not being prepared."[220] The US Department of State also said that the Russian move "dismayed" them.[221] Temur Mzhavia, chairman of the Supreme Council of Abkhazia in exile, said that Russia planned to recognize Abkhazia on 27 September, an "independence day" of Abkhazia, but Vyacheslav Kovalenko, Russian ambassador to Georgia, dismissed such claims as "fabrications".[222]
The new Russian troops' arrival in Abkhazia preceded by a few days a planned meeting between the presidents Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia and Dmitry Medvedev of Russia during a CIS summit in Saint Petersburg scheduled on 6–7 June. It was reported that Saakashvili would speak about this issue with Medvedev on 3 June by phone.[223] On 3 June, NATO secretary general Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said that Russia violated sovereignty of Georgia and called for the removal of railway troops.[224]
On 7 June 2008, the Russian defense minister Anatoliy Serdyukov said the railway troops would withdraw after they would have finished work on the railroad in two months.[225] Russia claimed to have found an anti-tank mine on 13 June on the railway section which was being rehabilitated. Russia claimed that a "subversive-terrorist act" was attempted against the Russian Railway Forces.[226]
On 18 June 2008, a Russian military official announced two explosions on the railroad near Sukhumi caused the security to be increased and Abkhaz police suspected the Russian railway forces were intended target of the bombings.[227] Malkhaz Akishbaya, chairman of the Georgian-backed Abkhaz government in exile, claimed the explosion was a provocation to discredit Georgia and also aimed at legitimizing the presence of Russian railway troops.[228]
On 23 June 2008, Sergei Bagapsh said construction material for a sports complex to be used in the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, Russia, would be moved by the railroad rehabilitated by the Russian railway troops.[229]
In early July 2008, Georgian political expert Mamuka Areshidze noted that the line between Sochi and Sukhumi was operational and the repair works mainly centered on the line leading to Ochamchira, where the former Soviet border base, very well-suited for the movement of troops into the Kodori Gorge, was located. Areshidze suggested that Abkhazia closed the border with Georgia to cover up the military preparations.[230] On 21 July 2008, it was reported that repair of the 54km (34miles) railroad line between Sukhumi and Ochamchira had been finished.[231] Earlier, Russian military official had said that the repair job was planned to be finished on 6 August.[232]
On 24 July 2008, the Russian Defense Ministry said renovation of the Abkhaz railway had been almost completed and there would be an opening ceremony at the end of July. After participating in the ceremony, the railway forces would return to Russia in early August.[233] Russian railroad troops attended the inauguration ceremony of the railroad on 30 July 2008.[234] Russian railroad forces began withdrawal from Abkhazia on 30 July 2008.[235] Historically, when the Soviet Union was planning a new military offensive, railway troops were deployed to the future combat area in advance. Previous instance of the deployment of the railway troops was in Chechnya in 1999.[236] [237] The fixed railroad (Sukhumi-Ochamchira line) was used to transport military equipment by at least a part of the 9,000 Russian soldiers who entered Georgia from Abkhazia during the invasion in August 2008.[238]
On 1 July 2008, the maritime traffic between Sochi and Gagra resumed.[239]
On 2 July 2008, Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia claimed that a car came up to the Russian checkpoint on the border with Georgia and threw an unidentified object which detonated, then the car turned back to Georgia and Georgian servicemen did not detain the car.[240] There was a blast between the Georgian interior ministry post and the Russian peacekeeping post in South Ossetia at 20:00 MSK.
On 3 July 2008, bombing killed a South Ossetian police official Nodar Bibilov in the village Dmenisi in the early morning.[241] [242] After several hours, a remote bomb targeted the car of Dmitry Sanakoyev, the leader of the pro-Georgian South Ossetian government. After the blast, fire was opened from the villages of Sarabuki and Kokhati and Sanakoev's bodyguards responded. Three bodyguards were wounded.[243] Deputy defense minister of South Ossetia Ibrahim Gazseev claimed that the Georgian interior ministry units had taken the 300 meter height near the village Sarabuki.[244] Around 20:10, the South Ossetian post in the village of Kokhati was fired upon.[245] South Ossetia reported that interior ministry post near the village Ubiat was attacked from the Georgian-controlled Nuli. The attack killed one South Ossetian militiaman and wounded another.[246] [247] South Ossetia reported that Georgia started shelling Tskhinvali at around 23:40.[248] Shelling of Tskhinvali resulted in the death of one man and the wounding of seven. By the morning of 4 July, the South Ossetians reported that Georgia's special military operation had resulted in the death of 3 people and wounding of 11.[249] Georgian authorities said that South Ossetians were shelling Georgian-controlled villages Tamarasheni and Nikozi for 6 hours and this forced the Georgians to respond.[250] Georgian chief of peacekeepers Mamuka Kurashvili said that at 6:00 in the morning of 4 July, South Ossetian separatists attempted to attack the Georgian post on the bypass road between Little Liakhvi and Great Liakhvi valleys.[251] [252]
South Ossetian military were mobilized in the morning of 4 July and peacekeeping forces were put on alert.[253] South Ossetia warned its heavy weaponry would enter the conflict zone if attacks did not cease.[254] Russian peacekeepers declared that 7 unidentified planes overflew Tskhinvali during the night.[255] The chief of the Russian peacekeepers was quoted as saying that additional forces could be sent to South Ossetia in case of further deterioration.[256] The Abkhazian Armed Forces were put on combat alert. Abkhaz leader Bagapsh threatened if Georgia did not stop attacking Tskhinvali, Abkhazia would not abandon South Ossetia in time of need and the war would spill to the entire Caucasus region.[257] South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity called on the President of Russia to deploy the Russian forces to South Ossetia to defend the citizens of Russia.[258] Kokoity said that Georgian peacekeepers were equal to the aggressors.[259] Russia's NATO envoy Dmitry Rogozin declared that Russia could not contain the volunteers from the North Caucasus from participation in the war against Georgia.[260] By late afternoon, Kokoity canceled total mobilization.[261] The Russian Foreign Ministry said that the assault on "the pro-Georgian puppet" Sanakoev was "obviously staged" and accused Georgia of "open act of aggression" against South Ossetia. Russian deputy foreign minister Grigory Karasin arrived in Tbilisi.[262] Kommersant confirmed that Georgians had taken control of the Sarabuki height after the attack on Sanakoev and observed, "Since the loss of a key height for Tskhinvali is unacceptable, large-scale hostilities may begin around the village of Sarabuk."[263]
Igor Smirnov, president of self-proclaimed Transnistria, arrived in Tskhinvali on 3 July.[264] One South Ossetian politician, commenting on the shelling of Tskhinvali during this visit, said on 4 July that Georgians were the "accidental people" in the Caucasus because their disrespect of the guest from Transnistria contradicted the customs of the Caucasus region.[265]
The Kavkaz Center reported on 4 July that Chechen separatists had intelligence data that Russia was preparing a military operation against Georgia in August-September 2008 which mainly aimed to expel Georgian forces from the Kodori Gorge; this would be followed by the expulsion of Georgian units and population from South Ossetia. The decision to attack Georgia had been made by Putin before Medvedev became president and the preparations had been ongoing for the several months. Provocations would antecede the start of the war.[266] [267] [268]
On 5 July 2008, the article was published by the Russian online paper Forum.msk.ru with the headline "Russia is on the verge of a great Caucasian war", stating that the war with Georgia had never been so close. The chief editor of the paper, Anatoly Baranov, just returning from the North Caucasus where he had spoken with Russian officers stationed in Rostov-on-Don, stated that "the army wants to fight" as the officers were seeing the war as the only solution to Russia's internal problems.[269]
Abkhaz leader Sergei Bagapsh claimed that Abkhaz military counterintelligence became aware of the Georgian plans to attack Abkhazia in April-May 2008.[270]
According to South Ossetian authorities, the Georgian side began firing on the South Ossetian post in Ubiat at 23:20 on 5 July with automatic firearms and then began using grenade launchers. During the night of 6 July, the Georgians opened fire on the posts near Tskhinvali and wounded one man. South Ossetians said that they didn't return fire.[271] Later, Georgian authorities reported that fire was opened on the Georgian villages of Nuli and Kekhvi, but the Georgian forces did not return fire.[272] South Ossetian interior minister Mikhail Mindzaev accused Georgia of a military build-up near South Ossetia's borders.[273]
On 6 July 2008, Georgian interior ministry reported that there were explosions near the villages of Rukhi and Ganmukhuri near the Abkhaz border.[274] A bomb in Gali in Abkhazia killed four people and wounded six. Abkhaz authorities claimed that Georgian "state terrorism" was responsible for the blasts and severed all communication with Georgia in response to the bombing. The travel documents of the Georgian citizens, who had the right to enter Gali, were seized and they could not leave Abkhazia.[275] Georgia decried the bombings and blamed them on Russia, claiming the attacks were being done for a continued Russian military deployment in Georgia.[276] South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity blamed the "provocations" on Georgia, and said, "Therefore, we must exercise wisdom, calmness, restraint, thus we will aid fastest collapse of the regime of Saakashvili."[277] [278] The French Foreign Ministry called to resume negotiations in a statement. Secretary General of the Council of Europe Terry Davis expressed his concern over the recent blasts in Abkhazia and said that "the situation may spin out of control." President of the United States George W. Bush discussed Georgia with his Russian counterpart Medvedev at the 34th G8 summit.[279]
Gruziya Online reported on 7 July that Bagapsh, the leader of the breakaway Abkhazia, planned to attack Upper Abkhazia, with the start of operation being scheduled for August 11-12 and Bagapsh reportedly planned to visit Moscow for the final consent for this operation.[280]
The Ministry of Defense of Georgia said on 7 July that when the Georgian side spotted about ten militants trying to sabotage a Georgian-controlled by-pass road in South Ossetia, the Georgians fired upon the group and the Ossetians withdrew to the nearest village. On 8 July 2008, South Ossetia reported that four Georgian Defense Ministry spies were arrested near to the village of Okona in the Znauri district the night before.[281] Georgian peacekeeping commander Mamuka Kurashvili said that four Georgian soldiers were kidnapped on the previous night from the Georgian territory near Kareli, Georgia outside of the South Ossetian conflict zone.[282] [283] South Ossetia accused Georgian secret services of kidnapping a 14-year old resident of Tskhinvali.[284] The Georgian law enforcement was ordered by Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili to arrange the liberation of soldiers.[285] South Ossetian interior minister Mikhail Mindzaev ruled out the release of Georgian soldiers until Georgia returned 14-year old boy. Later, it became known that the soldiers were released after Saakashvili's order to carry out a police operation.[286]
On 8 July 2008, South Ossetian envoy Dmitry Medoev accused Georgia of preparations for the war and claimed that the Georgian military had evacuated around 300 children from Georgian enclaves in Tamarasheni, Nuli, Eredvi and Kurta since 5 July. Medoyev said: "we are not opening fire yet, as there was an order."[287]
Russian military jets had an overflight over South Ossetia on 8 July 2008. On 9 July, Colonel Zurab Pochkhua, the deputy commander of Georgian Air Force, said that 4 Russian jets were flying for nearly 40 minutes close to Tskhinvali, while Russia accused Georgia of committing "a serious breach" by flying two Georgian Sukhoi Su-25 fighter jets over South Ossetia.[288] On 10 July, the Russian authorities acknowledged the flight. Russia said in an official statement the fighters were sent to "let hot heads in Tbilisi cool down."[289] [290] Four captured Georgian servicemen had already been released by the time of the overflight. The overflight violated the 2002 resolution of the Joint Control Commission requiring pre-approval for the overflights over the conflict zones.[291] Georgian authorities acknowledged that they knew about the release of the Georgian officers by midday and special operation in South Ossetia was no longer being considered by 20:10 when the overflight began.[292] This was the first time in the 2000s that Russia had confessed to an overflight of Georgian territory. A scheduled visit of Condoleezza Rice, the US Secretary of State, to Georgia on the next day nearly coincided with the timing of the flight.[293] In response, Georgia summoned back its ambassador to Russia "for consultations", stating that it was "outraged by Russia's aggressive policies."[294] Saakashvili noted the close proximity of the Russian overflight to Tbilisi and commented, "Maybe that's how they welcomed Condoleezza Rice."[295] The Georgian foreign ministry called the overflights open "military aggression" by Russia.[296]
On 8 July 2008, the statement was made by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice that Abkhaz and South Ossetian conflicts would be settled by Georgian NATO Membership Action Plan. The statement caused a negative outcry in Moscow: Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov responded, during his meeting with the de facto Abkhaz president Sergei Bagapsh, that Georgia's accession to NATO "may undermine the conflict resolution".[297] Rice arrived in Georgia on 9 July. She put the blame for the escalation on Russian inflammatory actions over the past months and said that Georgia "has to be treated like" an independent country.[298] Rice stated on 10 July in Tbilisi that Russia "needs to be a part of resolving the problem and solving the problems and not contributing to it."[299] [300] Saakashvili said at a joint conference that Georgia and Russia should work together to ensure the safety of the Sochi Olympics.[301]
On 9 July 2008, an incident took place in the buffer zone between Abkhaz-controlled area and the Georgian-controlled Kodori Gorge, which left 3 Georgian policemen injured. Georgian Interior Ministry said that the UN monitors were denied access to the area by the Abkhaz side. Abkhaz authorities claimed that 2 Abkhaz militiamen were wounded on Mount Achamkhara after an attack by 10 Georgian saboteurs. According to the Georgian Ministry, a separate incident took place near Abkhazia-Georgia proper border when Georgian police post was attacked. Georgian foreign minister Eka Tkeshelashvili and state minister for reintegration Temur Iakobashvili accused Russia of orchestrating provocations and sabotaging peace process.[302] Abkhaz State Security Service accused Georgia of staging the incident in the Zugdidi District ahead of Condoleezza Rices' visit.[303] According to the source of Gruziya Online, the incident in Kodori was a preparatory action carried out by the Russian paratroopers before the capture of the Georgian-controlled Kodori gorge and they were wearing the uniforms of the Abkhaz forces for camouflaging.[304]
On 10 July 2008, Colonel General Sergey Makarov, the commander of the North Caucasus Military District (SKVO), said SKVO had to help both the peacekeeping forces and civilian residents in the separatist regions.[305] Dmitry Medoyev, South Ossetian presidential envoy to Russia, declared on 11 July that South Ossetia "has all the necessary forces and means to repel" Georgia without resorting to Russia's aid, adding that more Russian peacekeepers should be deployed to the conflict zone.[306] [307] That day a statement of the Russian Ministry of Defense said that they had "to increase the combat readiness" of the Russian peacekeepers present in Abkhazia, adding that security had been increased at the military installations, and "additional training" had been given "to explain regulations governing the use of firearms while on duty."[308] [309] Nika Rurua, Deputy Head of the Georgian Parliament's Security and Defense Committee, warned Georgia would shoot down Russia's military aircraft should they appear in its airspace again. The proposal was discussed to this effect, but Georgian lawmakers decided instead to appeal to the international community on the matter. In response to Georgian organization of a special UNSC meeting, the sources in the Russian Foreign Ministry claimed that Russia would reveal the details of a planned Georgian military operation in South Ossetia to release the Georgian officers.[310] [311]
Gruziya Online reported that Abkhaz leader Sergei Bagapsh visited Moscow to finalize plans of attack on Upper Abkhazia. Russia reportedly was preparing to deploy 76th Guards Air Assault Division from Pskov to Abkhazia and Russian airborne brigades were already present in Abkhazia in violation of the existing agreements without the consent of Tbilisi. According to anonymous source, 45 wagons of Russian armament had arrived during the past week. According to another anonymous source, Russian military was redeploying in South Ossetia and a Russian military plan to wage war against Georgia in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia did exist.[312] [313] Another news report by abkhazeti.ru alleged that according to the source, the Russian special services were sending over a hundred Chechens from Vostok Battaliion, loyal to the GRU, to Abkhazia. It was alleged that the Chechens would stage an attack on the Russian peacekeepers and after casualties would happen, the attack would be blamed on Georgia and a full-scale offensive to occupy the Kodori Gorge, Zugdidi and Kutaisi would be launched.[314] [315] Abkhaz foreign minister Sergei Shamba declared that Bagapsh planned to negotiate the opening of the office of the Russian Foreign Ministry in Abkhazia.[316]
On 11 July 2008, Georgian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigol Vashadze called for an immediate UN Security Council session on the conflict zones.[317] A closed meeting was held on 21 July by the U.N. Security Council to review the overflights; however, no resolution was adopted. The "pro-Georgian bias" of some Security Council members was condemned by Russian representative Vitaliy Churkin.[318] [319]
On 11 July 2008, Aleksandr Khramchikhin wrote for Nezavisimaya Gazeta that Georgia's only chance at winning the war was "swift decapitating blow" to neutralize the separatist leadership, which required complete surprise, "so it should be carried out not during the next aggravation of the situation, but, on the contrary, when tension is minimal." Saakashvili knew well that Georgia would finally lose the territories if the war with separatists was lost for the second time.[320]
Former Prime Minister of South Ossetia Oleg Teziev said that South Ossetia refrained from cleansing the Georgian enclaves in the past and now they were "headache", further stating: "South Ossetia set a precedent in the international practice of resolving ethnic conflicts by ending the war without expelling the national minority that participated in the conflict from the opposite side." He claimed that Georgian advance in the previous war was stopped by the South Ossetian threat to detonate the portable nuclear devices in Tskhinvali and Tbilisi.[321]
On 12 July 2008, Javier Solana, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, condemned the Russian overflights and stated that the EU would closely follow the developments. Georgian Foreign Minister Eka Tkeshelashvili said in Riga that the deployment of additional Russian troops into Georgia would be viewed as "direct aggression" and would automatically transform Russian peacekeepers into occupiers.[322]
On 14 July 2008, Georgian deputy defense minister Batu Kutelia said more than 15 percent increase of Georgian army to 37,000 troops was intended to protect Georgian airspace and the Black Sea coast against the Russian aggression.[323]
On 14 July 2008, Nezavisimaya Gazeta (NG) reported that NG had gained a possession of the secret report which was read at a closed session of the State Duma's security committee in the Spring of 2008 and contained an analysis of the situation in Georgia. The report stated that Russia had several options, among them to "passively wait as the process of aggravation of the situation takes place, and to take decisive action by intervening at the stage of armed conflict."[324] Russian political scientist Sergey Markedonov wrote that several journalists had called specific dates of alleged hostilities between Russia and Georgia.[325]
Head of the Government of South Ossetia Yury Morozov told Komsomolskaya Pravda that "we have an excellent aviation" against Georgians, adding that he meant "our, Russian planes". The journalist observed that columns of the Infantry fighting vehicles and tanks were deployed near the Russo-Georgian border, from which march Towards Tskhinvali required half a day.[326]
On 15 July, a spokesman for the Union of Russia and Belarus said Abkhazia and South Ossetia had talked about joining the Union, but that they would need to be recognized as independent and become observers before they could join the Union as members.[327]
On 18 July, Komsomolskaya Pravda reported that the construction of the gas pipeline from Vladikavkaz to Tskhinvali would be completed by the year's end and Georgia was finally losing Tskhinvali.[328]
Source in Sukhumi told Gruziya-Online that the investigation of the Gagra bomb blast was almost finished and 4 suspects were arrested in Abkhazia. 3 of suspects were ethnic Abkhaz and 1 was ethnic Armenian. Two of the suspects were participants of the 1992-1993 war in Abkhazia and were recipients of the Abkhaz awards.[329]
Russian journalist Maxim Kalashnikov wrote that Georgian military attack on Abkhazia and South Ossetia could lead to Russia losing the North Caucasus and the only solution to this problem was the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Kalashnikov stated that Russia's 1991 borders "do not correspond to the interests of security and development of the Russian civilization" and Russia had to begin "reformatting" of the post-Soviet space by solving of the "Georgian question" first.[330] Kalashnikov admitted that Russia was involved in the overthrow of Zviad Gamsakhurdia. Kalashnikov wrote that after the annexation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia had to aid the self-determination of Mingrelians and Adjarians. He noted that pro-western Ossetian activists had emerged who were seeking to separate North Ossetia from Russia and Russia had to act quickly.[331]
According to media reports, Abkhaz militias attacked a Georgian police post using grenades on 19 July 2008; one Abkhaz militiaman died from an accidental explosion of a grenade.[332] Abkhaz officials denied the attack.[333] Georgian media reported on 19 July that a battalion of Russian troops had moved into the lower Kodori Gorge.[334] Source in the Abkhaz armed structure of Gali District, Abkhazia said that Russian troops in the lower Kodori gorge, coordinated by Emzar Kvitsiani, were preparing to launch an attack on the Georgian-controlled part of the gorge.[335] Commenting on alleged Russian deployment to the Kodori Gorge, Abkhazia's Foreign Minister said no new troops entered Abkhazia over the quota.
On 20 July 2008, South Ossetian official media concluded its news report by saying, "But the fact that events in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict zone continue to be one of the most interesting topics for discussion even at the international level, is a good sign that allows us to hope for a positive solution of the issue of freedom and independence of the Republic of South Ossetia in the near future."[336]
Georgian Defense Ministry claimed Russian troops occupied strategic passes of the Main Caucasus Ridge and were battle-ready.[337]
A U.N. report issued on 23 July 2008, describing the period between April and July 2008, noted discrepancies with the Georgian account of a shooting in Khurcha on the day of Georgian elections. In particular the report noted "the fact that the incident was filmed in such a way as to suggest that events were anticipated." The report said Georgian reconnaissance flights violated the ceasefire, but the shooting down of those fights also constituted a breach of the ceasefire. Concerning a military buildup in Abkhazia by Georgia, the UN report said it found no evidence of a buildup, but noted observers were denied access to certain areas, including the Kvabchara Valley.[338] [339]
Russian newspaper Trud reported that if Georgia attacked Tskhinvali, the Russian intervention would most likely come in the form of aerial and artillery support. Anonymous Russian officers were quoted as saying that the scale and nature of the response would be determined by the politicians.[340]
On 25 July 2008, Pavel Felgenhauer wrote that Georgian defense capabilities would be increased in 2009, "therefore today's Tbilisi has no objective interest in initiating a war right now." Felgenhauer stated that Abkhazians and Ossetians would not be able to independently fight in the possible full-scale conflict expected in the near future. Felgenhauer further wrote that Russian military "will have to actually fight and suffer losses almost from the first day, otherwise the self-proclaimed republics will crumble to dust very quickly."[341]
On 25 July 2008, bombing killed one person in Tskhinvali.[342] On 27 July, blast killed one man in Gali District, Abkhazia.[343]
On 27 July 2008, US presidential candidate John McCain said that Vladimir Putin still ruled Russia and Russia was "putting enormous pressure on Georgia in many ways".[344]
Anatoly Barankevich, Secretary of the South Ossetian Security Council, told Nezavisimaya Gazeta that the Russian exercises in the North Caucasus were connected with the situation in the Caucasus. He accused Georgia of financing the Chechen insurgents and of waging an undeclared war against Russia.[345]
On 28 July 2008, the Georgian flag was hoisted on the strategic Sarabuki height by the Georgian Defense Ministry. Later, the Russian command of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF) said peacekeepers and OSCE monitors had been barred by South Ossetians from entering the village of Cholibauri which was close to where Georgia said South Ossetia was building fortifications.[346] South Ossetian armed militias fired at the peacekeepers and OSCE observers.[347] Georgian media reported that Georgian posts on the Sarabuki heights were assaulted by South Ossetian forces overnight and early on 29 July, with no woundings reported.[346] [348] The Georgian village of Sveri was shelled with small arms and rocket-propelled grenades by the South Ossetians on the morning of 29 July.[349] South Ossetian official accused Georgia of opening fire first.[350] The peacekeepers and OSCE observers visited the area near Sveri to investigate an exchange of fire; however, they were fired upon at 10:00.[351] On the late evening of the same day, South Ossetia said due to South Ossetian positions being fortified on the frontier of the conflict zone, two South Ossetian villages had been fired on by Georgian forces in the morning.[352] Georgia reported that Ossetians fired on the Sarabuki height at around 22:00.[353] The South Ossetian Press and Information Committee reported one man as wounded as a result from Georgian attack from Sarabuki height.[354]
On 29 July 2008, South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity declared that the Army of Nagorno-Karabakh was stronger than the Georgian Army. He said that although the South Ossetian army was not equipped according to NATO standards, it was still a force to be reckoned with for the Georgians.[355]
On 29 July 2008, RBK Daily reported that Russia toughened its rhetoric against the United States and a source in the Russian Foreign Ministry threatened that Russia would halt negotiations on "substantial issues of interest to the American side." The source said that Russia was sick of the US "telling us how to behave, with whom to be friends, with whom to fight." American support of Georgia's push to restore its territorial integrity and NATO membership of the former Soviet states were quoted as major reasons behind Russia's escalation.[356]
On 31 July 2008, South Ossetian interior minister Mikhail Mindzaev admitted to building military fortifications in the conflict zone which violated previous agreements. Mindzaev claimed it was in response to similar actions by Georgia.[357] Mindzaev accused Georgia of "creeping annexation".[358] Vladimir Ivanov, Assistant Commander of the JPKF, reported that South Ossetian servicemen hindered the monitoring mission by the JPKF and OSCE observers.[359]
On 3 July, the Russian Federal Security Service border troops staged an exercise near the Georgian border in North Ossetia in which they repelled an armed attack on the Nizhny Zaramag border crossing. Russian Defense and Interior Ministry troops also participated in the simulation. This kind of training was staged for the first time since the 90s.[360]
On 5 July 2008, the Russians began military training, named Caucasus Frontier 2008, in the North Caucasus.[361]
In early July 2008, OSInform Information Agency published several articles where the participation of the Russian army in the future "peace enforcement" operation in Georgia was discussed.[214] [362] [363] One of the articles said that the planned Russian exercises were not accidental and this suggested a military operation on the foreign soil.[362]
On 15 July, the United States and Russia began two parallel military trainings in the Caucasus, though Russia denied that the identical timing was intentional.[364] [365] The Russian exercise was named Caucasus 2008 and units of the North Caucasus Military District, including the 58th Army, took part. The exercise included training to aid peacekeeping forces stationed in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.[366] The Black Sea Fleet and Caspian Flotilla also participated in the exercises.[367] A Russian military spokesman Igor Konashenkov said that the exercise would use around 700 military hardware. He also said, "In connection with the aggravated situation of the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts... we will also work on participation in special operations to bring peace to zones of armed conflicts."[368] [369] The paratroopers from 76th Airborne Division arrived in the North Caucasus on 16 July.[366] Russian Airborne Troops emphasized the fact that the paratroopers were not sent to Abkhazia.[370] Russian Airborne troop detachments arrived in the area near the Roki pass. Posts of logistical and medical supplies were established along the routes of the deployment. The participants in the exercises had an air support.[371] Georgia called the exercises a demonstration of Russian aggression against it.[366] The Georgian Foreign Ministry said in a statement: "Not a single document on conflict resolution authorises Russian armed forces to carry out any kind of activity on the territory of Georgia."[372]
On 18 July, the Roki and Mamisoni Passes on the border with Georgia were taken by 76th Guards Air Assault Division from Pskov and 7th Guards Airborne Division from Novorossiysk.[373] According to Nezavisimaya Gazeta, the fact that the exercises were spread across 11 regions of Russia was an evidence that the number of participating troops were higher than officially declared number. Russian General Yuri Netkachev said that the number of participating soldiers in the Russian exercises was "officially underestimated" to avoid attention of international monitors.[374] The second stage of the Russian exercises, which were a response to US-Georgian exercises, began on 22 July. The Russian fleet would also participate in the exercises.[375] Igor Konashenkov, assistant commander of the North Caucasus Military District, said on 23 July that the exercises gave the Mechanized infantry regiment of the Vladikavkaz division the task of securing the state border near the Roki Pass and all units of the division were deployed to the designated area and replaced the Air Assault battalion of the Pskov division.[376] During exercises, a pamphlet named "Soldier! Know your probable enemy!" was circulated among the Russian soldiers. The pamphlet described the Georgian Armed Forces.[377] The Russian exercises ended on 2 August.[378] Russian troops stayed near the border with Georgia after the end of their exercise on 2 August, instead of going back to their barracks.[379] Later, Dale Herspring, an expert on Russian military affairs at Kansas State University, described the Russian exercise as "exactly what they executed in Georgia just a few weeks later [...] a complete dress rehearsal."
The US exercises were called "Immediate Response 2008" and included servicemen from the United States, Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Armenia.[380] According to the officials, the exercises had been planned months in advance. The exercises were held at the former Russian military base in Vaziani.[381] [382] 127 American participating troops served as trainers in the exercises.[383] [384] Counter-insurgency action was the focal point of the joint exercise. The Georgian brigade was trained to serve in Iraq.[385] A total of 1,630 servicemen, including 1,000 American troops, took part in the exercise, which concluded on 31 July.[386] American troops had already left Georgia when the Russian invasion of Georgia began in August 2008.[387]
On 5 March 2008, Georgia left the Joint Control Commission for Georgian–Ossetian Conflict Resolution and suggested a new negotiation scheme which would include the EU, OSCE and the Sanakoyev government.[379] [388]
On 28 March 2008, the Office of the Georgian State Minister for Reintegration summmoned an international conference "The Role of Non-Governmental Organisations in the Processes of Reintegration in Georgia". The conference was attended by the President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili. Saakashvili announced new initiatives on the Abkhaz conflict, which were a joint free economic zone, Abkhaz representation in the central government and an Abkhaz vice-president, the right to veto all Abkhaz-related decisions, limitless autonomy and various security guarantees.[389] [390] [391] However, the initiatives were dismissed by Abkhaz separatists.[392] [393]
On 17 April 2008, Georgian minister for Euro-Atlantic Integration Giorgi Baramidze said if Abkhazia allowed the return of refugees, then Georgia would sign the treaty on non-use of force.[394]
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Matthew Bryza declared at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute: "Nobody wants such a development of the situation, when Georgian and Russian soldiers will face each other." He said that he did not have an "impression that Georgia is 100 percent right" and added: "Leaders of Georgia also need to work a lot more on peace proposals so that Abkhazians stop feeling fears."[395] Bryza also said that the existing peace formats for Georgia's breakaway regions no longer worked and "we need to rejuvenate [friends'] process." Georgian foreign minister Davit Bakradze said that NATO's promise to consider Georgia's possible accession in December 2008 contributed to Russia's aggressiveness: "this is the window of opportunity: to blow up Georgia in order not to make MAP in December possible."[396]
On 24 April 2008, Georgian president Saakashvili announced that Georgia would discuss with allies how to revise the peacekeeping format and increased involvement of other countries in the peace process because "the presence of the Russian [peacekeeping] contingent there [in Abkhazia and South Ossetia], as well as [Russia’s] recent actions, is a risk factor in the conflict zone."[397]
US Senators Joe Biden and Richard Lugar wrote that NATO's attempt to appease Russia by denying MAP to Georgia and Ukraine failed because in several days Moscow began to establish close ties with Abkhazia and South Ossetia in order to sabotage Saakashvili's peace plan on Abkhazia.[398]
On 30 April 2008, Member of the European Parliament Marie Anne Isler Béguin said that Russian peacekeepers were ineffective and the peacekeeping format should be changed.[399] The EU was asked by Georgia to consider the deployment of European peacekeepers to the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict zone.[400]
Georgian president Saakashvili and President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko issued a joint statement criticizing recent Russian actions. Ukraine announced willingness to participate in the peacekeeping operation in Georgia and approved Saakashvili's new peace plan on Abkhazia.[401]
Members of the Abkhaz parliament adopted a declaration to halt peace negotiations with the US, the UK, France and Germany because the "Group of Friends of the Secretary-General" was biased towards Georgia. In early May, Abkhaz foreign minister Sergei Shamba said that Abkhazia was disappointed in the West and approved the parliament's stance.[402]
On 1 May 2008, United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said that increase in Russian peacekeeping contingent in Abkhazia was unnecessary. On 3 May 2008, Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov said that "plans to pull Georgia into NATO" were to blame for Georgia's "inability to negotiate" on Abkhazia with Russia. He expressed hope that Georgia and "those capitals, which are pulling Georgia in the North Atlantic alliance" would not make "artificial problems in this very sensitive region."[403]
On 1 May 2008, Georgian Finance Minister Nika Gilauri announced that $150 million from the sale of Georgian-issued Eurobonds would be transferred to the Fund of Future Generations, which was intended to finance the development of the former breakaway regions after the restoration of Georgia's territorial integrity.[404]
Georgian and Abkhaz sides were talking about deescalation of tensions in early May. However, each side had different vision, with Georgians focusing on recent peace plan proposed by Saakashvili and the Abkhaz demanding the Georgian withdrawal from the Kodori Gorge and abolition of Georgian sanctions.[163]
On 10 May 2008, Matthew Bryza and the US ambassador to Georgia John F. Tefft met with the Abkhaz leadership. According to Bryza, Georgian drone overflights over Abkhazia were justified.[405]
On 12 May 2008, the Foreign Ministers of Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Sweden and Slovenia visited Georgia. Saakashvili spoke alongside the ministers and presented a Russian leaflet promoting the Sochi Olympics as a proof of Russia's design on Abkhazia. Saakashvili said that Russia's escalation was "a prelude to the act of annexation and act of occupation". Saakashvili said that when Georgia was occupied in 1921, Russia then attacked other European countries; Saakashvili expressed hope that "Europe will never again makes the similar mistake".[406]
On 12 May 2008, President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko and President of Lithuania Valdas Adamkus issued a joint statement supporting the territorial integrity of states, including Georgia.[407]
On 12 May 2008, Georgia's UN envoy Irakli Alasania visited Sukhumi to discuss peace plan with Abkhaz leader Sergei Bagapsh. The peace plan included proposals on the Georgian commitment not to use force and Abkhaz commitment to allow the return of Georgian refugees. Abkhaz foreign minister Sergei Shamba commented that Abkhazia was not completely against this plan. Bagapsh planned to visit Moscow on 19 May to get approval for the Abkhaz-Georgian peace plan.[408]
On 15 May 2008, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution underlining the right of return of all refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) to Abkhazia in addition to their property rights.[409] Russia voted against the Georgian-sponsored resolution.[410] The Russian Foreign Ministry said that Georgian proposal was "a counterproductive step".[411]
On 16 May 2008, Georgian minister for reintegration Temur Iakobashvili arrived in Moscow and proposed to hold an international conference on the settlement of the conflicts. Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov said that the US and the EU involvement indicated that Georgia did not want the real solution to the conflicts.[412]
On 23 May 2008, Temur Iakobashvili said after his visit to Moscow for the discussion of Saakashvili's peace plan that Georgia wanted to revise military peacekeeping formats not because "we are expelling the Russians." He added that "Russia should be one of the parties to the settlement, and not have the exclusive right to peacekeeping." He said that additional Russian troops in Abkhazia were not peacekeepers, but "illegal armed formations." Sources in the administration of the Russian president said that Russian peacekeepers would not leave Abkhazia even if Georgia demanded their withdrawal; instead Russian troops would remain as allied forces per future military agreement with Abkhazia.[413]
In late May 2008, Vladimir Putin said that Saakashvili's peace plan regarding Abkhazia was acceptable.[414] Putin said the plan was "correct", but it needed an approval of Sukhumi. Putin stated that Russia had asked the Abkhaz authorities to allow the return of 55 thousand Georgian refugees.[415]
On 5 June 2008, the European Parliament adopted a resolution which condemned the deployment of Russian forces to Abkhazia and endorsed Georgia's territorial integrity. The resolution called on Russia to pull out those additional forces and stated that the peacekeeping structure should be changed because Russia was no longer an unbiased player. A "deeper European involvement in these frozen conflicts in order to move the peace processes forward" was advised.[416] Russian officials did not comment on the resolution.[417]
On 7 June 2008, Abkhaz president Sergei Bagapsh said after meeting with EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Javier Solana that Abkhazia would never consider the replacement of the Russian peacekeepers because "there is no alternative" and Abkhazia would insist on the continued presence of the Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia. Solana said that Russia had a significant role and there would be no conflict resolution without Russia. A two-day visit to Abkhazia by fifteen EU ambassadors was finished that day.[418] Giorgi Baramidze, the Georgian deputy prime minister and minister on European and Euro-Atlantic integration, said: "Georgia is ready to sign a ceasefire agreement with Abkhazia if it is guaranteed by the European Union." Baramidze said that the loss of Gagra, Sukhumi and most of Abkhazia for Georgia was caused by absence of an effective guarantor of earlier agreements. He added, "We want to carry out our peace plan."[418]
Pro-Russian authorities of South Ossetia announced to have expelled 12 European ambassadors from South Ossetia due to their meeting with pro-Georgian government of South Ossetia on 22 June.[419]
On 23 June 2008, Georgian deputy foreign minister Grigol Vashadze visited Moscow in order to organize a meeting between Georgian and Russian presidents. The Speaker of the Georgian Parliament Davit Bakradze said that Georgian president would discuss the situation in Abkhazia. Bakradze hoped that the situation would improve.[420] Vashadze met with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin and talked about the situation in Abkhazia.[421] On 27 June 2008, Russian newspaper Kommersant reported that Georgia had proposed Russia to divide Abkhazia into Georgian and Russian spheres of influence. Georgian refugees would return to Gali and Ochamchira District and the line of contact would be moved from Enguri river to Kodori river in the north. Russia would win by Georgia's cancelation of bid for the NATO membership. When Abkhazia's leader Sergei Bagapsh arrived in Moscow on 26 June, he also met with Grigory Karasin to discuss this plan.[422] Abkhaz authorities rejected the proposal on Abkhazia's division. Abkhaz official Ruslan Kishmaria suggested that Abkhazia might demand the return of Abkhazia's historical medieval capital Kutaisi.[423] Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov denied that Russia was considering the plan to divide Abkhazia. However, an anonymous source in the Russian Foreign Ministry confirmed the existence of such plan. Later, the Ministry called the report as "deliberate leak of information."[424] [425] The Georgian Foreign Ministry denied the report on proposed spheres of influence in Abkhazia.[426]
On 25 June 2008, Saakashvili met with high-ranking German officials in Berlin to discuss a new peace plan.[427] Chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel met with Saakashvili. She said that Georgia would become a member of the NATO, but NATO membership depended on the settlement of the conflict in Abkhazia. She said that "the Russian peacekeeping mission should continue until new variants can be found in talks" and Germany would also be involved in the peace process.[428] Saakashvili was planning to visit a summit of the leaders of the member parties of the International Democrat Union in Paris.[429]
Patricia Flor, German ambassador to Georgia, was planning to meet with Sergei Bagapsh and other high-ranking officials in Sukhumi on 27 June.[430]
On 28 June 2008, the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE supported Georgia's territorial integrity, with OSCE PA President Göran Lennmarker saying: "We want to find a compromise and a peaceful resolution of this issue."[431] On 30 June, American representative said that the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly urged Russia to respect Georgia's sovereignty by refraining from relations with the governments of the separatist territories.[432]
On 30 June 2008, U.N. Secretary-General’s Group of Friends discussed the Abkhaz conflict in Berlin.[433] A three-part peace plan was announced by German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, according to which a trust-building and the repatriation of around 250,000 refugees to Abkhazia would be followed first by the rebuilding of the infrastructure and then by a settlement of the conflict. Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov, along with U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, endorsed the German plan. Georgian president Saakashvili also accepted the plan.[434]
On 7 July 2008, the United States Department of State called on the central Georgian government and the Abkhaz de facto authorities to resume negotiations. The Department of State also called on Russia to stop "provocative" actions and proposed the deployment of International Police Force to Abkhazia.[435] However, Abkhaz leader Sergei Bagapsh denied the possibility of removal of the Russian peacekeepers. The State Department spokesman also said that Condoleezza Rice would visit Georgia to support a peaceful settlement to the Abkhaz and South Ossetian conflicts.[436] [437]
The visit of OSCE ambassadors and the Danish foreign minister to Georgia began on 7 July, which would last until 9 July and separatists would also be visited.[438]
On 8 July 2008, David Bakradze, chairman of Georgia's parliament, said that he raised the issue of changing the peacekeeping format in Abkhazia with UN envoy Bertrand Ramcharan. He added that if the peacekeeping format did not change, then Georgia would make a unilateral decision regarding the Russian peacekeepers.[439] Ramcharan arrived in Abkhazia on 11 July to negotiate resumption of Abkhaz-Georgian talks.[440]
On 9 July 2008, European diplomats stated 2 criteria for the European Union to become involved in the peacekeeping operation in Abkhazia. These criteria were: security for the foreign personnel and mutual consent from the conflict sides.[441]
On 11 July 2008, the Parliament of Georgia adopted a resolution urging the international community to back Georgian peace proposals. The resolution said, "Otherwise, the Georgian side will be forced to undertake appropriate legal measures in the nearest future for the de-legitimization and for the prompt withdrawal of the armed forces of the Russian Federation from the conflict zones." The Western officials earlier had told Georgian authorities to pause the demand for the removal of the Russian peacekeepers.[442]
On 14 July 2008, Sergei Bagapsh met with special envoy of the German Foreign Ministry for Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the Caucasus, Hans-Dieter Lucas. Peace plan was discussed.[443] On the same day EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus Peter Semneby met with Abkhaz leader Sergei Bagapsh in Sukhumi. Bagapsh said that he studied a draft plan on the settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict that was worked out by the U.N. Secretary-General’s Group of Friends, but he suggested that it was unacceptable for Abkhazia in its current form. Bagapsh stressed that the main condition for resuming the dialogue with Georgia was "the withdrawal of all armed units from the Kodori gorge and the signing of an agreement on non-use of force". He also said that he was "not going to discuss Abkhazia’s status with anyone" because Abkhazia was "an independent, democratic state." Peter Semneby also met with Prime Minister of Abkhazia Alexander Ankvab and foreign minister Sergei Shamba.[444] Sergei Shamba said that "more preparation" was required.[445]
On 14 July, the U.S. Department of State said in a statement it was "deeply troubled" by Russia’s acknowledgement that Russian military plane flew over South Ossetia because "Such actions raise questions about Russia's role as peacekeeper and facilitator of the negotiations and threaten stability throughout the entire region."[446] That day, a special session was held by the OSCE Permanent Council. The need for the resumption of talks regarding peace between Georgian and South Ossetian authorities was hightlighted.[447] On 15 July 2008, NATO said it was concerned by Russian military flights. Russia's peacekeeping and mediating duty was questioned.[448]
German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier met with Secretary-General of the United Nations Ban Ki-moon. Then Steinmeier had a phone conversation with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, who said Russia wanted both Georgia and Abkhazia "to accept obligations not to use force," and the withdrawal of the Georgian forces from the Kodori Gorge.[449]
Georgian president Saakashvili told The Times, "situation is precarious and the things they [Russia] are doing are outrageous. Unfortunately, they are not opposed by the Europeans and other players." When asked about the possibility of war, Saakashvili responded: "The point is that every day we are waking up with some surprises and when sometimes I think it can’t get any worse, then it does get worse."[450] Ronald Asmus wrote that Russia was trying "to provoke Tbilisi into actions that could lead to further Russian military intervention." He also wrote, "In the short term, we need to prevent a conflict from starting this summer." Asmus suggested that Russia would then focus on Crimea.[451]
On 16 July 2008, Georgian National Security Council Secretary Alexander Lomaia said that "polishing" of the new German plan was still needed despite "positive elements" being present there. Lomaia also said that the return of IDPs could not start until the Russian peacekeeping force was pulled out.[452] David Bakradze said that if a German plan for resolving the conflict did not get large support, Georgia would be forced to "unilaterally bring an influence to bear on the deployment of armed forces in Abkhazia."[453]
Russian human rights activists began collecting signatures against the escalation of the Russian-Georgian tensions. They were of the opinion that the conflict was looming to transform into war between the two countries.[454]
On 17 July 2008, the Georgian Foreign Ministry said in a statement that France supported the active involvement of the EU in the process of peaceful settlement of the conflicts in Georgia.[455]
On 17 July 2008, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that the repatriation of refugees to Abkhazia was "entirely unrealistic at this stage", adding "the situation first needs to be improved and trust restored."[456] [457] German Foreign Minister Steinmeier met with his Georgian counterpart Eka Tkeshelashvili in Tbilisi.[458] Steinmeier said in Tbilisi that due to recent multiple incidents, the international community had "growing anxiety" and there were no more "frozen conflicts."[459] Abkhaz foreign minister Sergei Shamba said that Georgia first had to withdraw its troops from Kodori Gorge before Abkhazia would begin negotiations.[460] On the evening of the same day, Saakashvili said at a briefing that there were no plans in Tbilisi to use force to restore control over Abkhazia. Saakashvili called Lavrov's statement on the refugees "shameful" and said that blocking the return of refugees would be "inhumane and barbaric decision."[461] Steinmeier met with Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili in Batumi.[462] Saakashvili said at a joint briefing that the conflicts of the 20th century must be solved with "modern European methods". Steinmeier said that Germany viewed Abkhazia to be Georgia's inalienable part.[463] Steinmeier said that he wanted "a peaceful resolution based on the territorial integrity of Georgia". Sources from the German delegation called the talks with Saakashvili "difficult".[464] The Georgian Foreign Ministry stated on 18 July that Russia was seeking to legalize the results of the Russian-sponsored ethnic cleansing.[465]
On 18 July, Steinmeier met with Abkhaz leader Sergei Bagapsh in Gali.[466] After his meeting with Steinmeier, Bagapsh said that Abkhazia still would not consider German peace proposal and he intended to present his own plan.[462] Chairman of the Georgian Parliament, Davit Bakradze, called the Abkhaz refusal "just a political game" and said that the Russian position would be "decisive".[467] On the same day, Frank-Walter Steinmeier met with Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov. Lavrov suggested an international "road map" on Abkhazia, however, he resisted the German plan since Georgian refugees would return to Abkhazia at the beginning of conflict resolution. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev also received Steinmeier.[468] Medvedev insisted that Georgia must withdraw its forces from the Kodori Gorge otherwise there would be no peace between Georgia and Abkhazia.[469] According to the source of the Russian newspaper Kommersant, Lavrov admitted to Steinmeier that the Georgian withdrawal from the Kodori Gorge was less likely in the near future.[470] American diplomat Matthew Bryza said that Russian and Abkhaz rejection of the German peace plan was alarming.[471]
On 21 July 2008, Russian Newsweek published an article where a source with close links with the Kremlin was quoted as saying that the territorial problems of Georgia could be settled if pro-Russian government came to power in Georgia. Russia viewed the tensions with Georgia as a part of Russia-America confrontation. Sources told Newsweek that the Russian overflight over South Ossetia in early July was sanctioned by Russian president Dmitry Medvedev after consultation with Vladimir Putin. There were indications that Georgia would receive the status of NATO associate member in December 2008, and Russia understood that it was forced to settle the Georgian problem quickly. The Russian Foreign Ministry source said that Irakli Alasania negotiated the meeting between Georgian and Abkhaz presidents in May 2008; however, the interested parties organized the blasts in Abkhazia, which caused this meeting to be cancelled.[472]
On 21 July 2008, REGNUM News Agency reported that the western mediators were proposing to replace Georgian troops in the Kodori gorge with international police force. This force would exclude Russia.[473] Matthew Bryza said that currently there was no need to deploy international force in Abkhazia and the United States was working to establish direct dialogue between Georgian and Abkhaz sides.[474] Abkhaz foreign minister Sergei Shamba said that the replacement of Georgian troops with international force was his initiative.[475]
By 22 July 2008, Georgian intelligence had given the West some proof of Russian military build-up in Abkhazia. The Georgian government stated on 22 July that "the German plan in its present form does not address the proximate cause of the recent, dangerous escalation in the conflict zones: the role and actions of Russia, a central player in degrading security in Georgia." Carl Bildt, Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs, said that Russia's 16 April decision was the culmination of annexation of Abkhazia. On 23 July, Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary of State, stressed that Georgia’s territorial integrity and the return of refugees to Abkhazia were the key principles, and promised that the removal of Russian peacekeepers would be discussed.[476] Russian foreign minister Lavrov told Condoleezza Rice that the return of the refugees to Abkhazia must be postponed to the later phase of the peace settlement. On 24 July, analyst Vladimir Socor criticized the German plan and stated that Germany was more sympathetic towards Russia's position on Georgia's territorial integrity.[477]
On 23 July 2008, the meeting of the EU foreign ministers, after hearing German Foreign Minister Steinmeier's report on Abkhazia, recognized that Russia was a party to the conflict in Georgia.[478]
On 24 July 2008, Matthew Bryza said that Russia "has taken steps that are deeply provocative and have led to some people in Georgia calculating that their only way forward is through escalation, and that is a path that cannot succeed."[479] Bryza arrived in Georgia on 25 July and was planning to visit Sukhumi together with Patricia Flor, German Ambassador to Georgia.[480]
On 25 July 2008, the South Ossetian separatists rejected proposal by the OSCE chairman-in-office Alexander Stubb to hold Georgia-South Ossetia meeting in Helsinki. The separatists had previously refused to participate in talks in Brussels arranged by the EU on 22 July.[481] According to Kommersant, the South Ossetian decision to refuse participation in Brussels talks was coordinated with Moscow.[482]
On 25 July, the Abkhaz separatists met with Matthew Bryza. Bryza declared in Sukhumi that Russia was "more or less" in favor of the German plan approved by the Group of the Friends of the UN Secretary General.[483] Lack of progress in peace settlement alarmed Bryza. Abkhaz officials suggested that the German project was irrelevant to Abkhazia regardless of which country supported it.[484] Bryza tried to persuade the Abkhaz authorities to unanimously agree to talks in Berlin the following week, but Abkhaz officials refused.[485] Later that day, Abkhaz president Sergei Bagapsh hinted that the Abkhaz could meet with the Group of Friends in Berlin. Abkhaz foreign minister Sergei Shamba also said that the Abkhaz "in principle" did not oppose talks in Berlin. However, according to Shamba, Abkhazia would not resume direct negotiations with Georgia's central government.[486] Russian ambassador to UN Vitaly Churkin said that Russia objected to urgent meeting of the UN Secretary General's Group of Friends on Georgia.[487] According to the Jamestown Foundation, the Western involvement "may help steer the process away from the Russian-controlled formats. This is why Moscow encouraged Sukhumi to thwart the German-proposed consultations."[488] Russian editorial opined that the Western initiatives contradicted Russia's interests and the placement of American bases in Abkhazia could lead to the loss of the North Caucasus for Russia.[489] [490]
On 26 July, Matthew Bryza, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, left Sukhumi and arrived in Tbilisi. He said that Georgian and Abkhaz separatist officials must start direct unconditional talks.[491] Georgian Security Council Secretary Alexander Lomaia said after meeting with Bryza that the United States proposed a new peace plan combining elements from Saakashvili, Steinmeier and Rice plans.[492] [493] Bryza denied media reports that he had demanded the Georgian withdrawal from the Kodori Gorge.[494]
On 28 July 2008, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon expressed his concern over the escalation in Abkhazia, which could have "unpredictable consequences for a fragile peace process", and increasing hostility between Russia and Georgia.[495]
On 29 July 2008, Bagapsh said that Abkhazia would never agree to the deployment of the international police force to Abkhazia.[496]
On 30 July 2008, a German Foreign Ministry spokesman said that efforts were made by Germany to organize a meeting between the Georgian and Abkhaz officials. Abkhaz separatists had earlier rejected to attend talks in Berlin scheduled on 30–31 July.[497]
On 31 July 2008, Abkhaz president Sergei Bagapsh said there would be a separate meeting between Abkhazia and the Group of UN Secretary General's Friends on Georgia (the U.K., Germany, Russia, U.S. and France). Bagapsh said that Georgia would hold a separate meeting with the Group. Bagapsh also said, "The meeting was initially planned for July 28–29. However, this didn't suit us. We have settled on August 15–20 for the meeting."[498]
See main article: Timeline of the Russo-Georgian War.
South Ossetian attacks on Georgian positions caused incidents in South Ossetia in early August 2008.[499]
The crisis gave rise on 7 August 2008, when the Georgian villages were shelled several hours after a cease-fire announced by Georgian president Saakashvili. The Georgian army began a military operation against South Ossetian separatists.[500] [501]
On 26 August 2008, Russia recognised Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent republics. The United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy and Sweden did not approve this decision.[502] [503] In response to Russia's recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Georgian government announced that the country severed all diplomatic relations with Russia.[504]
See main article: Post-war Russo-Georgian crisis in 2008-2009.
After the war, a number of incidents occurred in both conflict zones, and tensions between the belligerents remained high. There were expectations that armed hostilities would resume in 2009.